DISSENTING OPINION OF
CIRCUIT JUDGE ACOBAI believe the conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial on two grounds and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.
*3101.
The first ground for remand is the trial court’s incorrect instruction on the robbery element of being “armed with a dangerous instrument.” Robbery in the first degree is defined in the Penal Code’s chapter on “Property Offenses.” Under that definition, proof of the “dangerous instrument” element is required:
§ 708-840 Robbery in the first degree. (1) A person commits the offense of robbery in the first degree if, in the course of committing theft:
(b) He is armed with a dangerous instrument and:
(ii) He threatens the imminent use of force against the person of anyone who is present with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property. [Emphasis added.]
“Dangerous instrument” is defined in the same section as follows:
§ 708-840
(2) As used in this section, “dangerous instrument” means any firearm, or other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or threatened to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. [Emphasis added.]
The court did not give this definition of “dangerous instrument” to the jury. Instead, it gave the definition of “dangerous instrument” found under the chapter on “Offenses Against Persons.” That section states:
§ 707-700
(4) “Dangerous instrument” means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury[.] [Emphasis added.]
*311The instrument in evidence was a razor. No party contends, and there is no evidence, that the razor was “used.”1 Under the correct definition then, the State was required to prove, and the jury was required to find, that the razor was “threatened to be used” in the manner prescribed by HRS § 708-840(2), beyond a reasonable doubt. But the jury was never instructed that this was the legal standard to apply. Thus, the jury did not have the correct standard by which to measure the proof adduced on that issue. “It is well settled that the trial court must correctly instruct the jury on the law. . . . This requirement is mandatory to insure the jury has proper guidance in its consideration of the issues before it.” State v. Nakamura, 65 Haw. 74, No. 7823, slip op. at 5 (July 1, 1982), quoting State v. Feliciano, 62 Haw. 637, 643, 618 P.2d 306, 310 (1980).
Of course, an “instruction may properly be refused where the same proposition is adequately covered in another instruction that is given. . . Nakamura, supra, at 5, quoting State v. Stuart, 51 Haw. 656, 660-61, 466 P.2d 444, 447 (1970). That is not the case here. Quite simply, the trial court intended to correctly instruct the jury on the definition of “dangerous instrument” but gave the wrong definition of that element.
True, the instructions must be considered in their entirety to determine whether error was committed. Feliciano, supra, 62 Haw. at 641,618 P.2d at 309. But, considered as a whole, the instructions do not cover the missing definition as the majority contends. The trial court did instruct the jury that it must find the defendant threatened the “imminent use of force” against the complaining witness before it could convict. However, this instruction related to the “imminent use of force” element. That element is separate and distinct from the “dangerous instrument” element which requires a finding of threatened use of such an instrument.2 For HRS § 708-840(1 )(b)(ii) *312provides:
(b) He is armed with a dangerous instrument and:
(ii) He threatens the imminent use of force against . . . anyone who is present. . . . [Emphasis added.]
Nor can the erroneous definition of a “dangerous instrument” as one that is “intended” to be used in the culpable manner be fairly equated with the definition of one which is “threatened” to be used in that manner. Intent is a state of mind. See HRS § 702-206. A threat is the communication of an intent. Black’s Law Dictionary 1327 (5th ed. 1979). The difference in definition was expressly incorporated into the Penal Code by the drafters. It is a difference which affects the legal standard applied to the evidence by the jury.
The prejudicial effect which would follow from equating the two definitions is revealed by the record here. The jury was told that the “dangerous instrument” element was satisfied by proof that the defendant “intended” to use it in the culpable manner. Applying this erroneous statement of law, the jury convicted the defendant. But the jury should have been told that it was required to find the defendant “threatened” the razor’s use in the culpable manner. Had it been correctly instructed, the jury would have had to consider evidence contrary to such a finding.
For the complaining witness himself testified the defendant did not threaten him with the razor:
Q. Did he ever threaten you with the razor?
A. No, he did not.
[Emphasis added.]
The complaining witness was never asked whether he felt threatened by the razor, nor did he ever say that he felt threatened by the razor. Indeed, in the context of his entire testimony, the defendant’s appearance and voice appeared to be of primary significance to the complaining witness:
Q. Now, when you say you were scared, why were you scared?
*313A. Appearance; fact that he entered my car without permission; tone of voice.
Q. When you say “tone of voice,” can you describe his tone of voice or mimic his tone of voice?
A. Describing it, it was a tone that I wouldn’t argue, you know. If he told me to do it, I wasn’t about to do anything else.
Q. For instance, what is one of the things that he told you?
A. To drive and he was going to tell me where to drive.
Q. When he asked you — when he told you to drive, can you mimic the tone of voice he used when he said to drive?
A. I don’t remember.
Q. Okay. But you said — you described it as menacingly?
A. More so.
Q. Did Cornwell [the defendant] ever tell you he was going to hurt you in any way?
A. No.
Q. You indicated that at no time did you attempt to resist because you were afraid of the appearance of Cornwell, is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Okay. Did he ever tell you he was going to hurt you in any way?
