dissenting.
Because I believe the trial judge correctly decided in Freeman’s favor the issue of its obligation to indemnify Interface for its liability to GWCC, I must respectfully dissent.
As acknowledged by the majority, Ackridge has been paid workers’ compensation benefits on behalf of Freeman, her statutory employer, and there is no longer the possibility of any “liabilities, suits and claims” arising from this accident which could legally be attributable to Freeman’s negligence.
Additionally, Ackridge dismissed her claim against Interface, *47also her statutory employer, on November 23, 1994, and in the consolidated pretrial order filed with the court on December 30, 1994, and consented to by all parties, Ackridge’s claim is stated as: ££[w]hile in the course and scope of her employment, Plaintiff was travelling on a motorized-scooter across the Georgia World Congress Center F Marshalling yard area, when she was seriously injured. A rope, which had been secured across the roadway by employees of the Defendant [GWCC], caught her by the throat and threw her to the pavement. Unknown to the Plaintiff, employees of the Georgia World Congress Center had stretched a rope across the roadway in such a fashion that it was not visible to those using the roadway and without warning of the dangerous condition created.” (Emphasis supplied.)
On July 10, 1995, plaintiff Ackridge reiterated her position that “the only evidence of negligence in this case rests squarely with the Georgia World Congress Center.”
While the majority suggests a theoretical possibility that a question of fact exists as to whether Freeman knew about the rope and did not advise its employees, that possibility is negated by plaintiff Ackridge’s stated position in the litigation at hand which is an admission in judicio. O’Brien Family Trust v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 218 Ga. App. 379, 381 (2) (461 SE2d 311) (1995); Plunkett v. Ginsburg, 217 Ga. App. 20 (456 SE2d 595) (1995). Additionally, the only duty which Freeman had for any such warning was to its employee Ackridge, not to Interface or GWCC, and she has been compensated as far as Freeman and Interface are concerned by workers’ compensation.
Further, “£ ££[t]he scope of . . . indemnity provisions . . ., manifested in the form of written contracts, is a question of law for the court.” (Cit.)’ Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Williams, 183 Ga. App. 845, 846 (2) (360 SE2d 411) (1987).” Tokheim Corp. v. First American Bank &c., 206 Ga. App. 105, 107 (1) (424 SE2d 54) (1992). In so considering a contract of indemnification, the court construes it strictly against the indemnitee, here Interface. DeKalb County v. Lenowitz, 218 Ga. App. 884, 889 (4) (463 SE2d 539) (1995); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra at 847 (2).
The cases relied upon by the majority for its interpretation of “arising from the misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance of the indemnifying party” are also inapposite to an indemnity. Rather, both Abercrombie, supra, and Southeastern Fidelity, supra, are both cases involving interpretation of automobile insurance policies, which are construed in a broad, not strict, sense.
In the context of this case, at the time the order appealed was entered, there was no claim against Freeman for negligence, only one against GWCC. Interface’s liability for GWCC’s negligence was solely premised on the broad language of its indemnity agreement with GWCC, under which Interface would be responsible for GWCC’s own *48negligence.
Decided June 28, 1996 Johnson & Kane, Frederick A. Johnson, for appellant. Harman, Owen, Saunders & Sweeney, Timothy J. Sweeney, Greene, Buckley, Jones & McQueen, Harold S. White, Jr., J. Russell Phillips, Howard K. Henson, for appellee.Therefore, I conclude that the trial court properly interpreted the indemnity language and her ruling should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Beasley, Judge Johnson and Judge Smith join in this dissent.