concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment for the reason that when the ALJ substituted DonCo for Rocor in the interlocutory order on DonCo’s1 motion to reopen the OCGA § 34-9-102 hearing, upon finding that the claimant’s employer at the time of the heart attack was DonCo, the unanswered admissions became moot. The admission that Rocor was the employer had no legal effect because Rocor was no longer a party. No withdrawal pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-36 (b) was necessary.
Although the request had been served on Rocor and had not been answered or objected to within 30 days as required by OCGA § 9-11-36 (a) (2), the representations of DonCo’s counsel and the affidavits attached to the motion to reopen convinced the court that there was good reason for the unanswered admission not to govern the case. The reason was that the request had been served on a company which did not employ claimant. That company was in effect deleted from the proceedings before the ALJ made an award based on the initial hearing at which no employer was present. The ALJ has author*763ity “to add or delete parties with or without motion.” OCGA § 34-9-102 (c). Had Rocor been retained as the employer, there would be no reason to consider DonCo’s motion to reopen and certainly no reason to grant a new hearing.
In opposition to DonCo’s motion, claimant had argued only against the reopening of the hearing on compensability, in order to keep the admissions and resulting proven compensability and damages of the original hearing. He did not challenge the representation that DonCo and not Rocor was his employer, although he styled his pleading with Rocor as the “Employer.” He did not object to DonCo’s entering the case even though there was no motion for substitution under OCGA § 9-11-25 or motion of misjoinder under OCGA § 9-11-21. Although OCGA § 34-9-102 expressly requires only that the discovery procedures of the Civil Practice Act (CPA) govern and control the workers’ compensation administrative hearings, DonCo’s taking such steps would have made the path more clearly marked. See Chem Lawn Svcs. v. Stephens, 220 Ga. App. 239, 244 (469 SE2d 375) (1996) (“technical niceties” not strictly followed); Continental Baking Co. v. Brock, 198 Ga. App. 578, 579 (402 SE2d 331) (1991) (“The legislature intended that processes and procedures under the Workers’ Compensation Act be as summary and simple as reasonably possible.”).
After the ALJ on his own initiative implicitly substituted DonCo, as can be done pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-21 even had the CPA applied, and granted the motion of DonCo as employer to reopen the hearing, a new hearing on compensability was set and held several months later. Notice was sent to the claimant and to the actual employer DonCo but not to the originally named company, because it was not a party. Predictably, it was not present nor officially represented.
Claimant did not object to proceeding at the hearing in accordance with the rulings of the interlocutory order, which included the finding that DonCo was the employer. He has not sought an appeal from the rulings in the interlocutory order or from the superior court’s ruling on that order.
Then, when at the reopened hearing counsel for DonCo explained the relationship between the two companies, claimant did not object to proceeding against DonCo as his employer although he wished to have Rocor in the case. The court allowed it, even though it had been found that Rocor was not the employer at the time of the injury. Because, as of an intervening date, Rocor had assumed DonCo’s liabilities as its successor. According to the final award, Rocor was not added back to the case as a successor party, see OCGA § 34-9-102 (c), but doing so would not have benefited claimant at all because the ALJ awarded no compensation. Nor was it a party at the *764appellate decision stage. Claimant gratuitously named Rocor as the employer/self-insurer and sole appellee in his notice of appeal to the superior court. DonCo’s successor, Rocor, in its new capacity, filed briefs in the name of Rocor “f/k/a DonCo.” The ALJ’s subsequent award was that “the claim of James Guyton, Employee, against the Employer/Self-Insurer for workers’ compensation benefits is hereby denied.”
Decided December 5, 1997There is no need to consider the law construing and applying OCGA § 9-11-36 (b) with respect to withdrawal of undenied admissions. DonCo certainly did not have to move to withdraw them, as the request was not directed to it and it had never been served with claimant’s request for admissions.. Rocor had been ruled not the proper party as employer, in the interlocutory order, so it had no further obligation with respect to the request and the admissions were of no legal consequence to it.
The fuzziness of the actions taken by the parties and by the ALJ has made the unraveling of the proceedings, to assure the procedural law was followed insofar as the enumerated error is concerned, very difficult. Even though OCGA § 34-9-102 (c) and (e) give the ALJ broad authority to conduct the hearings in an informal manner, attention to the CPA as a guide should be given at the administrative level in these workers’ compensation cases, so that it is clear what procedural steps have been taken and 'what rulings have been made. See OCGA § 9-11-81. Correct due process procedure must be followed even were it not explicitly mandated by OCGA § 34-9-102 (e) (1). Motions and rulings should be based on identified procedural authority.
Employee Guyton filed his workers’ compensation claim against an entity that was not his employer. His actual employer voluntarily entered the case with the permission of the ALJ, and Guyton never contested the fact that this was his employer. He, by counsel, participated in the new hearing on compensability held for the benefit of the actual employer. Having lost on the merits, employee Guyton seeks an award of benefits from an entity which he does not dispute was not his employer at the time of his injury. His basis is a legally created fact which he does not deny is untrue and which became inconsequential when the non-employer was deleted as the employer party. The superior court erred in remanding the case to the workers’ compensation board for a hearing on whether the admissions should be allowed withdrawn in accordance with the governance of OCGA § 9-11-36 (b).
*765Saveli & Williams, Jennifer H. Chapin, for appellants. Smith, Wallis & Scott, Christopher B. Scott, for appellee.The motion was actually by DonCo and its servicing agent, Alexsis Risk Management, but since their interests coincide, references to DonCo include both.