dissenting.
OCGA § 43-9-16 (b) states that “chiropractic adjustment of the articulations of the human body may include manual adjustments. ...” I dissent in this case simply because I believe massage is a form of manual adjustment within the contemplation of the statute. I do not take issue with Judge Blackburn’s thorough discussion of the rules of statutory construction or the applicability of those venerable principles to the cases upon which his decision relies, Metoyer v. Woodward, 176 Ga. App. 826 (338 SE2d 286) (1985) and Foster v. Ga. Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 257 Ga. 409 (359 SE2d *516877) (1987), both of which I agree were correctly decided but which are distinguishable from this case. And because I believe that massage falls within the purview of the statute, a contract for such services is not unenforceable as an illegal contract as held in Division 2 of the majority’s opinion.
Decided September 26, 1997 Reconsideration denied November 21, 1997 Suzanne A. Littlefield, for appellant. Downey & Cleveland, Richard A. Griggs, for appellee.