Defendant was convicted of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, ORS 167.207. On appeal to the Court of Appeals he assigned as error the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized in a search of his apartment pursuant to a search warrant, based upon the affidavit of a police officer which stated that one Marshall Edward Morton had "contacted” the officer and informed him that while he (Morton) was in defendant’s apartment he saw a large quantity of what he was able to identify as marijuana, as well as a large quantity of a white powdery substance which defendant represented to be cocaine and offered to sell to Morton.
Defendant contended that "the affidavit [in support of the application for search warrant] was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the magistrate,” in that neither the credibility of the informant nor the reliability of his information was established in the affidavit, as required by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108, 84 S Ct 1509, 12 LEd 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 US 410, 89 S Ct 584, 21 LEd 2d 637 (1969).
The Court of Appeals rejected that contention (38 Or App 363, 590 P2d 274 (1979)), holding that an informant’s reliability is sufficiently established for the purposes of such an affidavit when, as in this case, he is named and his information comes from personal observation, citing its previous decisions in State v. Poteet, 9 Or App 231, 495 P2d 783, rev. den., (1972); State v. Poole, 11 Or App 55, 500 P2d 726, rev. den., (1972), and State v. Bidwell, 14 Or App 679, 514 P2d 559, rev. den., (1974). We allowed defendant’s petition for review in order that this court may consider the intrinsic sufficiency of such an affidavit to support a search warrant.1
*362Both Aguilar v. Texas, supra, and Spinelli v. United States, supra, involved the sufficiency of search warrants based upon affidavits stating facts supplied by anonymous, unnamed informants. The test established by Aguilar-Spinellito be applied in determining the sufficiency of such affidavits is the following "two pronged” test:
1. The affidavit must set forth informant’s "basis of knowledge.”
2. The affidavit must set forth facts showing the informant’s "veracity,” either by showing:
a. The informant is credible, or
b. That his information is reliable.2
This case involves the "veracity prong.”
The difference between the "credibility spur” and the "reliability spur” of the "veracity prong” has been stated as follows:
"Unless the alternative phraseology of Aguilar is meaningless, the informant’s 'credibility’ would seem to involve his inherent and ongoing character as a person — his reputation and demonstrated history of honesty and integrity. Informational 'reliability,’ as something separate from its source’s credibility, would seem to involve some circumstances assuring *363trustworthiness on the particular occasion of the information’s being furnished. * * *” Moylan, 25 Mercer L. Rev. at 757-58.3
A distinction is recognized, however, in the application of these requirements to cases in which search warrants are based upon affidavits setting forth facts supplied by named "citizen-informers,” as distinguished from paid or protected, anonymous and unnamed police informants.
Thus, the "citizen-informer” is distinguished from the ordinary "police informer” in 1 Lafave, Search & Seizure, § 3.3, p. 499 (1978), as follows:
"Everyone who gives information to the police might be called an 'informant’ in the broad sense of that word. 'But the person most of us have in mind when we discuss this subject is in a somewhat more restricted category. He is likely to be a person in the underworld or a person on its periphery; in its confidence, or so much 'a part of the scenery’ to the criminal that this person is in a particularly good position to know the story of a crime committed, the story of criminal business done, being transacted or proposed for the future; or at least he gets significant bits of information which, when placed in context by the investigator, will demonstrate an accurate picture of crime.’ It is this type of person to which the word 'informant’ is intended to apply herein.
"This narrower interpretation of the word is necessary in this context, for the courts have quite properly drawn a distinction between such a person and the average citizen who by happenstance finds himself in the position of a victim of or a witness to criminal conduct and thereafter relates to the police what he knows as a matter of civic duty.”
