Stegall v. Stegall

Justice Meyer

dissenting.

Finding that N.C.G.S. § 50-ll(a) acts as an absolute bar of an action for equitable distribution or alimony brought after the divorce, I conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct in determining that plaintiff’s claims in this case were barred.

Chapter 50 establishes the specific rules under which claims for equitable distribution and alimony may be brought. The statute clearly states that such actions may not be brought “[a]fter a judgment of divorce” because at that time, “all rights arising out of the marriage . . . cease.” N.C.G.S. § 50-ll(a) (1993). The statute allows preservation of claims of alimony if the claim being litigated *480after the divorce was pending when the judgment of divorce was entered, N.C.G.S. § 50-19(c) (1987) (repealed effective 1 October 1991), and of equitable distribution, if the right had been asserted before the absolute divorce was ordered, N.C.G.S. § 50-ll(e) (1993). Case law has established that the particular cause of action for equitable distribution being contested after the divorce must have been pending at the time of the absolute divorce. Lutz v. Lutz, 101 N.C. App. 298, 399 S.E.2d 385 (plaintiff asserted a right to equitable distribution before divorce and voluntarily dismissed claim without prejudice after absolute divorce entered; defendant barred from bringing equitable distribution claim even though “right” of equitable distribution had been asserted prior to absolute divorce), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 732, 404 S.E.2d 871 (1991).

I believe that case law and public policy dictate that for an action of equitable distribution and alimony to survive, the particular action requesting equitable distribution and or alimony must have been pending at the time of the divorce. In this case, the action at issue for equitable distribution and alimony was not pending at the time of the divorce. The original action pending at the time of the divorce had been voluntarily dismissed. A voluntary dismissal is a final termination of the original action. Collins v. Collins, 18 N.C. App. 45, 50, 196 S.E.2d 282, 286 (1973); see also Thomas v. Miller, 105 N.C. App. 589, 591, 414 S.E.2d 58, 59, disc. rev. denied, 331 N.C. 557, 417 S.E.2d 807 (1992). Rule 41(a) allows that “[i]f an action commenced within the time prescribed therefor, or any claim therein, is dismissed without prejudice under this subsection, a new action based on the same claim may be commenced within one year after such dismissal.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(a) (1990) (emphasis added). Rule 41(a) clearly states that the action that is renewed in one year is a “new action based on the same claim.” It is not the “same claim” as was originally brought. Chapter 50 provides that an action for alimony or equitable distribution must have been brought before the divorce because after the divorce, all rights arising out of the marriage “cease.” N.C.G.S. § 50-ll(a). I conclude that Chapter 50 does not allow a “new action” for equitable distribution and alimony to be brought after the judgment of divorce has been entered.

When there are two rules that address similar matters but seem to be in conflict, “ ‘the special statute, or the one dealing with the common subject matter in a minute way, will prevail over the general statute . . . unless it appears that the legislature *481intended to make the general act controlling.’ ” Batten v. N.C. Dept. of Correction, 326 N.C. 338, 344, 389 S.E.2d 35, 39 (1990) (quoting Food Stores v. Board of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 628-29, 151 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1966)) (alteration in original). In this case, N.C.G.S. §§ 50-ll(a), (e), and -19(c) specifically address the situations under which a claim for equitable distribution and alimony may be brought. Rule 41(a) states specifically that this rule shall be “[s]ubject to the provisions of . . . any statute of this State.” Therefore, I believe that Chapter 50 should control the manner in which equitable distribution claims and alimony claims may be brought.

Case law has held that Rule 41(a) does not protect claims for alimony that are voluntarily dismissed before a divorce is entered. Banner v. Banner, 86 N.C. App. 397, 404, 358 S.E.2d 110, 113-14, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 70 (1987), overruled on other grounds by Stachlowski v. Stack, 328 N.C. 276, 401 S.E.2d 638 (1991). I believe there is no reason to distinguish between a voluntary dismissal taken before divorce and a voluntary dismissal taken after the divorce judgment is entered. Once a claim of alimony or equitable distribution is voluntarily dismissed, it can only be renewed in a new action. Contrary to the majority’s contention, I do not believe that the claim that was renewed in this case is the “same claim” that was pending at the time of the divorce. Thus, the second claim, or “new action,” does not satisfy the requirements of Chapter 50 and must be barred.

Public policy dictates that after a divorce, if no claims are pending, the monetary and property concerns of the parties should be laid to rest so the parties may be free to dispose of the property. Divorce affects property rights of the parties, dissolving tenancies by the entirety. Highway Commission v. Myers, 270 N.C. 258, 261, 154 S.E.2d 87, 89 (1967). In this case, the couple was divorced in 1989; the original action for equitable distribution and alimony, which was pending at the time of the divorce, was dismissed in 1990. The parties should be able to rely on the finality of the divorce in regard to property when the absolute divorce has become final and no action arising out of the marriage is pending. Therefore, I believe that plaintiff’s new action for equitable distribution and alimony, brought after the judgment of absolute divorce, cannot survive, and the Court of Appeals decision should be affirmed.

Justices MITCHELL and Whichard join in this dissenting opinion.