concurring specially.
I concur specially to emphasize that the judicial system should not condone the transformation of ordinary traffic incidents into exercises in the wholesale assassination of defendants’ characters. Nothing in this case evidences the wilful misconduct necessary to sustain a punitive damages award. OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). It is undisputed that when Carter first observed Spells’ vehicle, it was stopped at an intersection. Then, when Spells’ vehicle pulled out into Carter’s lane of travel, Carter testified that he was unable to avoid colliding with the left front side of Spells’ vehicle. The investigating officer ticketed Spells only for failure to yield and no proof of insurance. There is absolutely no evidence that Spells was speeding or was driving recklessly at the time of the collision. In fact, according to Spells’ uncontroverted testimony, after another vehicle bumped his truck, he got scared and his foot slipped off the clutch pedal, causing him to move forward. Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required to support an award of punitive damages. Cullen v. Novak, 201 Ga. App. 459, 460 (2) (411 SE2d 331) (1991). Negligence, even gross negligence, will not provide that support. Id.- In Cullen, we determined that the negligent running of a red light could not give rise to punitive damages. Id. Here, Spells’ actions were even less culpable. The Carters failed to satisfy their burden on summary judgment of showing some evidence of aggravating circumstances or wilful misconduct in support of their claim for punitive damages. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991).
Further, the wilful misconduct or aggravating circumstances required for punitive damages “ ‘must relate to the tort being sued on. . . .’ [Cit.]” McNorrill v. Candler Gen. Hosp., 188 Ga. App. 636 (373 SE2d 780). The facts relied on by the dissent to support the punitive damages (subsequent speeding tickets and jumping or hitting a curb) appear unrelated to the conduct giving rise to the cause of action. See id. Nor do these specified actions demonstrate the wilfulness required to impose punitive damages, which again points to the danger of injecting extraneous character evidence rather than focusing on the actions which are truly at issue.
*445Decided November 18, 1997. Loyce W. Turner, Jr., for appellants. Young, Thagard, Hoffman, Scott & Smith, Henry P. Scott, for appellees.I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this special concurrence.