A. No, he did not.
Q. He never actually hurt you, is that correct?
A. Physically, no.
Q. Garrett, besides the appearance of Cornwell, you mentioned that you were afraid of him because of his tone of voice, is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Did you think he would hurt you if you didn’t follow his directions?
A. Personally, that’s — that’s how I felt.
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, then, the foregoing excerpts from the trial indicate a rational basis for finding that the threat of force was conveyed by the defendant’s appearance, and *314voice, rather than by a razor. If that finding were made by the jury, the defendant would have been entitled to an acquittal on robbery in the first degree for failure to prove the “dangerous instrument” element.
In any event, it is not for the appellate court to determine that one finding is correct to the exclusion of another finding where an erroneous instruction is at issue. The majority, however, adopts that approach in order to reach its conclusion that the correct instruction does not have to be given. That approach is unsupportable on two grounds. First, the appellate court “must construe the evidence in the case in a light most favorable to the appellant in determining whether or not the instruction should be given.” State v. O’Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 528, 616 P.2d 1383, 1390-91 (1980). This the majority failed to do. Second, whether or not the defendant was armed with a “dangerous instrument” as correctly defined is a question for the jury, not the appellate court. At trial the wrong instruction could only have “left an erroneous impression in the minds of the jurors.” State v. Laurie, 56 Haw. 664, 672, 548 P.2d 271, 277 (1976). Thus, the majority approach would foreclose the jurors from deciding a question which was theirs to decide. Rule 1102, Hawaii R. of Evid.
Because a rational basis existed for acquitting the defendant of robbery in the first degree, an instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery in the second degree should have been given. Where a rational basis for acquitting the defendant of a charge and convicting him of an included offense exists, the court should give an instruction relating to that offense. HRS § 701-109(5).3 Robbery in the second degree may be proved by the same elements as robbery in the first degree, except being armed with a dangerous instrument is not an element of the former. See HRS § 708-841(a) and (b). The parties did not request a second degree robbery instruction. However, Rule 1102, Hawaii R. of Evid., mandates that “the court shall instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the facts of the case. . . .” And the defendant “is entitled to an instruction on every defense . . . having any support in the evidence, provided such evidence would support the consideration of that issue by the jury, *315no matter how weak, inconclusive or unsatisfactory the evidence may be.” O’Daniel, supra, 62 Haw. at 527-28, 616 P.2d at 1390 (emphasis in original). Hence, the error resulting from the failure to give the correct instruction on the “dangerous instrument” instruction was magnified by the failure to give an instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery in the second degree.
The incorrect “dangerous instrument” instruction was not claimed as error. Rule 52, HRPP, however, allows the court to notice plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights. The erroneous instruction here affected substantial rights. The error cannot be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Pokini, 57 Haw. 26, 30, 548 P.2d 1402, 1405 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976).
The kidnapping conviction rested on proving the commission of a felony. The felony involved was robbery in the first degree. Because that charge should be remanded for retrial, the kidnapping charge should also be remanded.
II.
The second ground which independently requires remand is the State’s failure to allege the essential elements of the robbery charge in the indictment.
In pertinent part, the statute states, “[a] person commits the offense of robbery in the first degree if, in the course of committing theft. . . [h]e threatens the imminent use of force against the person of anyone who is present. . . .” HRS § 708-840(l)(b)(ii) (emphasis added).
The indictment charged that the defendant in the course of committing theft and “while armed with a dangerous instrument, to wit, a straight edge razor, did threaten the imminent use of force against [the named person]. . . .”
The indictment did not allege that the named person was a person who was “present” at the time of the theft.
The “presence” element is traceable to prior Hawaii law. “[T]he Code’s definitions of the [robbery] offenses are substantively similar to those of prior Hawaii law. . . .” Commentary to HRS §§ 708-840 and 708-841. Under prior Hawaii law, robbery was defined as the “ ‘stealing of a thing from the person of another or from hu custody or *316presence, by force or putting him in fear.’ "Id., quoting HRS § 765-1 [1968] (emphasis added).
The instant indictment does not indicate that the taking of property was from the named person by putting him in fear or from the custody or presence of the named person by putting him in fear. Indeed, it does not indicate that the threat was against a person present contemporaneously with the taking of property, an allegation necessary under the “presence” requirement of prior law and retained in the Penal Code. Under the express terms of the statute, the “presence” of the person threatened must be proved. Without such proof, robbery is not established. An essential element is one which must be proved to establish the crime. Cf. State v. Nases, 65 Haw. 217, 649 P.2d 1138 (1982). Because “presence” must be proved to establish robbery, “presence” is an essential element. An indictment “must sufficiently allege all of the essential elements of the offense charged.” State v. Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 281, 567 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1977). Presence of the threatened person must, therefore, be alleged in a robbery indictment.
