dissenting.
Although I agree with the court’s opinion (Parts I and II, ante) that the applicant’s failure to appeal does not prevent his seeking relief by the writ of habeas corpus, I would defer to the district judge’s factual conclusion that the applicant failed to prove that Judge Baraka prejudged his punishment. I agree with the “Burden of Proof’ portion of Judge Keasler’s opinion (post, at 461-62).
When a judge grants probation and warns the defendant that the court will impose the maximum sentence if the defendant violates the conditions of probation, the judge could be stating for the record a plan to prejudge the outcome of a subsequent hearing of a motion to revoke probation. Or the judge’s statement may be a rhetorical device to impress on the defendant the importance of complying with the conditions. The appellate record of that proceeding may not, and probably will, not show whether the judge’s statement was one or the other.
If, in any such case, the court did impose the maximum sentence when a defendant was proved to have violated the conditions, the sentence does not, by itself, show that there was a prejudgment of punishment. Other facts in the appellate record might call for an appellate court to vacate the sentence and remand the case to the trial court. But if there were no other indications of prejudgment in the appellate record, the question could not be resolved in the appellant’s favor. In such a case, the writ of habeas corpus would be the procedure by which a defendant could go outside the record for additional evidence.
Two types of evidence, in particular, would be useful to the resolution of the issue. First, an examination of other cases could show in what types of cases, and how often, the judge threatened to impose the maximum sentence, and in what types of cases, and how often, the judge actually assessed that punishment. A second source of relevant information beyond the appellate record could be the judge’s own testimony on the issue.
In the convicting court, a successor judge found that Judge Baraka exhibited a pattern of prejudgment of punishment. The judge noted that in several cases, Judge Baraka had told defendants, when placing them on probation, that if they “messed up” he would impose the maximum sentence at their revocation hearing, and that he did so. But from evidence introduced at the hearing, the court found that in this case Judge Baraka imposed the maximum sentence based on what he “learned about the applicant from what was before him during the original plea and revocation hearing.” I believe the record supports the judge’s conclusion.
KEASLER, J., dissenting in which KELLER, P.J., and HERVEY, J., joined.
Brown’s due process claim fails for three reasons: (1) he forfeited any claim of error by his failure to object at trial; (2) he forfeited his claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal; and (3) he fails to satisfy his *459burden of proof. Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent.
Preservation of Error
Brown forfeited this claim of error by failing to object at trial. Just three years ago, in Hull v. State,1 this Court made clear that a claim that a trial judge prejudged the defendant’s sentence is forfeited by the failure to object at trial. Hull was a direct appeal case, but we have indicated that rules regarding preservation of error apply on habeas as well.2 The majority attempts to distinguish this case from Hull on the grounds that, in Hull, the defendant “was fully aware of the court’s policy ... and did not object,” while in this case, the judge imposed the maximum sentence “without any explanation for its basis.”3
But the majority itself disagrees with this statement. Later in its opinion, the majority summarizes the facts as follows: “Judge Baraka promised applicant at the original plea hearing that he would impose the maximum punishment of 20 years if applicant failed to report to his probation officer. He reminded applicant at the adjudication hearing of this earlier colloquy, and applicant agreed “You said you’d give me twenty years’ if applicant failed to report to his probation officer. Judge Bara-ka then sentenced applicant to 20 years imprisonment, exactly as he had previously promised.”4 Based on this rendition of the record, Brown was “fully aware” that Judge Baraka was sentencing him to 20 years because of an earlier promise. As a result, he could have objected.
Indeed, Brown himself recognizes this. He contends that the trial court violated his due process rights “by failing to and/or refusing to consider the full range of punishment by sentencing petitioner using a predetermined sentencing procedure.” He quotes pages from the record where Judge Baraka says such things as, “You’re not asking me to do anything but what I said, aren’t you? I told you what I was going to do if you did this, didn’t I? You remember that long conversation I had when I put you on probation? I told you what I’ll do about it if you did.” 5 Brown argues that this record “reflects Judge Baraka made good on a promise in which petitioner did not have anything to say about the punishment. Without considering any evidence, not considering the full range of punishment.” 6 He also complains that counsel failed to object to the court’s predetermined sentencing procedures, “especially when Judge Baraka repeatedly made it clear that he would sentence petitioner according to a promise he made in 1989.”7 There is no reason why Brown could not have objected.
