dissenting in part, in an opinion in which Judges CHAGARES and JORDAN join, and which Judges BARRY and SMITH join for all except Part V.
All members of the Court sitting en banc agree that the District Court correctly determined that Boyd’s claim was not procedurally defaulted. As for Boyd’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, nine judges agree that the District Court erred when it conditionally granted Boyd a writ of habeas corpus. Although I agree that the writ should not have issued, I must respectfully dissent from the six-judge majority which holds that the District Court’s error requires a remand.
Boyd should be denied habeas relief for two independent reasons. First, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), and Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984), Boyd’s guilty plea— which he candidly admits was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary — superseded and rendered immaterial any ineffective assistance of counsel that preceded it. Second, even assuming that Tollett and Mabry do not apply, Boyd cannot show prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
I.
In the summer of 2000 and one month before his twentieth birthday, Boyd was living at home with his parents when he decided to pass the time by drinking in a park with William Carpenter, Raymond Jones, and a few other friends. In a fit of bravado, Jones wagered that he could drink ten shots of alcohol in ten minutes. After Boyd and Carpenter refused to pay Jones for what can best be described as a Pyrrhic victory, an argument ensued and a short time later Boyd retrieved an aluminum bat and beat Jones with it. Jones lay unconscious and bleeding on the ground for some time before Boyd and Carpenter took him to the hospital. Jones suffered permanent brain injuries which left him confined to a wheelchair. Boyd initially attempted to conceal his role in the crime by hiding the baseball bat and fabricating an alibi. Five days after the attack, Boyd confessed to police.
The Commonwealth charged Boyd with attempted murder, aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment, tampering with evidence of a crime, and possession of an instrument of crime. Boyd’s parents posted bail and hired a family friend, attorney Guy Sciolla, to represent their son. During the pretrial phase, the Commonwealth contacted Sciolla and proposed a plea agreement that *365included a recommended sentence of 4-8 years of imprisonment.28 Seiolla telephoned Boyd’s mother, informed her of this offer, and asked her to communicate it to Boyd. Seiolla also advised Boyd’s mother that the offer was unacceptable, and asked her to tell Boyd as much. She did so, and Seiolla rejected the offer.29 Thus, Boyd himself never was asked to accept or reject the initial plea offer, and there is no evidence that the trial court approved it or was even aware of its existence.
After he rejected the initial plea offer, Seiolla negotiated a second deal with the Commonwealth pursuant to which Boyd would enter an open plea to the charges of aggravated assault and possession of an instrument of crime. In exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosequi the charges of attempted murder, simple assault, reckless endangerment, and evidence tampering. On Sciolla’s advice, Boyd accepted this second offer, and pleaded guilty to the two aforementioned charges before the Honorable Gary S. Glazer of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
About two months later, Judge Glazer sentenced Boyd to a term of imprisonment of 8-22 years. Boyd appealed and Judge Glazer issued a written opinion in which he found that Boyd entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea of guilty after having signed a written guilty plea, which was supplemented by an extensive oral colloquy. Judge Glazer reviewed the details of the oral colloquy — which included an admonition that Boyd could be sentenced to “anything up to 12 and a half to 25 years in prison,” App. 159 — and concluded: “nothing more could have been done to ensure that [Boyd’s] guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” App. 93.
In his direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Boyd’s second lawyer, Thomas Quinn, argued that trial counsel (Seiolla) was ineffective by failing to discuss the relative merits of accepting the Commonwealth’s initial plea offer. Quinn asserted that Seiolla had communicated the initial plea offer “to [Boyd] and his parents,” and that Boyd “accepted the advice of counsel, and rejected the plea.” App. 135. In support of this claim, Boyd submitted an affidavit in which he admitted that Seiolla “told me, through my mother” of the initial plea offer. App. 116. Boyd did not attack the validity of his open guilty plea, but the Superior Court noted nonetheless that Boyd’s “guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” App. 88. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, finding that Boyd’s own affidavit conceded that he knew about the initial plea offer, but “decided to take his chances on the discretion of the court as to sentencing.” App. 85-86. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur.
Upon the conclusion of direct review, Boyd’s third counsel, Cheryl Sturm, filed a collateral challenge under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 PA. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq., in which Boyd alleged for the first time that Seiolla provided ineffective assistance when he re*366jected the initial plea offer without first discussing it with him. Boyd also argued that Quinn had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present all of the pertinent facts on direct appeal. Significantly, Boyd did not challenge the validity of his guilty plea.
The PCRA court denied the application, holding that Boyd’s claims were previously litigated under 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 9543(a)(3) and, in an alternative holding, explained that Boyd’s claim against Seiolla would fail on its merits. The Superior Court affirmed on the basis that Boyd’s claims against Seiolla and Quinn under Strickland were previously litigated, and noted that Boyd’s “own affidavit conceded trial counsel informed him of the existence of the first plea offer, which [Boyd] chose not to accept.” App. 71.