The majority contends that the element of “presence” may be inferred by reference to a statutory provision outside of the indictment itself, citing State v. Tuua, 3 Haw. App. 287, 649 P.2d 1180 (1982). Under this approach, the court must look to the statutory definition of “dangerous instrument.” That definition indicates a “dangerous instrument” is one which is “threatened” to be used. From there, the threat to use a razor is read with the indictment allegation of an imminent use of force. It is said that together these factors raise the probable inference that the named person against whom force was imminently threatened was present. The instant indictment, therefore, requires the court to look beyond the text in search of saving statutory language which will give rise to a range of probabilities from which the missing element may be inferred.
Rule 7(c), HRPP, however, mandates that “the charge shall be a plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” (Emphasis added.) An indictment whose meaning must be ascertained by the aforementioned process is not “plain,” “concise” or “definite.” Nor does it contain the “essential facts.” The indictment patently violates Rule 7(c), HRPP.
In addition, the court should not be required to, nor a party put to the risk of, searching beyond the indictment itself to ascertain its *317meaning:
It is essential that an indictment must allege all of the material facts and circumstances embraced in the statutory definition of the offense, and if any essential element of the crime is omitted such omission may not be supplied by intendment or implication. The charge must be made directly and not inferen tially or by way of recital.
U.S. v. American Oil Co., 249 F. Supp. 799, 806 (D.N.J. 1966).
And the controlling precedent in this jurisdiction would require that an essential element be expressly stated in the indictment. In Jendrusch, supra, the defendant was charged with causing public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. The charge also stated the defendant did make “unreasonable noise or offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display or address abusive language to any person present. . . .” 58 Haw. at 280, 567 P.2d at 1243. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the charge should have referred to “physical” inconvenience.
Arguably, the charge could have been saved because “noise,. . . gesture or display or .. . abusive language” might reasonably infer “physical” inconvenience to the public. But the court required the express and specific use of the term “physical”:
Without the averment that defendant’s conduct resulted or threatened to result in physical inconvenience, the complaint was insufficient to charge an offense.
Id. at 282, 567 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis in original).
Further, the court stated:
Where the statute sets forth with reasonable clarity all essential elements of the crime intended to be punished, and fully defines the offense in unmistakable terms readily comprehensive to persons of common understanding, a charge drawn in the language of the statute is sufficient.
Id. at 283, 567 P.2d at 1245.
Here, the statute set forth all essential elements of robbery with reasonable clarity in terms readily comprehensive to persons of common understanding. But the charge was not drawn in the language of the statute.
In State v. Faulkner, 61 Haw. 177, 599 P.2d 285 (1979), the charge failed to allege the state of mind element. The court stated that “[ijntent is an essential element. ... No allegation of intent was *318made.”Id. at 178, 599, P.2d at 286. Similarly, the essential element of “presence” here was not alleged.
Finally, the indictment cannot be sustained under an application of the “fair construction” test. That test would sustain an indictment “even if an essential averment is faulty in form, if by fair construction it may be. found within the text.” 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 125 at 233-34 (1969) (emphasis added).
Here, the essential averment is not- faulty “in form,” it is entirely absent. The fault here is not one of form, but substance:
We are aware that liberality is the guide today in testing the sufficiency of an indictment, but this applies to matters of form and not of substance. We cannot dispense with the requirement that the indictment charge all essential ingredients of a crime.
U.S. v. Tornabene, 222 F.2d 875, 878 (3rd Cir. 1955).
And as indicated above the averment cannot be found “within the text” of the indictment. Instead, reference must be made to a statutory section which was not cited or referred to in the indictment itself.
The indictment, therefore, failed to allege the essential elements of the charge. This error was raised for the first time on appeal. Such an error may be noticed at any time. Rule 12(b)(2), HRPP. “[T]he defect is ground for reversal, even when raised for the first time on appeal.” Jendrusch, supra, 58 Haw. at 281, 567 P.2d at 1244. The indictment herein should be dismissed with leave granted the State to reindict, the defendant being held in custody or on bail as may be set by the trial court pending reindictment. See Rule 12(g), HRPP; Dawson v. Lanham, 53 Haw. 76, 486 P.2d 329 (1971).
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand.
The trial transcript indicates the following:
Q. He [the defendant] never actually hurt you, is that correct?
A. [By complaining witness] Physically, no.
Also Court’s Instruction No. 18 (State’s proposed Instruction No. 4) stated:
There are three material elements to this offense.
First: That the Defendant while in the course of committing theft was armed with a dangerous instrument;
*312Second: Thai the Defendant did threaten the imminent use of force against Garrett Arashiro; and,
Third: That the Defendant did so threaten Garrett Arashiro with the intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property that was the subject of the theft. ]Emphasis added.]
The lesser-included offense doctrine aids the prosecution, the defendant and society as well. State v. Kupau, 63 Haw. 1, 620 P.2d 250 (1980).