The majority also finds that an objection was not necessary because in this case, “as with many ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the trial record, by itself, is not necessarily adequate for the defendant to object and present a valid constitutional claim at the time of the conduct.”8 With this statement, the majority confuses two different points of law. We have held that, when a defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial *460record may be inadequate to resolve his claim.9 This is not the same as holding that the defendant need not object to errors occurring at trial. Regardless of whether a record is adequate to resolve a claim, objections are still required to preserve trial errors. Of course, a defendant need not object to receiving ineffective assistance of counsel, since that would be impossible — it would require a deficiently-performing lawyer to lodge an objection against his own performance. A claim of prejudgment of sentence is obviously different. It is not impossible to object to this error.
Finally, excusing Brown’s failure to object creates an odd loophole in the law.’ If litigants have to object to obtain relief on direct appeal, but do not have to object to obtain relief on habeas, then those who fail to object will simply bypass direct appeal and seek relief on habeas. But if the claim need not be raised on direct appeal, then Hull’s holding requiring an objection becomes meaningless.
I believe an objection was required to preserve this error and Brown’s failure to do so waived it.
Appellate Remedy
Brown also forfeited this claim by fading to raise it on direct appeal. We have long held that “[t]he Great Writ should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on appeal.”10 We recently reiterated in Ex parte Townsend11 that “even a constitutional claim is forfeited if the applicant had the opportunity to raise the issue on appeal” and failed to do so.
The majority concludes that this case qualifies as an “exception in which a habe-as applicant may raise his due process claim for the first time by writ of habeas corpus. As with the vast majority of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the trial record is insufficient to allow an appellate court to resolve the issue.”12 With this, the majority creates an exception that swallows the rule.
The exception to which the majority refers was first articulated in Ex parte Torres.,13 We were addressing the rule that “a claim which was previously raised and rejected on direct appeal is not cognizable on habeas corpus.”14 We concluded that “this doctrine should not be applied where direct appeal cannot be expected to provide an adequate record to evaluate the claim in question, and the claim might be substantiated through additional evidence gathering in a habeas corpus proceeding.” 15
We then explained in some detail why a claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel came within this exception:
In most instances, the record on direct appeal is inadequate to develop an ineffective assistance claim. Moreover, the inadequacy of the appellate record in these situations is due to the inherent nature of most ineffective assistance claims. The very ineffectiveness claimed may prevent the record from containing the information necessary to substantiate such a claim. Moreover, *461the trial record ordinarily does not reflect counsel’s reasons for doing or failing to do actions of which the defendant complains. While expansion of the record may be accomplished in a motion for new trial, that vehicle is often inadequate because of time constraints and because the trial record has generally not been transcribed at this point. Further, mounting an ineffective assistance attack in a motion for new trial is inherently unlikely if trial counsel remains counsel during the time required to file such a motion. Hence, in most ineffective assistance claims, a writ of habeas corpus is essential to gathering the facts necessary to adequately evaluate such claims.16
Since then, we have only applied the Torres exception to claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel,17 although we have expanded it to include situations in which the applicant fails to raise the claim on direct appeal.18
The majority applies the Torres exception to this case because, according to the majority, in this case “the trial record is insufficient to allow an appellate court to resolve the issue.”19 The problem with this rationale is that it considers this case individually instead of considering prejudgment claims generally. That is, the Torres exception should not be applied every time a particular litigant is unable to prove his claim on direct appeal. Instead, it should be limited to categories of claims which, as a whole, may not be proved on direct appeal. Otherwise, it will be applied whenever a defendant has a claim which is not supported by the trial record, and the Torres exception will completely swallow the Banks and Acosta rules.
Our courts of appeals have made clear that a claim regarding prejudgment of sentence,20 even one concerning Judge Baraka himself,21 may be considered (and found meritorious) on direct appeal. If those records were adequate to evaluate a prejudgment claim, then this one is, too. As a result, the Torres exception should not apply to a claim regarding prejudgment of sentence. Therefore, Brown procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal.