During the pendency of his PCRA application, Boyd filed an initial and an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (collectively, Petition) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he reiterated the same Strickland claims against Seiolla and Quinn that he had raised in his PCRA application. The case was assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Peter B. Scuderi, who held an evidentiary hearing at which Boyd, Seiolla, and Quinn testified. Once again, Boyd failed to allege in his Petition that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Nevertheless, at some point that issue appeared to have been joined before the Magistrate Judge. In his Report and Recommendation (R & R), Magistrate Judge Scuderi specifically addressed the issue, noting that Boyd’s guilty plea was constitutionally valid because the thorough colloquy “belie[d] any claim [Boyd] would make regarding the voluntary and knowing nature of his plea.” App. 25. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court deny Boyd’s Petition because it failed on the merits under Strickland.30
Following the adverse R & R, Boyd filed objections in which he alleged that the Magistrate Judge “misperceivefd] the nature of [his] claims. [Boyd] is not claiming the guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.... [Boyd] does not want to take back the plea.” Boyd v. Warden, Civ. No. 06-491, Dkt. 18 at 6 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 19, 2006). Boyd argued that he was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because Sciolla’s failure to communicate the Commonwealth’s plea offer directly to him constituted ineffective assistance that prejudiced him under Strickland.
The District Court agreed with Boyd and rejected the R & R. Applying de novo review without holding any hearing, the District Court found that Boyd was entitled to relief under Strickland because: (1) Sciolla’s failure to speak directly with Boyd before rejecting the Commonwealth’s initial plea offer was per se deficient; aild (2) Boyd was prejudiced because he ultimately received a sentence which was more than double the sentencing guidelines range under the initial offer. The District Court concluded that because Boyd should be returned to the position he would have been in but for Sciolla’s ineffectiveness, the writ should issue unless the Commonwealth revived the original plea offer. The District Court also noted that Boyd abandoned his Strickland claim as to Quinn.
The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. The Commonwealth also filed a motion to stay the issuance of the writ *367pending appeal, but the District Court denied that motion as well.
II.
The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal in this Court and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. A three-judge panel heard argument on October 25, 2007. This Court granted initial rehearing en banc, and oral argument was held before the full Court on November 19, 2008. Although the appeal presents two important issues affecting our habeas corpus jurisprudence-one procedural and one substantive — the extensive briefing and oral argument presented to the Court en banc focused entirely on the substantive issue.
II.
We begin by addressing the Commonwealth’s procedural challenge, viz., that Boyd’s claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Our review is plenary. See Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 713 (3d Cir.2004). As we will explain, the Commonwealth’s arguments are premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of the import of Pennsylvania’s “previously litigated” rule. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543(a)(3). Because this rule has generated confusion, we will discuss its ramifications for the procedural default analysis at some length.
Under the PCRA, a petitioner cannot obtain review on the merits unless he can show that an “allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived.” Id. An allegation is “previously litigated” if “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue” or the allegation “has been raised and decided in a proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence.” 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 9544(a)(2) and (3). Furthermore, “an issue may not be relitigated merely because a new or different theory is posited as a basis for reexamining an issue that has already been decided.” Commonwealth v. Senk, 496 Pa. 630, 437 A.2d 1218, 1220 (1981).
Boyd did not dispute that his Strickland claim was “previously litigated” for purposes of the PCRA, but he argued that this did not constitute a procedural bar to his federal habeas claim. The District Court agreed, stating: “[t]his court agrees with the determination of other courts in this district holding that the PCRA’s ‘previously litigated’ rule is not a state procedural requirement within the meaning of Coleman [v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) ].”
A.
It is axiomatic that “a habeas petitioner is required to exhaust available state remedies before requesting habeas relief in federal court.” McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 940 (3d Cir.1987). Exhaustion is accomplished when a petitioner “presents” in the state courts substantially the same claim he asks the federal courts to review. See Johnson v. Pinchak, 392 F.3d 551, 556 (3d Cir.2004). “The habeas petitioner carries the burden of proving exhaustion of all available state remedies.” Lambert v. Blackwell (Lambert I), 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir.1997) (citation omitted).
In this case, the District Court found that Boyd exhausted his claim that Sciolla was ineffective in rejecting the initial plea offer without consulting his client. The record supports the District Court’s conclusion because Boyd made this argument to the PCRA courts. Additionally, Boyd alerted the PCRA courts to the federal nature of his claim by citing Strickland, which satisfied the presentation requirement. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004); see also Hameen v. Delaware, 212 *368F.3d 226, 247 (3d Cir.2000). That the courts denied Boyd’s claim on procedural grounds does not change the fact that he “presented” it. See Holloway, 355 F.3d at 717-18.
