concurring specially.
While I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel, I cannot concur with the rationale set forth by the majority to the extent that the majority’s opinion can be read to hold that an exception to the *346confidentiality of the peer review proceedings is not triggered by a “violation of this article” alleging that an individual peer review group member was motivated by malice in his peer review activity. This Court must construe these statutes so as to give meaning to every phrase, including the “exception” language in OCGA § 31-7-133 (a). See generally Boyles v. Steine, 224 Ga. 392, 396 (162 SE2d 324) (1968). While I agree the statute bestows on certain individuals immunity from criminal and civil liability arising out of their performance of peer review activities, the statute also contains an exception created by the legislature to accommodate those persons adversely affected by peer review activity motivated by malice. See OCGA § 31-7-132 (a). In such “proceedings alleging [a] violation of this article,” i.e., malicious abuse of the peer review process, the otherwise shielded information is rendered discoverable. OCGA § 31-7-133 (a).
Decided July 11, 1994. Jerry B. Hatcher, for appellants.The purpose of OCGA § 31-7-133 is to “ensure effectiveness and competence of health organizations by providing an atmosphere for candor and constructive criticism within the organization,” a purpose which can only be accomplished “by protecting professional peers’ opinions and findings as to the competence or performance of members and employees.” Cobb County Kennestone Hosp. Auth. v. Martin, 208 Ga. App. 326, 327 (430 SE2d 604) (1993). It does not serve “the goal of encouraging medical staff candor,” id., to apply the discovery bar in OCGA § 31-7-133 to those claims asserting malicious use of a health organization’s peer review activities as to the very members and employees whose competence and performance such peer review organizations are designed to oversee.
Accordingly, I can agree with the majority’s implicit holding that evidence directly related to the matters raised in the peer review proceeding (as opposed to original source evidence) is not discoverable insofar as that holding applies to individuals, such as medical malpractice plaintiffs, whose liability claims are not based upon damages occasioned by maliciously motivated peer review activities. Because the Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that Butler maliciously used his “positional privilege” as a person charged with reporting nurses’ concerns about doctors to Piedmont Hospital’s peer review organization to interfere intentionally with appellants’ business relations, Freeman v. Piedmont Hosp., 209 Ga. App. 845, 848 (434 SE2d 764) (1993), I would apply the exception in OCGA § 31-7-133 (a) to the instant case and would find that appellants were entitled to the discovery sought.
*347Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Sidney F. Wheeler, M. B. Satcher III, for appellees.