concurring specially.
I concur in the Court’s opinion, but write separately to address certain concerns raised in arguments set forth by the dissent. The dissent posits its arguments that the trial court should be reversed on two grounds: (1) the court applied the wrong test in determining the reasonableness of the stop in light of Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. _ (116 SC 1769, 135 LE2d 89) (1996); and (2) “the trial court could not simply disregard the unrebutted testimony of the officer.”
Before addressing these arguments seriatim, let me first assert that Whren is inapplicable, but even if it were applicable, it is factually distinguishable. What the dissent misperceives is the factual distinction between Whren and the instant case, as well as the age-old principle in our law that irrespective of how much an appellate court may disagree with the trial court, factual and credibility findings are binding on the appellate court unless “clearly erroneous.” See Edwards v. State, 219 Ga. App. 239, 244 (3) (464 SE2d 851) (1995); Anderson v. State, 267 Ga. 116, 119 (2) (475 SE2d 629) (1996).
In Whren, police were patrolling a high drug area when they noticed a car at an intersection stop sign for an inordinate amount of time. When the youthful occupants of the car saw the police car, they turned right without signaling and sped away at an “unreasonable” speed. 135 LE2d at 93. After the police stopped the vehicle and one of the officers approached the car, the officer noticed what appeared to be two bags of crack cocaine in the hands of one of the occupants. The *740officers decided to stop Whren and the other occupants of the car because of several traffic violations: failure to give full attention to the operation of the vehicle, turning without signaling, and speeding. Id.
There was essentially no known traffic violation in the instant case. The record reveals that around midnight on September 25, 1996, Lieutenant Jimmy Hightower of the Lowndes County Sheriff’s Department was sitting in the median of Interstate 75 using radar to check for speeding motorists. He did not state that this was a high crime or drug area. He noticed that Aguirre was traveling 49 mph in a 70 mph zone, a slow speed but within the regulated speed limit. Hightower then noticed that, due to Aguirre’s license tag cover, he could not read the expiration date for the temporary Ohio tag. High-tower said that he decided to pull behind Aguirre’s vehicle to see if he could read the expiration date. According to Hightower, when he came alongside Aguirre’s vehicle, Aguirre tried to cover his face with his hand. Hightower said that this aroused his suspicion and as a result, he initiated the traffic stop.
The state maintained that (1) Aguirre’s speed on the highway, though not a traffic violation, (2) his attempt to conceal his face and (3) Hightower’s inability to see the expiration date of Aguirre’s temporary license tag authorized the stop. That is, according to the state, these three factors were the specific articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct warranting the investigatory stop. See Edwards, supra.
In its order, the trial court did not state its reasons for granting the motion to suppress. However, at the close of the suppression hearing, the trial judge said that he hoped driving under the speed limit at midnight on an interstate is not grounds to stop someone. Regarding the expired tag, the judge said ££[t]he officer could not have seen the fine print [on the tag] because he wasn’t in a position to see fine print. He was on the side of the road, not behind the vehicle when it came by.” Finally, the judge concluded that ££[p]utting your hand up by your face is no grounds to stop somebody and you add these [the tag, hand movement and low speed] together and I find the testimony on why the defendant was stopped to be not credible.”
In addition to being factually distinguishable, Whren simply is inapplicable in this situation. The U. S. Supreme Court concluded in Whren that ££[t]he temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective.” 135 LE2d at 93. There is no evidence that the trial court in the instant case based its suppression of evidence on the fact that, although the arresting *741officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred, the arresting officer used the traffic violation as a pretext to stop Aguirre for some ulterior motive, such as to check for drugs. Rather, the trial court was bothered by the fact the officer decided to stop a motorist who was traveling within the regulated speed limit because the officer could not read the expiration date on the motorist’s license tag and the motorist moved his hand to his face while driving.
The dissent’s other claim that the trial court could not disregard the officer’s unrebutted testimony is unsupported by the record. Furthermore, it was within the court’s authority to find either portions or all of the officer’s testimony unbelievable, even absent contradictory testimony. Anderson, supra.
We are constrained by the “any evidence” rule to give deference to the trial court’s determination of facts, and the evidence in the record does not demand a different result than that obtained by the lower court. See Edwards, supra.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Smith join in this special concurrence.