Although the Commonwealth concedes that Boyd presented this federal claim in the PCRA proceedings, it argues that the District Court’s finding of exhaustion is contrary to Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218 (3d Cir.2001), where we held that a habeas petitioner who neglected to file a timely petition for allocatur to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to exhaust his claims. Id. at 223-24. Significantly, however, Boyd’s claim arose after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued In re: Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post Conviction Relief Cases, No. 218 Judicial Administration Docket No. 1 (Order 218). Since Wenger we have held that Order 218 “renders review from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ‘unavailable’ for purposes of exhausting state court remedies under § 2254(c).” Lambert v. Blackwell (Lambert II), 387 F.3d 210, 233 (3d Cir.2004). Accordingly, we hold that Boyd exhausted his Strickland claim in state court. See Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 410 (3d Cir.2002).
B.
Our conclusion that Boyd exhausted his Strickland claim does not answer the question of procedural default, however, because the Supreme Court has made clear that a procedural default “forecloses relief even when the petitioner has exhausted his remedies.” See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 850, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 848, 119 S.Ct. 1728 (O’Connor, J., writing for the majority) (“We do not disagree with Justice Stevens’ general description of the law of exhaustion and procedural default” and “[specifically, we do not disagree with his description of the interplay of these two doctrines.”).
Whereas the exhaustion inquiry asks whether a claim was “presented to the state courts,” the procedural default analysis considers whether the claim was “presented in the manner that state law requires.” See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a petitioner who does not “fairly present” his claim to the state courts is barred from presenting it to the federal courts. Cristin, 281 F.3d at 410.
To understand why Pennsylvania’s rule against relitigating claims in PCRA proceedings that have been “previously litigated” under the current statute does not operate as a procedural default, we need only consider the Pennsylvania rule in light of the “adequate and independent” state ground doctrine, of which the procedural default rule is but one application. See Villot v. Varner, 373 F.3d 327, 334 (3d Cir.2004) (citation omitted). That doctrine precludes a federal habeas court from addressing a question of federal law decided by a state court “if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546. “A state rule provides an adequate and independent basis for precluding federal review if (1) the rule speaks in unmistakable terms; (2) all state appellate courts refused to review the petitioner’s claims on the merits; and (3) their refusal was consistent with other decisions.” Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir.2007) (citations omitted). Pennsylvania law provides that a claim raised in a PCRA petition is “previously litigated” if the Superior Court decided the issue “on the merits” on direct appeal. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. *369ANN. § 9544(a)(2). Thus, when a PCRA court refuses to reach the merits of an issue because it was “previously litigated,” it confirms that a Pennsylvania appellate court already rendered a decision on the merits. Because this rule assumes the inverse of one of the preconditions of a procedural default — viz., that “all state appellate courts refused to review the petitioner’s claims on the merits,” see Nara, 488 F.3d at 199 (emphasis added) — it is not an “independent” state law ground.
The Commonwealth contends that our decision in Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666 (3d Cir.1996), commands a different result. We disagree. In Sistrunk, we held that the 1994 version of § 9543(a)(3) was an adequate and independent state law ground supporting procedural default. See id. at 674-75. Significantly, however, that version of the statute provided that a claim was “previously litigated” if “the trial court ... ruled on the merits of the issue and the petitioner did not appeal.” 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9544(a)(1). Because Sistrunk did not raise his claim on direct appeal, we concluded that the claim was procedurally defaulted. See Sistrunk, 96 F.3d at 669, 673-75. Nevertheless, writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Stapleton explained the oxymoronic aspect of the statute insofar as it defined unappealed claims as “previously litigated”:
The [previously litigated doctrine] foreelose[s] state review in a PCRA proceeding of claims that have been fully litigated and rejected on direct appeal [as well as claims which were not presented on direct appeal]. While such claims and claims like Sistrunk’s are both categorized by the statute as “previously litigated,” the two categories are distinct for purposes of the adequate and independent state ground doctrine.... Unlike here, in a situation where a claim has been “previously litigated” and collateral review is barred by § 9544(a)(3) — because the claim has been fully litigated and rejected on direct review — the petitioner will have exhausted state remedies and the state appellate courts will have had the required opportunity to address the federal claim. Nothing here said is intended to address whether federal habeas review would be available with respect to claims fully litigated on direct review in such a case.
Id. at 675 n. 11 (emphasis added). In 1995, the Pennsylvania legislature amended the statute to clarify that unappealed claims are “waived,” and not “previously litigated” as they had been under the prior version of the statute. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9544(a) and (b).
