-Plaintiff, a physician and member of the Negro race, appeals from a judgment for defendant on the pleadings in an action for injunctive relief under sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code.1
Plaintiff alleges that the defendant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of California; *881that it is engaged in the business of constructing and operating rental housing projects, and particularly the “Barrington Plaza ’ ’ in the City of Los Angeles; that in the development of Barrington Plaza defendant received public assistance and the state was involved in the project; that defendant denied to plaintiff the rental of an apartment in Barrington Plaza solely because of plaintiff’s race; that plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to compel defendant to lease an apartment to him, and that plaintiff will suffer irreparable damage if not permitted to lease or occupy an apartment at Barrington Plaza.
The answer admits that defendant is generally engaged in the business alleged, but denies the operative portions of the complaint. Issues were drawn when plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction and supported the motion with the declaration of one Ed Cray. The Cray declaration, which we must deem as undisputed, sets out that defendant received a $17,000,000, low interest rate loan under the National Housing Act to construct Barrington Plaza; that such sum represents 90 percent of the construction costs of the plaza; that the development is a part of the urban redevelopment program undertaken by the City of Los Angeles; that Barrington Plaza is the largest apartment development in the western United States, providing apartment living for 2,500 people; that it includes many retail shops and professional services within its self-contained facilities; that it provides a fall-out shelter, completely stocked by the federal government with emergency supplies; that the plaza replaced private homes of both Caucasians and non-Caucasians; that the city effected zoning changes to accommodate the development; that the defendant’s securities were sold, its construction contracts were let, its building permits were issued and its shops and professional services established all pursuant to state or local approval, cooperation and authority.
At the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings. It was stipulated that the Cray declaration would serve to limit the extent of public assistance and state involvement alleged in the complaint. The motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted on the ground that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient *882to constitute a cause of action by reason of article I, section 26, of the California Constitution. That section provides in pertinent part: “Neither the State nor any subdivision thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.” “Persons” are defined to include “corporations,” and “real property” is defined to include an apartment of the type here involved.
We have concluded today in Mulkey v. Reitman, ante, p. 529 [50 Cal.Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825], that article I, section 26, is, in its entirety, an unconstitutional infringement of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The circumstances in the Mulkey case are indistinguishable from the instant circumstances except that in the instant case there is conceded evidence of the fact that both the federal government, through its substantial financial assistance to defendant, and the state and municipal governments, through their participation in effecting urban redevelopment, are farther significantly involved in the discriminatory acts. The “state action” which was evident in Mulkey without this facet of state participation is thus even more positively identified in the instant case. (See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 [81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45].)
For the foregoing reasons the trial court was not justified in relying upon article I, section 26, in concluding that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed.
Traynor, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Burke, J., concurred.Civil Code, section 51, provides as follows: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. ’ ’
Section 52 of the Civil Code provides as follows: “Whoever denies, or who aids, or incites such denial, or whoever makes any discrimination, *881distinction or restriction on account of color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin, contrary to the provisions of Section 51 of this code, is liable for each and every such offense for the actual damages, and two hundred fifty dollars ($250) in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the right provided in Section 51 of this code. ’ ’