OPINION ON REHEARING
Opinion was filed in the above styled and numbered case March 20, 1974. Within the rules of this Court, appellee filed its Petition for Rehearing, and, with permission of the Court, appellant filed his Response.
On May 31, 1972, in Case No. CRF-72-1330, defendant (appellant herein) plead guilty to Burglary in the Second Degree and pronouncement of Judgment and Sentence was deferred for a period of two (2) years, as authorized by 22 O.S.1971, § 991c, one of the conditions of the deferment being “defendant was not to violate any City, State or Federal laws.”
On July 12, 1973, the trial court heard the State’s amended application to accelerate on the sole ground that in Case No. CRF-73-592, the trial court had pronounced Judgment and Sentence on July 11, 1973, based upon a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of Burglary in the Second Degree. The record clearly reflects, and neither party contends otherwise, defendant gave notice of appeal and timely lodged the same in this Court under No. F — 74—9.
*415Notwithstanding the appeal said Judgment and Sentence was the only ground for acceleration in Case No. CRF-72-1330. No other evidence except proper identity of defendant was offered and introduced at the hearing.
We stated in our opinion, “it is obvious that said Judgment and Sentence was not final on July 12, 1973, and could not be the basis for acceleration.”
Appellee in its Petition for Rehearing contends that such holding is in conflict with our previous cases of: Phillips v. State, Okl.Cr., 483 P.2d 759 (1971), Fields v. State, Okl.Cr., 484 P.2d 558 (1971), and Winningham v. State, Okl.Cr., 488 P.2d 1351 (1971), each dealing with revocation of a suspended sentence, and Murray v. State, Okl.Cr., 507 P.2d 1286 (1973), an acceleration of deferred sentence case, and in all except Murray, supra, the Court used this language:
“We decline to hold that a suspended sentence cannot be revoked until such time as the offense which was the basis of the revocation is appealed and affirmed.”
Reconciling the apparent conflict, we now hold in order that a judgment and sentence pronounced for a crime committed subsequent to a suspended or deferred sentence may be received in evidence in support of an application to revoke or accelerate such sentence, it must be a final judgment and sentence, one unappealed from within the time prescribed for direct appeal or final disposition made and entered by the appellate court if direct appeal has been perfected.
However, this is not to prevent the State from making the subsequent crime a predicate for revocation or acceleration, even before or without the filing of an Information or return of Indictment therefor, or if filed or returned during the pendency thereof, or after pronouncement of judgment and sentence, during the appeal period or while on appeal. The State may offer in support of its application to revoke or accelerate any competent evidence proving or tending to prove the subsequent offense and the court hearing the application may admit the same and give it such weight and credit as it deems it to have, and if the court determines such evidence sufficient to revoke the suspended sentence or accelerate the deferred sentence, then it may do so without regard to appeal from the pronouncement of judgment and sentence, if any, in a separate and independent prosecution for the predicate crime, nor shall the results of such an appeal in any way disturb the order of revocation or acceleration.
The only review of an order of revocation of a suspended sentence or acceleration of a deferred sentence is a direct appeal contemplated by 22 O.S.1971, § 991b or by certiorari under the rules of this Court as to deferment of sentence upon a plea of guilty.
Accordingly, the above cited cases and any others inconsistent with this opinion are hereby expressly overruled. The holding herein shall be applied prospectively.
We deny the Petition for Rehearing, reiterate our original opinion and direct the issuance of Mandate herein.
BRETT and BUSSEY, JJ., concur.