In the case at bar, this distinction makes all the difference. Because the state courts invoked the “previously litigated” rule to decline reconsideration of Boyd’s Strickland claim on the ground that it had been litigated on direct appeal, and did not find this claim to be “waived” within the meaning of § 9544(b), we are presented with the situation anticipated by the panel in Sistrunk. In light of the Supreme Court’s acceptance of Justice Stevens’s characterization of the procedural default doctrine as a “waiver rule,” see O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 850, 119 S.Ct. 1728, we conclude that Sistrunk’s holding is limited to those cases arising under the “waiver” section set forth in § 9544(b).
In its current form, the “previously litigated” rule codified in § 9544(a) simply relieves Pennsylvania courts of the burden of revisiting issues which are res judicata. But res judicata is not an adequate state law ground to support a procedural default. See, e.g., Daniels v. Knight, 476 F.3d 426, 431 (7th Cir.2007); see also Stevens v. Zant, 968 F.2d 1076, 1089 (11th Cir.1992). Even the courts of appeals that have yet to hold res judicata-based rules “inadequate,” have refused to treat them as a basis for procedural default. See *370Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir.2004) (California’s bar against re-litigation in state habeas proceedings of claims already litigated on direct appeal is “neither a ruling of procedural default nor a ruling on the merits”); see also Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411, 415 n. 1 (4th Cir.2003) (although North Carolina’s bar against re-litigation of issues decided on appeal was an adequate and independent state procedural rule, it was “not a state procedural bar that prevents federal habeas review”).31
Even apart from § 9544(a)’s “adequacy” or “independence,” it is clear that the “previously litigated” rule insulates state courts from duplicative effort but does not preclude federal habeas review. When a PCRA court invokes the “previously litigated” rule, it does so not because an applicant has failed to present his claims, but because he has already presented those claims at least once before and received a decision on the merits. This situation may implicate res judicata, but “[fjederal review is precluded only by procedural forfeitures, not by res judicata concerns.” Page v. Frank, 343 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir.2003) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Viewed from this perspective, treating Pennsylvania’s “previously litigated” rule as a procedural default would contravene the very purpose of that doctrine: to ensure that state courts have had “an opportunity to address [a petitioner’s claims] in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32, 111 S.Ct. 2546. State rules that preclude relitigation on collateral review of claims already decided on direct appeal serve a salutary purpose in state courts, but they are not the kind of “state procedural requirement” that lead to a default of habeas claims in federal court, which typically occurs because a petitioner fails to raise an issue, not because he raises that issue twice, i See, e.g., Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 381 (3d Cir.2004).32 This is consistent with Su*371preme Court dicta. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (noting that a state decision based on ineligibility for further state review does not constitute a procedural default).
For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court correctly determined that Boyd exhausted his Strickland claim in the state courts, and that this claim was not procedurally defaulted by Pennsylvania’s bar against the relitigation of “previously litigated” claims in PCRA proceedings.
IV.
Turning to the merits, in preparation for en banc review, we ordered the parties to brief numerous issues including: (1) the appropriate standard of review in light of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA); (2) the propriety of the Magistrate Judge’s evidentiary hearing; (3) and the District Court’s de novo review of the facts found by the Magistrate Judge. Review of these complex questions was essential to a proper evaluation of Boyd’s claim that Sciolla rendered ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the Commonwealth’s initial guilty plea offer. Ultimately, however, the adequacy of Sciolla’s representation with respect to the Commonwealth’s initial guilty plea offer is immaterial because Boyd’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea “represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). That is, once Boyd pleaded guilty, he forfeited his ability to challenge any constitutional deficiency that came before that plea — provided, of course, that the plea was validly entered.
In Tollett, Henderson, a state prisoner who had pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 99 years in prison, sought federal habeas relief because “Negroes had been excluded from the grand jury which indicted him in 1948.” Id. at 259, 93 S.Ct. 1602. The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered Henderson’s release, finding that he did not waive his right to be indicted by a constitutionally selected grand jury. Id. at 261, 93 S.Ct. 1602. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Henderson was not “entitled to release from custody solely by reason of the fact that the grand jury which indicted him was unconstitutionally selected.” Id. at 269, 93 S.Ct. 1602. Instead, once Henderson pleaded guilty, he forfeited his right to challenge any constitutional violations that antedated the plea. See id. at 266, 93 S.Ct. 1602. The Court reasoned:
We thus reaffirm the principle recognized in the Brady trilogy: a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann [v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) ].
*372Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602. “The focus of federal habeas inquiry is the nature of the advice and the voluntariness of the plea, not the existence as such of an antecedent constitutional infirmity.” Id. at 266, 93 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added). Because the record was unclear whether Henderson was “precluded from raising the issue of the voluntary and intelligent nature of his guilty plea,” id. at 268, 93 S.Ct. 1602, the Supreme Court remanded the case.
