dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The heart of this controversy is one not of law, but of economic advantage, translated through the political process into a statute of this State.
I see no difference in the market struggles reflected in the “Georgia Motion Picture Fair Competition Act,” Code Ann. Ch. 106-13, and in the old Milk Control Law (Ga. L. 1937, p. 247) which was struck down by our Court over thirty years ago in Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561 (67 SE2d 692) (1951). There we held: “The right to contract, and for the seller and purchaser to agree upon a price, is a property right protected by the due process clause of our Constitution, and unless it is a business ‘affected with a public interest,’ the General Assembly is without authority to abridge that right.” 208 Ga. at 564.
Is the elimination of “blind-bidding,” as proscribed by this Act more critical to the welfare of Georgians than an adequate supply of wholesome milk?
Are purchasing procedures more affected with a public interest than pricing structures?
I fail to see wherein the competitive struggles of motion picture distributors and exhibitors are “affected with a public interest” to *258any greater degree than similar struggles of other producers and consumers. “For an industry or any particular business to become ‘affected with a public interest,’ its business or property must be so applied to the public as to authorize the conclusion that it has been devoted to a public use and thereby its use, in effect, granted to the public.” 208 Ga. at 564.
Will anyone seriously suggest that the film industry is “devoted” to the citizens of Georgia, and “its use granted to the public?”
Further, I most decidedly fail to see wherein the taxpayers should be called upon to pay the costs of carrying a brief for either side, as they have done in this case.
The approval by the majority of a “fair competition act” relative to a designated industry presents a major danger for the future. We have now invited all the special interests of Georgia to draft their own “fair competition” acts, which will without doubt strive to preserve and enhance every present competitive advantage, and to create new ones denied them by a free market. We have also assured these interests that, if their lobbying efforts be successful, the taxpayers will thenceforth pay their legal fees and court costs necessary to uphold the legislative product of their labors.
We have opened a door which should remain permanently barred.
The majority seeks to disregard the constitutional protections declared in Harris v. Duncan by suggesting that it is limited in its scope only to legislation which fixes consumer prices. While it is true that the legislation struck down in that case was price-fixing in nature, our Constitution cannot be so constricted.
Can we fail to recognize that the final result of all competitive advantage is price? Can we deny that this intrusion into an industry will affect bargaining power,.and, of necessity, price?
What our Constitution prohibits is not just the regulation of price, but any intrusion into the private affairs of individuals regulating their activities where no state interest is involved.
Because Harris v. Duncan should be dispositive of this case, I need not allude here to the questions which this statute raises relative to our Constitutional right of free speech.