concurring in part and dissenting in part.
1. I concur in Division 1 insofar as it concludes that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction of the custody and contempt actions.
2. I dissent with respect to Division 2 because (a) no consolidation took place, (b) no Georgia statute authorized service of process on the mother in Switzerland, and (c) the mother did not waive personal jurisdiction.
(a) On November 5 the father moved to consolidate all three actions (contempt, custody, and domestication), but the mother did not consent and no consolidation was ordered. OCGA § 9-11-42 (a) requires consent, as was emphasized in Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 267 Ga. 226, 228-229 (476 SE2d 565) (1996). Thus the trial court could not have consolidated, and did not consolidate, the custody and contempt actions with the domestication action when it heard the father’s two actions on November 25.
(b) The mother’s second enumeration of error has merit. She asserts the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her in both the contempt and custody actions.
“While the Georgia court may have the authority to hear the contempt [and custody actions], its judgment is not enforceable against the non-resident defendant unless the court has obtained personal jurisdiction over the non-resident. [Cit.]” Dyer v. Surratt, 266 Ga. 220, 221 (3) (466 SE2d 584) (1996). The defendant has the burden of proving lack of personal jurisdiction. Beasley v. Beasley, 260 Ga. 419, 420 (396 SE2d 222) (1990); Millard v. Millard, 204 Ga. App. 399, 401 (1) (419 SE2d 718) (1992). Both parties agree, and the court found, that at the time of the filing of the contempt and custody actions the mother was a resident of Switzerland. Process in both actions was served in Switzerland, not Georgia.
“The courts of this state have no extra-territorial jurisdiction, and cannot make the citizens of foreign states amenable to their process, or conclude them by a judgment in personam, without their consent.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ashburn v. Baker, 256 Ga. 507, 509 (2) (350 SE2d 437) (1986). There are three prerequisites *867for a court to have personal jurisdiction over a non-consenting, nonresident defendant: a Georgia statute must authorize the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant; a Georgia statute must authorize extra-territorial service of process on the defendant; and the defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts to Georgia to meet the test of Intl. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (66 SC 154, 90 LE 95) (1945). See generally Straus v. Straus, 260 Ga. 327, 328-329 (2) (393 SE2d 248) (1990), overruled on other grounds, Scruggs v. Dept. of Human Resources, 261 Ga. 587 (408 SE2d 103) (1991). The contempt and custody actions must be analyzed separately. See Kemp v. Sharp, 261 Ga. 600 (409 SE2d 204) (1991); Ruck-stuhl v. Corley, 218 Ga. App. 660 (462 SE2d 795) (1995). Although OCGA § 9-10-91 (5) applies to certain financial aspects of divorce proceedings, “[i]t is a well-settled matter that the 1983 ‘domestic relations’ amendment to the Long-Arm Statute (OCGA § 9-10-91 (5)) does not provide a means by which a Georgia court may obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident in a proceeding involving child custody or visitation. [Cits.]” Dyer, supra at 221 (3). This includes actions to modify a child custody order.
The Long-Arm Statute also provides no personal jurisdiction over defendants in contempt proceedings relating to child custody. “[Ajlthough the superior court rendering a decree in a divorce action retains exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the provisions therein relating to custody of the minor children of the parties by attachment for contempt, even where subsequent to the rendition of the order the party sought to be adjudged in contempt has removed his or her residence to another jurisdiction, nevertheless, in order for the court to bind nonresidents by its judgments in personam there must be personal service or waiver of personal service upon such nonresidents.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Ashburn v. Baker, supra at 509 (2). This personal service must be in Georgia. Id.; see Dyer, supra at 222 (3) (“Because of the limited nature of Georgia’s domestic relations long-arm statute, a non-resident parent alleged to be in contempt of the visitation provisions of a Georgia divorce judgment and who was served outside Georgia may divest the court of its power to enforce its judgment by timely asserting a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction”); Ruckstuhl v. Corley, supra at 660-661 (long-arm statute provides no personal jurisdiction in action for contempt of divorce decree).