Eleven years after Tollett, the Supreme Court considered the ease of George Johnson, who was convicted in Arkansas state court of burglary, assault, and murder. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). Although Johnson was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 21 years for the burglary and 12 years for the assault, the Arkansas Supreme Court vacated the murder conviction. Id. at 505, 104 S.Ct. 2543. Upon remand, negotiations ensued and the prosecutor offered Johnson a plea bargain on the murder charge that included a recommendation for a concurrent sentence of 21 years. Id. at 505-06, 104 S.Ct. 2543. Three days later, Johnson accepted the prosecutor’s offer. Claiming that he was mistaken, the prosecutor purported to withdraw the offer that Johnson had already accepted, and offered a plea bargain that included a recommendation for a consecutive sentence of 21 years. Id. at 506, 104 S.Ct. 2543. Johnson initially rejected the prosecution’s second offer, but later accepted it and received a consecutive sentence of 21 years. Id.
Presumably because he learned that he could have enforced the initial plea offer for a recommendation for a concurrent sentence, Johnson filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied the petition, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the prosecution’s initial offer was enforceable. Id. at 506-07, 104 S.Ct. 2543.
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Stevens began by noting: “It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.” Id. at 508, 104 S.Ct. 2543. “It is only when the consensual character of the plea is called into question that the validity of a guilty plea may be impaired.” Id. at 508-09, 104 S.Ct. 2543. The Court summed up its terse opinion by noting that Johnson “was fully aware of the likely consequences when he pleaded guilty; it is not unfair to expect him to live with those consequences now.” Id. at 511, 104 S.Ct. 2543.
Like Henderson and Johnson, here Boyd does not challenge the validity of his guilty plea. Indeed, both in his brief before the en banc court and at oral argument, Boyd conceded that his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Instead, Boyd claims ineffective assistance of counsel at a point that preceded the entry of the valid guilty plea. In light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Tollett and Mabry, Boyd’s valid guilty plea should be the beginning and the end of the matter.
Neither counsel for Boyd nor the Federal Defender amici even cite, much less attempt to distinguish, Tollett. Both briefs attempt to distinguish Mabry,- but the efforts are unpersuasive. They claim that counsel in Mabry was competent whereas Sciolla was ineffective for Boyd. This is a false distinction. Both here and in Mabry, counsel were arguably ineffective in their representation prior to their clients’ guilty pleas. However, neither Boyd nor the plaintiff in Mabry contended that counsel was ineffective with regard to the plea itself. In this case, on the contrary, Boyd’s repeated assertion that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily accepted the terms of the second plea offer is *373a concession that Sciolla was not ineffective in his representation with regard to that plea. Indeed, it is a logical and legal impossibility to say that one’s decision was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary if it was infected by constitutionally deficient advice from counsel.
In Mabry, counsel could have filed a motion to enforce the 21-year concurrent sentence deal because his client had accepted the offer before it was withdrawn. See United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir.1989) (“Although a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it remains contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under contract-law standards.”). Under contract principles, one may accept an offer at any point until the offer is withdrawn. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 35 (1981).
Here, Sciolla could have — and should have — communicated the Commonwealth’s initial offer directly to Boyd rather than “through his mother.” Nonetheless, there is no question as to the adequacy of Sciolla’s advice that the case was not triable, nor is it disputed that Boyd entered a valid guilty plea. This valid plea dooms Boyd’s claim for habeas relief in the same way that it doomed Johnson’s claim in Mabry.
In sum, because Tollett and Mabry foreclose Boyd from challenging any constitutional violation antecedent to his valid guilty plea, I would reverse the District Court’s conditional grant of the writ of habeas corpus.
Y.
A majority of the court holds that Tollett and Mabry do not control Boyd’s case because Strickland applies instead.33 However, even if this Court were to ignore Tollett and Mabry, Boyd’s claim would fail under the Strickland test.34
It is important to recall what we have been asked to decide in this appeal. The parties focus on whether Sciolla was constitutionally ineffective for rejecting the Commonwealth’s initial offer of 4-8 years imprisonment without first discussing it with Boyd and, if so, whether Boyd was prejudiced thereby. I accept this general characterization of the issue, but qualify it in two respects. First, our Court does not assess the merits of this habeas petition as we would have had the issue been raised *374on direct appeal; as Chief Judge Scirica’s opinion explains, we must remain faithful to AEDPA’s deferential standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Second, because the issue of Strickland prejudice turns on the facts, we must consider only those facts which were either developed in the state court, or properly developed in the District Court under AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
A.
The per curiam opinion instructs the District Court to decide on remand whether the Magistrate Judge should have held an evidentiary hearing in this case. In my view, such a hearing is precluded by AED-PA.