Burden of Proof
Finally, Brown fails to satisfy his burden of proof. We have repeatedly held that the burden of proof in a habeas application is on the applicant to prove his factual allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.22 But today, the majority puts the burden of proof on the State to show that Judge Baraka did not prejudge the sen*462tence. The majority presumes that prejudgment occurred in the face of no evidence to the contrary.23 But it is Brown’s job to produce evidence that demonstrates prejudgment by a preponderance of the evidence. It is not the State’s job to prove that no prejudgment occurred.
The majority concedes that, when we remanded this application, “the bare record could [have] supported] a finding of punishment prejudgment ... [but] there might also [have] be[en] other reasons, not apparent on the record, which would [have] explained] Judge Baraka’s sentence.” 24 So at that time, Brown had not satisfied his burden of proof. He had shown a possibility of prejudgment, but he had not shown prejudgment by a preponderance of the evidence. Then, at the evidentiary hearing on remand, the majority concedes, “Judge Baraka forthrightly acknowledged that he could not remember anything about this case.”25 Obviously, then, Brown was still unable to satisfy his burden of proof after the remand.
The majority finds significance in the fact that Judge Baraka testified that he “would have considered mitigating evidence in deciding whether to revoke probation.” 26 The majority says that this testimony “tells us nothing ... about whether Judge Baraka carried through on his original promise to applicant to impose the maximum sentence....”27 This is true. And as a result, Brown fails to satisfy his burden of proof. As noted, Judge Baraka remembered nothing about this particular case. The fact that Judge Baraka testified that he “would have considered mitigating evidence in deciding whether to revoke probation” does not mean that Judge Bar-aka would not have considered mitigating evidence in deciding what sentence to impose. Nothing in Judge Baraka’s testimony demonstrates that he prejudged Brown’s sentence.
Brown fails to satisfy his burden of proof, and the majority errs in placing the burden of proof on the State instead of Brown.
Conclusion
Brown forfeited any claim of error by failing to object at trial. He forfeited his claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. And he fails to satisfy his burden of proof. Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent. I also note that, despite the majority’s reference to ineffective assistance claims, the majority does not reach Brown’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Neither do I. The majority grants Brown relief on his prejudgment claim, and I dissent to that holding.
. 67 S.W.3d 215 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).
. Ex parte Pena, 71 S.W.3d 336, 337 (Tex. Crim.App.2002).
. Ante, op. at 453 n. 3.
. Id. at 456.
. Writ record at 4.
. Id.
. Id. at 452.
. Ante, op. at 453 n. 3.
. Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. Crim.App.1997).
. Ex parte Banks, 769 S.W.2d 539, (Tex. Crim.App.1989); Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.Crim.App.1978).
. 137 S.W.3d 79, 81 (Tex.Crim.App.2004).
. Ante, op. at 453.
. 943 S.W.2d at 475.
. Ex Parte Acosta, 672 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. Crim.App.1984).
. Torres, 943 S.W.2d at 475.
. Id. (internal citations omitted).
. Ex Parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 49, n. 1, 2004 WL 2179272 *1 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 130-31 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Ex parte Varelas, 45 S.W.3d 627, 630 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813-14 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999).
. White, 160 S.W.3d at 49, n. 1, 2004 WL 2179272 *1 n. 1.
. Arafó, op. at 453.
. Howard v. State, 830 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, pet. ref’d).
. Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1993, pet. dism’d); Jefferson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref d).
. Ex parte Thomas, 906 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. Crim.App.1995); see also Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Ex parte Salinas, 660 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Ex parte McWilliams, 634 S.W.2d 815, 818-19 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Ex parte Alexander, 598 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Ex parte Sanders, 588 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Ex parte Rains, 555 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
.Ante, op. at 456 (“Judge Baraka’s testimony does not support the conclusion that he did not prejudge applicant’s punishment.”; "There is nothing in this record to suggest that applicant’s case falls into the .8% of the cases that Judge Baraka did not follow his normal routine.”); at 456 ("There is nothing in the habeas record on remand which con-
. Id. at 452.
. Id. at 455.
. Id.
. Id.