To the same effect, as stated in Harney & Cross, The Informer in Law Enforcement 40 (2d ed. 1968):
"On the probable cause issue, courts quite properly have drawn a distinction between such a person and the average citizen who by happenstance finds himself in the position of a victim of or a witness to *364criminal conduct and thereafter relates information to the police as a matter of civic duty. One who qualifies as the latter type of individual, sometimes referred to as a 'citizen-informer,’ is more deserving of a presumption of reliability than the informant from the criminal milieu.”
As Justice Harlan noted (in his dissenting opinion) in United States v. Harris, 403 US 573, 599 (1971),
"[T]he ordinary citizen who has never before reported a crime to the police may, in fact, be more reliable than one who supplies information on a regular basis. 'The latter is likely to be someone who is himself involved in criminal activity or is, at least, someone who enjoys the confidence of criminals.’ ”
As stated in Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L. Rev. 741, 769-72 (1974):
"The typical paid or protected police informant— drawn from the criminal milieu — is almost universally viewed with a jaundiced eye. He is inherently suspect. He hides behind a cloak of anonymity. His information — just as the testimony of an accomplice — is looked upon with a healthy skepticism and is examined with great scrutiny. The citizen-informer — with no ax to grind and motivated by civic duty — is in stark contrast * *
******
" 'Veracity,’ rather, in one or the other of its disjunctive manifestations Vi e., credibility or reliability], flows from the very status of the citizen-informer.”
In accord with these distinctions, probably most courts which have considered this problem have held that an affidavit naming a "citizen informant” as the source of the information set forth in the affidavit sufficiently satisfies the "veracity” requirement of Aguilar-Spinelli, without setting forth further facts showing that such an inf ormant was "credible” or that his information was "reliable.” See, e.g., opinion by Friendly, J., in United States v. Burke, 517 F2d 377 (2d Cir 1975); Cundiff v. United States, 501 F2d 188 (8th *365Cir 1974); United States v. Bell, 457 F2d 1231 (5th Cir 1972); Woods v. State, 533 SW2d 16 (Tex Crim App 1976); State v. Drake, 224 NW2d 476 (Iowa 1974); State v. Lindquist, 295 Minn 398, 205 NW2d 333 (1973); State v. Paszek, 50 Wis 2d 619, 184 NW2d 836 (1971); People v. Glaubman, 175 Colo 41, 485 P2d 711 (1971); State v. Northness, 20 Wash App 551, 582 P2d 546 (1978).
Some other courts have held that identification of a citizen informant does not of itself satisfy the requirement of "veracity,” and that the affidavit must also affirmatively set forth the circumstances from which the status of the named informant as a "citizen informant” can be inferred by the magistrate in issuing the search warrant. See People v. Smith, 17 Cal 3d 845, 132 Cal Rptr 397, 553 P2d 557 (1976). See also Commonwealth v. Stokes, 480 Pa 38, 389 A2d 74 (1978).
Still other courts have held that when it affirmatively appears that the person named in the affidavit was not a disinterested "citizen informant,” but was a possible accomplice or participant in the crime, such a person was not entitled to a presumption of reliability. See United States v. Pincus, 450 F Supp 66 (WD Pa 1978); Wilson v. State, 314 A2d 905 (Del 1973). See also People v. Trontell, 188 Colo 253, 533 P2d 1124 (1975).
Also, according to LaFave, supra, at § 3.4, p. 599:
"It does not follow from what has been said above that if the name of the person providing the information is disclosed, then he is by virtue of that fact alone properly characterized as a citizen-informer entitled to the presumption of reliability. 'That a person is named is not alone sufficient grounds on which to credit an informer, but it is one factor which may be weighed in determining the sufficiency of an affidavit.’” (Emphasis added)
In this case, however, there is another "factor” in addition to the naming of the informant in the affidavit in this case which entitled this named informant to *366the presumption of veracity. Also, this is not a case in which it appears on the face of the affidavit that the named informant was himself a participant or accomplice in the criminal acts or in which other facts appeared on the face of the affidavit reflecting adversely upon the reliability of the named informant.