A federal district court’s power to hold a hearing is limited by AEDPA. This restriction is consistent with the principle that “[fjederal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Taylor, 504 F.3d at 437 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437, f20 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). Here, in ordering an evidentiary hearing, the Magistrate Judge erroneously failed to ascertain whether AEDPA authorized such a hearing. This error was significant because the record reflects that Boyd “has failed to develop the factual basis” of his claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
Boyd attempted to “develop the factual basis” for his claim by requesting an evidentiary hearing in state court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(e)(2). But because Pennsylvania law provides that the right to an evidentiary hearing in post-conviction proceedings is not automatic, see Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011, 1014 (Pa.Super.2001), Boyd was required to offer evidence and argument in support of his claims of counsel ineffectiveness and prejudice. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906-07 (Pa.Super.2008) (noting that “a hearing will be rendered superfluous if the court can determine from the existing record that there has been no prejudice to the appellant”); see also Pa. R.Crim. P. 907(1). When a defendant attempts to show the need for an evidentiary hearing by providing affidavits, those affidavits must “tie everything together”; otherwise, he will not be entitled to a hearing. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 867 A.2d 619, 632 (Pa.Super.2005).
Reading the affidavits Boyd submitted and the pleadings filed by counsel in light of the fact that Boyd knew about the initial plea offer yet decided to “take his chances with the discretion of the court,” the state court determined that no evidentiary hearing was warranted. The record confirms that Boyd’s state court offer of proof was insufficient to establish prejudice, and did not put the court on notice that he could establish cause. Because the affidavits Boyd submitted were not sufficiently relevant or comprehensive to establish both prongs of his ineffectiveness claim in state court, Boyd failed to develop the factual basis for his ineffective assistance claims before coming to federal court. See, e.g., Owens v. Frank, 394 F.3d 490, 500 (7th Cir.2005) (finding the petitioner who was denied a hearing in state court did not develop the factual record diligently under § 2254(e)(2) because, inter alia, the affidavits he submitted to the state court omitted key factual allegations known to him).
Given that Boyd failed to meet Pennsylvania’s prerequisites for an evidentiary hearing, it follows that he is not entitled to a hearing in federal court. Section 2254(e)(2) bars a hearing unless the petitioner “diligently but unsuccessfully seeks an evidentiary hearing in state court.” Taylor, 504 F.3d at 444 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court explained in Williams, “[diligence will require in the *375usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” See 529 U.S. at 437, 120 S.Ct. 1479 (emphasis added). As the emphasized portion of this quotation reflects, the mere act of seeking and being denied a hearing in state court is not enough to satisfy § 2254(e)(2); rather, Williams requires that the petitioner do so “in the manner prescribed by state law.” Other courts of appeals have recognized that merely seeking and being denied a hearing in state court does not entitle a defendant to a hearing in federal court under § 2254(e)(2). See, e.g., Teti v. Bender, 507 F.3d 50, 62 (1st Cir.2007); see also Smith v. Bowersox, 311 F.3d 915, 921-22 (8th Cir.2002); Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 758 (5th Cir.2000) (“Mere requests for evidentiary hearings will not suffice; the petitioner must be diligent in pursuing the factual development of his claim.”). As explained above, Boyd may have “sought” an evidentiary hearing in state court, but he did not present sufficient evidence in that court to permit the inference that he was in any way prejudiced by Sciolla’s handling of the initial plea. Nor did he argue that a hearing was necessary to develop evidence of prejudice. Pennsylvania law did not require the state courts to give Boyd a hearing until he did so; because Boyd never met this standard, he has failed to prove diligence such that he should be entitled to a hearing in federal court.35
Nor can Boyd show that the factual basis for his claim “could not have been previously discovered” through his diligence — one of the “other stringent requirements” of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii). See Williams, 529 U.S. at 437, 120 S.Ct. 1479. By the end of his guilty plea hearing, Boyd knew all of the facts he needed to know to claim that Sciolla was ineffective. Boyd knew that Sciolla had not discussed the initial plea with him directly before rejecting it, and he knew that the potential sentencing range was far greater than the 4-8 years that the initial plea offer contemplated. And by the time he was sentenced, Boyd knew the facts necessary to claim prejudice insofar as he knew that he was receiv*376ing a higher sentence than 4-8 years and that he would have preferred the 4-8 year plea offer. Nothing prevented Boyd — who was represented by counsel each step of the way — from providing comprehensive (or at least, complete) affidavits to support his factual allegations. Yet Boyd did not do so in state court, even though such evidence was available to him. Thus, his efforts to develop the state court record cannot be considered diligent. See Commonwealth v. Lambert, 529 Pa. 320, 603 A.2d 568, 579 (1992) (affirming a trial court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing where the evidence to be offered “could have been discovered much earlier with due diligence”).
