dissenting.
I dissent to the majority opinion since it appears to be contrary to our hoped for aim of judicial economy.
The majority opinion treats the action of the trial court as simply the denial of a motion to dismiss and applies principles applicable to such motions.
It is clear that more than this was involved. The opening statement in the appellee’s brief is that “appellant’s motion to dismiss was properly treated as a motion for summary judgment since matters of record were considered by the court.” Appellee then cites principles of law applicable to motions for summary judgment.
The appellants point out in their brief that there were four sets of interrogatories propounded and answered; twenty-eight depositions were taken; and there were two lengthy hearings before the Personnel Review Board. From the pleadings and the voluminous evidence in this record this Court should treat the matter as the parties have treated it, i.e., the overruling of a motion for summary judgment, and proceed in the interest of judicial economy to reach the legal issues presented in this case. That was our apparent reason for granting certiorari.
The overriding and principal issue is whether or not the defendants are legally immune from a suit for libel and slander under the circumstances of this case and whether or not the plaintiffs constitutional rights have been violated.
Therefore, it is my opinion that this Court should at the present time consider and decide these issues rather than return the case to the trial court with these issues undecided. It will be only a matter of time before the case is returned to this Court presenting the identical issues for resolution.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Marshall and Justice Weltner concur in this dissent.