dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion which affirms the judgment of the trial court.
In this case, Michael Ward was the “star” witness for the plaintiff, although he testified he had been subpoened. He was the only witness to testify that he and defendant engaged in a sexual relationship, that defendant showed affection toward him, that he lived with defendant for about two weeks, that defendant received alimony and that defendant’s father set up “one or two million dollars” for her. All of this testimony was denied by the defendant.
At the close of plaintiffs evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the claims of alienation of affections and criminal conversation. The trial court allowed the motion as to the claim for criminal conversation stating that the plaintiff failed to produce “legal and sufficient evidence the defendant committed the specific act of sexual intercourse required to show the existence of that tort.”
Defendant’s motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(l)(2)(3) and (6) sets forth the following in part:
(1) On 23 July 1998, plaintiff filed an action against her husband, Michael Ward, alleging an adulterous relationship by Mr. Ward and that he abandoned plaintiff and the children (Ward v. Ward, 98 CVD 201).
(2) On 6 August 1998, plaintiff filed a consent order in which she waived alimony and post-separation support and Mr. Ward was ordered to pay child support.
(3) Immediately thereafter, on 6 August 1998, plaintiff filed this action (98 CVS 209).
(4) Following the consent order, Michael Ward did not pay specified child support; however, plaintiff filed an affidavit excusing and explaining Mr. Ward’s failure to pay.
(5) Following the trial on 10 and 11 March 1999, defendant in this case discovered in the Ward v. Ward file plaintiff’s statement releasing Michael Ward from paying $900.00 and a letter dated 26 March 1999 from plaintiff’s counsel stating that plaintiff and Michael Ward had reconciled and plaintiff requested that her husband’s child support obligation be terminated.
*54Defendant argues that under Rule 60(b)(6), the judgment should be set aside because (1) extraordinary circumstances exist, and (2) justice demands that relief be granted. In support of her argument, defendant points to the sequence of events beginning with the filing of the action in Ward v. Ward on 23 July 1998 and ending with the reconciliation on 26 March 1999, which raises a question of whether plaintiff and Mr. Ward “connived” or “colluded” in pursuing these claims against defendant. I agree the highly unusual events in this case demand that a new trial be ordered on plaintiffs claim of alienation of affections and her entitlement, if any, to compensatory damages.
After careful review, I conclude the evidence does not support an issue of punitive damages. In a similar case, this Court has held:
It is incumbent on the plaintiff to show circumstances of aggravation in addition to the malice implied by law from the conduct of defendant in causing the separation of plaintiff and her husband which was necessary to sustain a recovery of compensatory damages. Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426, 102 S.E. 769 (1920). In the present case, the wrongful conduct of defendant in permitting plaintiffs husband to visit her at her residence with knowledge of the marital discord which these visitations produced and over plaintiffs protests was sufficient to establish the tort. However, we are of the opinion that plaintiff has not shown such circumstances of aggravation in addition to the above conduct of defendant to justify the submission of the punitive damage issue to the jury.
Heist v. Heist, 46 N.C. App. 521, 527, 265 S.E.2d 434, 438 (1980).
In a later case, this Court further stated that punitive damages may be awarded where the defendant’s conduct was willful, aggravated, malicious or of a wanton character. See Chappell v. Redding, 67 N.C. App. 397, 403, 313 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1984). There must be some circumstances of aggravation in addition to the malice implied by law from the conduct of a defendant in alienating the affection between the spouses, which is necessary to sustain compensatory damages. Id. Here, it is apparent that the jury was influenced by the prejudicial evidence from the Register of Deeds and Mr. Ward concerning the wealth of the defendant.
There is no evidence of aggravated conduct on the part of the defendant. The only aggravated conduct in this case was on the part *55of Mr. Ward when he admitted to having consumed alcoholic beverages before and during his visits at defendant’s residence in July of 1998.
In sum, for the reasons stated, the judgment should be vacated and a new trial ordered on the plaintiffs claim of alienation of affections and her entitlement, if any, to compensatory damages.