The Supreme Court has recognized that “AEDPA generally prohibits federal habeas courts from granting evidentiary hearings when applicants have failed to develop the factual bases for their claims in state courts.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 n. 1, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)). Though AEDPA leaves open “the potential for harsh results in some cases, we are not free to rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted.” Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359, 125 S.Ct. 2478, 162 L.Ed.2d 343 (2005) (denying a habeas petition based upon AEDPA’s statute of limitations). That Boyd did not receive an evidentiary hearing in state court is perhaps regrettable, but it is a product of his own doing and should not be cured by granting him a hearing in federal court in contravention of AEDPA. Accordingly, I encourage the District Court on remand to review the record as developed in state court alone without granting an evidentiary hearing for further factual development.36
B.
In light of the foregoing considerations, the issue should be framed as follows: In denying Boyd’s Strickland claim against Sciolla, did the state courts render a decision that was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable application of’ federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the evidence presented in those courts?
1.
It is axiomatic that, to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must establish both prongs of the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Strickland. That test requires Boyd to demonstrate: (1) his attorney’s performance was deficient in the sense that it fell *377below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result of the attorney’s deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Strickland applies to counsel’s conduct during plea negotiations. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Thus, under Strickland, Boyd must demonstrate that Sciolla’s act of telling the Commonwealth that its initial plea offer was unacceptable before discussing the matter with Boyd was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency; that is, he must prove that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
We need not consider the ineffectiveness prong, however, if we determine that no prejudice resulted from counsel’s conduct. Strickland approved of this approach explicitly:
Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffectiveness claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies .... If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which ive expect ivill often be so, that course should be followed.
Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). Our Court has followed this approach. See McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 170-71 (3d Cir.1993).37
To demonstrate prejudice, Boyd “must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127 (3d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, a petitioner alleges that counsel’s ineffective assistance cost him the opportunity to take a plea, he must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s ineffective assistance, he would have accepted the foregone plea offer. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366; see also United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 254 (3d Cir.2003); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 45 (3d Cir.1992). This showing requires “some ‘objective evidence’ that a petitioner would have accepted a plea offer.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 254 (citation omitted); cf. Meyers v. Gillis, 142 F.3d 664, 668-69 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding ineffective assistance in the context of a plea offer where the petitioner’s testimony that he would have rejected a plea was corroborated by other evidence in the record).
2.
With the foregoing standard in mind, we should conclude that the state court record resolves the question of Strickland prejudice.38 In his affidavit before the Superior *378Court on direct appeal, Boyd admitted that he was aware of the initial plea offer and its rejection. Boyd was told several times during his guilty plea hearing that the court could sentence him to 12^-25 years.39 He also stated that he had discussed his case with his parents and Sciolla, was satisfied with Sciolla’s performance, and still wanted to plead guilty, even though he knew he could receive a 25-year prison sentence. During that same hearing, Boyd was told the standard guidelines range, which coincided roughly with the 4-8 year range contemplated in the original plea offer. In light of this evidence, the state court found that Sciolla informed Boyd of the initial plea offer and Boyd chose not to accept it. This was a reasonable interpretation of the transcript of the guilty plea hearing, which reflects that Boyd — an adult who was found competent to stand trial — was told about the possibility of a 12^-25 year sentence no fewer than five times, stated he understood each time, and asked no questions when invited to do so. Boyd’s pleadings and affidavits — some of which do not even assert that he would have elected to take the initial plea offer, and contradict later affidavits on this point — reasonably are read as conceding his knowledge of the initial plea offer and his assent to its rejection.40 *379And Boyd’s parents’ affidavits are only relevant as to what they would have said or done; they are irrelevant as to Boyd’s intentions or actions.41 Additionally, these affidavits reasonably could have been rejected for the same reason Boyd’s affidavit was incredible; ie., despite their claims as to what they would have told Boyd had they known of the guidelines, they, like their son, apparently made no objection on or off the record at the change of plea hearing. Accordingly, Boyd has not shown that the PCRA court’s conclusion that he was not prejudiced by Sciolla’s conduct was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent and we should defer to the state court’s factfinding in this regard. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d) & (e)(1); see also Weeks v. Snyder, 219 F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir.2000).
I appreciate the fact that to the extent Sciolla believed he could persuade the court to impose a more lenient sentence than the 4-8 year term the Commonwealth initially offered, hindsight shows that he was seriously mistaken. But Boyd has not adduced clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state courts’ implicit finding that there was no reasonable probability that, but for Sciolla’s rejection of the initial plea offer, Boyd would have taken it. All of the objective evidence before the state courts suggests that Boyd took his counsel’s advice to try to persuade the court to be more forgiving than the Commonwealth was inclined to be in its initial plea offer.