The affidavit of the police officer in this case stated as follows:
" That on January 17, 1978 at approximately 9:00 p.m., I was contacted by Marshall Edward Morton, 1037 W. 4th Ave., Apt. #29, Eugene, Lane County, Oregon during the course of a burglary investigation. That Marshall Edward Morton advised me of the following:
"That on January 16, 1978 from approximately 8:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. Marshall Edward Morton was present, with permission, in an apartment at 1522 W.
6th Ave., Apt. #5, Eugene, Lane County, Oregon. That Marshall Edward Morton had personal knowledge that 1522 W. 6th Ave., Apt. #5, Eugene, Lane County, Oregon is presently occupied by and rented by a person known to Marshall Edward Morton to be Terry Edward Montigue.
"That while present at 1522 W. 6th Ave., Apt. #5, Eugene, Lane County, Oregon on January 16, 1978 from approximately 8:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. Marshall Edward Morton observed a large quanity (sic) of a green vegetable material that Marshall Edward Morton was able to identify as the narcotic drug marijuana. Marshall Edward Morton also observed a large quantity of a white powdery substance which Terry Edward Montigue represented to be the narcotic drug cocaine which Marshall Edward Morton could purchase for one hundred dollars per gram.
"That Marshall Edward Morton has been shown marijuana on numerous occasions by numerous persons who used the narcotic drug marijuana and Marshall Edward Morton is familiar with the narcotic drug marijuana and can identify it in its processed form.
"That in my discussions with Marshall Edward Morton I have further learned that he is capable of *367identifying the narcotic drug marijuana through casual use.” (Emphasis added)
In Oregon, by reason of ORS 162.375, it is a crime to initiate a false report to a law enforcement agency. Also, a person who does so may be liable for damages in a civil action for malicious prosecution. Cf. Rose v. Whitbeck, 278 Or 463, 564 P2d 671 (1977). Finally, by revealing his name, and by thus exposing his identity, an informant may more likely be called as a witness so as to be exposed to the penalties of perjury in the event that his testimony is contrary to the facts stated in the affidavit.
The affidavit in this case states not only the name of the informant, but that he (the informant) "contacted” the police officer within 24 hours of the event in question and "advised” the officer of the fact that he was present in defendant’s apartment "with permission” for a period of only 30 minutes; that while he was there he observed not only a substance which he believed to be marijuana, but also a substance which defendant represented to be cocaine and offered to sell to him.
We hold that from these facts, taken as a whole, the magistrate could properly infer that Mr. Morton "initiated” the report of a crime to a law enforcement agency which, if false, would subject him to punishment under ORS 162.375, as well as to possible liability in damages for malicious prosecution and further punishment for perjury if subsequently called as a witness and that, for these reasons, this named informant was sufficiently credible and his information sufficiently reliable so as to provide a proper basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
We hold that the facts stated in the affidavit in this case were sufficient to support the issuance of the search warrant and that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the decision by the Court of Appeals.
Affirmed.
Defendant’s petition for review is limited to the question of the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress because of the claimed insufficiency
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of the affidavit to support the search warrant and does not question the decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the denial by the trial court of defendant’s supplementary motion to controvert the affidavit.
Although, as a result, the decision by that court on that question is not before this court on this petition for review, we note that the Court of Appeals, in support of its holding that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to controvert, quoted from the Commentary, Oregon Criminal Procedure Code § 168 at 107 (1968) as stating that "the defendant may challenge the good faith but not the objective truth of testimony in support of probable cause * * *.” We also note, however, that this comment was made with reference to the terms of that section of the Oregon Criminal Procedure Code [final draft], but that the Oregon Legislature, in adopting what is now ORS 133.693 expressly provided that defendant may contest the "good faith, accuracy and truthfulness of the affiant as to the evidence presented before the issuing authority,” but may do so "only upon supplementary motion * *
Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L. Rev. 741 (1974).
Moylan, supra, note 2, at 757-58.