OPINION
HENDLEY, Judge.Plaintiff filed an assault and battery complaint against defendant, his brother, on July 23, 1979. Defendant failed to answer, although service upon him was allegedly made. On June 9, 1980, the summons, motion for default, and certificate as to state of the record were filed with the Clerk of the Court. A default judgment was entered the same day, awarding plaintiff $15,-000 compensatory damages.
On August 11, 1981, defendant filed a motion to set aside default judgment, alleging defendant was not served by legal process and, therefore, had no knowledge of the lawsuit until a writ of execution was attempted to be served at his home. A hearing was held on August 25, 1981, at which time plaintiff’s witness, the process server, testified on direct examination. However, before defendant was allowed the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the trial judge stated: “I’m sorry, I won’t be able to conclude this. We’ll have to take some time and come back. I’ve got these criminal matters.” A hearing was set for the following day, but was vacated due to plaintiff’s counsel’s admission to the hospital. Another hearing, set for September 21, 1981, was not attended by defendant or his counsel due to a misunderstanding. At that hearing, the trial court orally denied the motion to set aside default judgment and allowed the default judgment to stand.
On September 23,1981, defendant filed a motion asking the court for an opportunity to present the balance of his case. At a hearing on September 28, 1981, the following exchange took place:
MR. JONES [Attorney for plaintiff]: I believe all he’s [defendant] asked for is a chance to present the rest of his evidence.
THE COURT: I’ll give you the opportunity to present the argument.
MR. JONES: We will then finish the hearing basically that we started on the 25th, and you’ll make your ruling at that time?
THE COURT: Yes.
On November 9, 1981, the final hearing was held. Attorney for defendant requested cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witness, the process server. However, he was not present at the November 9 hearing. Plaintiff’s attorney stated he had not been able to contact him, and that he had told defendant’s attorney that he had not intended to subpoena him for that hearing. “I made no effort to secure Mr. Romero’s [process server] attendance here today as I anticipated that Mr. Carvajal [defendant’s attorney] was going to take care of securing his appearance.”
Defendant’s motion to strike the witness’ testimony since no cross-examination was possible was denied. Defendant then presented his witnesses and the hearing was concluded. On November 16,1981, an order was entered affirming the default judgment and denying defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment. Defendant appeals from that order.
Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment; (2) whether the trial court erred in not striking the testimony of the process server; and (3) whether damages were improperly awarded, since no evidence on damages was received by the court.
We address the second issue, since it is dispositive, and comment on the third issue for purposes of guidance.
Testimony of Process Server
We limit our discussion to the issue as framed by the parties.
Plaintiff contends that defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by his inability to cross-examine the witness. Plaintiff argues that defendant could have sought post-judgment relief by deposing the process server, and then moving for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence if it appeared the witness had lied. See State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979) (Cross-examination of surprise rebuttal witness allowed, but defendant denied continuance to allow time to find witnesses to corroborate or contradict witness’ testimony.)
Plaintiff is mistaken in thinking the defendant needs to show prejudice. The rights of confrontation and cross-examination are basic ingredients of a fair trial. Crabtree v. Measday, 85 N.M. 20, 508 P.2d 1317 (Ct.App.1973). Defendant is prejudiced simply by not having the opportunity in cross-examination to challenge the witness’ credibility and the weight of his testimony. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). The party who did not call the witness
may in all cases cross-examine the witness in respect to all the material matters disclosed in the examination in chief * *.
Cross-examination is the right of the party against whom the witness is called, and the right is a valuable one as a means of separating hearsay from knowledge, error from truth, opinion from fact, and inference from recollection, and as a means of ascertaining the order of the events as narrated by the witness in his examination in chief, and the time and place when and where they occurred, and the attending circumstances, and of testing the intelligence, memory, impartiality, truthfulness, and integrity of the witness[.]
The Ottowa, 70 U.S. [3 Wall] 268, 18 L.Ed. 165 (1865).
Further, the subpoena provided: “We command you, and each of you, to be and appear before Judge Gerald Fowlie * * * on August 25, 1981 * * * and thereafter as you may be advised by the Court or the attorney requesting this subpoena * * Since the trial court did not excuse the witness after the first hearing, the witness should have been present at the later hearings, and it was plaintiff’s duty to secure that appearance. It was not defendant’s duty to subpoena the witness. The witness was still subject to the subpoena served by plaintiff. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment without allowing defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Proof of Damages
Should the trial court deny defendant’s motion after taking additional testimony, the damages issue will still remain.
Plaintiff asked for $15,000 in damages. A default judgment was entered in the amount of $15,000. It does not appear in the record that any evidence on damages was received. Defendant argues it was error not to hold a hearing on the amount of damages. Plaintiff contends the trial court could have determined without a hearing that $15,000 was an appropriate compensatory damage award for the plaintiff. Plaintiff also argues that to require plaintiffs to prove damages in default cases would encourage defendants without a valid defense to fail to answer, thereby burdening the courts and plaintiff with unnecessary proceedings and expenses.
New Mexico decisions recognize that liability and damages are different and separate concepts. Herrera v. Springer Corporation, 85 N.M. 6, 508 P.2d 1303, reversed on other grounds, 85 N.M. 201, 510 P.2d 1072 (1973). Thus, a default judgment is not necessarily an admission of the amount of damages pled by plaintiff. See, Gallegos v. Franklin, 89 N.M. 118, 547 P.2d 1160 (Ct.App.1976). Rule 55 of the N.M.R.Civ.P., N.M.S.A.1978 (1980 Repl.Pamph.), provides in part: “If, in order to enable the court to enter [default] judgment and to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages * * *, the court may conduct such hearings * * * as it deems necessary and proper * * (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff argues that Rule 55 vests the district court with discretion to determine whether a hearing on damages is necessary.
We would agree with plaintiff if the damage claim were for a liquidated sum. However, where the claim for damages is unliquidated, it would be an abuse of discretion not to have a hearing and to put plaintiff to the test of presenting evidence to support the claim for damages. Gallegos v. Franklin, supra.
Thus, under the foregoing analysis, we need not reach plaintiff’s contention of a possible conflict between Gallegos and Herrera. Our holding is limited to 1) the right of cross-examination, and 2) the right to a hearing when the claim for damages is for an unliquidated amount.
We reverse and remand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
NEAL, J., concurs. SUTIN, J., specially concurring.