On the other hand, OCGA § 19-9-43 of the UCC JA, as judicially construed, provides for personal jurisdiction over non-resident parents in petitions to modify custody and in contempt actions to enforce child custody orders where the provisions of that statute are met. Lee v. Pace, 252 Ga. 546, 547 (1) (315 SE2d 417) (1984) (“Jurisdiction over [the non-resident parent] as to custody is present because of the pres*868ence of the child within the jurisdiction. OCGA § 19-9-43”); Ashburn, supra at 508-510 (2) (court may have personal jurisdiction over nonresident parent in contempt action to enforce custody decree if UCCJA provisions met); Baker v. Ashburn, 179 Ga. App. 757, 758-759 (347 SE2d 660) (1986) (personal jurisdiction over non-resident parent may exist in custody modification action if UCCJA provisions met), aff’d, Ashburn v. Baker, supra; Paul v. Paul, 184 Ga. App. 217, 218 (361 SE2d 221) (1987) (in contempt action to enforce visitation rights in custody decree “jurisdiction and service over the [nonresident parent] were proper under the provisions of the [UCCJA]”).
The relevant provision of the UCCJA provides that a Georgia court has jurisdiction to modify or enforce its custody decree where (a) Georgia had been the child’s home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding, (b) the child is absent from Georgia because of its removal by a parent, and (c) a parent continues to live in Georgia. OCGA § 19-9-43 (a) (1) (B). When the contempt and custody actions were filed on September 16, 1996, these criteria were met. Until September 5, 1996, Georgia had been the child’s home state. The child was absent because of the mother’s unlawfully removing the child to Switzerland. And the father continued to live in Georgia. Thus, the UCCJA authorized the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the non-resident mother in both the contempt and custody actions.
But no Georgia statute authorized the service of process on the mother in Switzerland. OCGA § 9-10-94, which authorizes service on non-residents of foreign countries, applies only to persons “subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state under Code Section 9-10-91.” As discussed above, OCGA § 9-10-91 does not provide for personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in custody and related contempt actions. Camp v. Sellers & Co., 158 Ga. App. 646 (281 SE2d 621) (1981), which speaks of service in a foreign country, is a tort action under the predecessor to OCGA § 9-10-91 (see Ga. L. 1970, pp. 443-445, § 1) in which the defendant challenged the method, not the authority for extra-territorial service in a foreign nation. The authority for international service in Camp came from OCGA § 9-10-94. Accordingly, Camp properly referred to a treaty7 between the United States and several foreign countries that speaks to the method of foreign service if foreign service is authorized; Camp does not hold, nor could it, that the treaty gives a party in a Georgia action the authority to serve process in a foreign country. For Georgia state courts, *869that is a matter exclusively within the province of the Georgia legislature.
Decided December 5, 1997 Reconsideration denied December 17, 1997 Jesus A. Nerio, for appellant. Richard L. Moore, Rebecca S. Walton-McFalls, for appellee.The Supreme Court rejected a judicial rectification of the void in Binns v. Smith, 251 Ga. 861 (310 SE2d 225) (1984). The dissent in that case decried the safe haven created by the majority’s recognition that the power to confer jurisdiction and to establish methods of achieving jurisdiction lies in the legislative and not in the judicial branch. Nor can a Swiss court confer jurisdiction on a Georgia court by its decrees.
We are left only with the extra-territorial service provision (OCGA § 19-9-45) of the UCCJA, which allows service of process on parents located in another state of the United States, Paul, supra at 218, but not in foreign nations. Binns, supra (no service allowed on parent in Canada); Richardson v. Richardson, 257 Ga. 101 (355 SE2d 664) (1987) (no service allowed on parent in Germany). Service on the mother in Switzerland was invalid, so the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her.
(c) Although not argued by the father on appeal, the majority finds the mother waived personal jurisdiction by filing the action to domesticate the Swiss decree of September 6. Filing an action in Georgia could be a factor to establish the minimum contacts required by Intl. Shoe Co., supra, but does not constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in other Georgia actions. See Fralix v. Cordle, 261 Ga. 224 (403 SE2d 793) (1991) (filing garnishment actions is evidence of minimum contacts); Straus v. Straus, supra at 328-329 (filing contempt action to enforce payment of alimony and child support is evidence of minimum contacts), overruled on other grounds, Scruggs v. Dept. of Human Resources, supra at 587. Cf. Kemp v. Sharp, supra at 601-602 (3) (filing counterclaim in UCCJA action does not constitute waiver of personal jurisdiction). But minimum contacts need not be addressed, for service in Switzerland was invalid and the mother did not waive the defense. See Millard v. Millard, supra at 403 (2).
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial & Extrajudicial Documents, Vol. 20 Part 1, U. S. Treaties & Other International Agreements 1969 (20 UST 361, TIAS 6638).