Accordingly, the state courts’ conclusion that Boyd was not prejudiced by Sciolla’s rejection of the initial plea offer was neither “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable application of’ Supreme Court precedent, nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before them. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, the District Court erred in granting the writ “[wjithout deciding whether [ ] counsel acted reasonably.” United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir.2002).
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, I cannot support a remand in this case. Because Boyd is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to further develop the factual record, all that is left is for this Court to apply AEDPA’s deferential legal standard to the established factual record, a task that is well within our purview. Whether we determine that Boyd’s admittedly valid guilty plea forecloses his request for habeas relief under 'Tollett and Mabry, or whether we assess the merits of Boyd’s Strickland claim under AEDPA’s deferential standard, Boyd is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the decision to remand the case.
. The terms of this initial plea offer are disputed. Boyd contends that the offer was to recommend a 4-8 year prison sentence while the Commonwealth insists that the recommended term was 4-10 years. Although the District Court appeared to agree with Boyd, its remedy suggests that it accepted the Commonwealth’s characterization. The disparity is immaterial to this opinion.
. There is considerable ambiguity about what Seiolla meant when he testified that he rejected the initial plea offer. Boyd insists that Seiolla rejected the initial plea offer before Boyd learned of it. The Commonwealth maintains that the offer was still on the table if Boyd later had expressed an interest in it. This dispute is immaterial as well.
. The Magistrate Judge should not have addressed this issue, because Boyd’s failure to raise it at any point in the state court proceedings constituted a procedural default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Albrecht v. Horn, 471 F.3d 435, 459-60 (3d Cir.2006) (vacated on other grounds).
. Only the Sixth Circuit has held to the contrary. See Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 538 (6th Cir.2006) (Ohio’s res judicata rule, which bars relitigation of issues that were raised or could have been raised, is an "adequate and independent” ground justifying default) (citations omitted). Following Carter, the Sixth Circuit explained: "There are two variants of res judicata under Ohio law for collateral attacks on convictions. The first variant is when a petitioner could have, but failed to, bring a claim on direct review. The second variant occurs in state court when a claim was actually brought and litigated on direct appeal. This second variant of res judicata cannot form the basis of federal procedural default, however, because the petitioner did not fail to comply with a state procedural rule-namely that claims must be raised on direct appeal if possible.” Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 434 (6th Cir.2007) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, inasmuch as Carter’s failure to distinguish between the variant of the Ohio rule governing issues that were previously litigated, and the variant which governed issues that were waived, its teachings are no more helpful to our interpretation of the current version of § 9544(a) than Sistrunlc.
. Our confidence in this conclusion is bolstered by our recognition that characterizing § 9544(a)’s "previously litigated” requirement as a basis for procedural default would lead to absurd consequences in practice. If a "previously litigated” claim were to constitute a procedural default, we would consider whether Boyd could show "cause and prejudice” or a "fundamental miscarriage of justice” to excuse that default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546. "To show 'cause,' the petitioner must demonstrate some objective factor external to the defense that prevented compliance with the state’s procedural requirements.” Holloway, 355 F.3d at 716 n. 3 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner's noncompliance would be his "litigation” of the issue on direct appeal. The Kafkaesque absurdity of asking a petitioner to excuse his own litigation of an issue on direct appeal — which litigation is required by the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default — demonstrates why the "previously litigated” rule is not the kind of *371“procedural requirement” that Coleman envisioned.
. Like Boyd's case, both Tollett and Mabry involved arguably ineffective assistance of counsel prior to the entry of a valid guilty plea, whereas Strickland was a death penalty case where the issue was whether counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase after the entry of a valid guilty plea. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Mabry was decided one month after Strickland and does not even mention Strickland. Therefore, in my view, despite Strickland’s ubiquity, its two-part test applies to cases alleging ineffective assistance in conjunction with, or subsequent to, a guilty plea, but does not apply to ineffectiveness antecedent to a valid guilty plea.
Judge Sloviter's citation to Menna is not persuasive because Menna is a waiver case and the state does not allege that Boyd "waived” his right to bring his ineffective assistance claim. As the Supreme Court explained in Tollett:
If the issue were to be cast solely in terms of "waiver,” the Court of Appeals was undoubtedly correct in concluding that there had been no such waiver here. But just as the guilty pleas in the Brady trilogy were found to foreclose direct inquiry into the merits of claimed antecedent constitutional violations there, we conclude that respondent's guilty plea here alike forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury.
411 U.S. at 266, 93 S.Ct. 1602.
. Judges Barry and Smith do not join Part V of this Opinion, not because they disagree that Boyd’s claim would fail under the Strickland test, but because they believe that it is unnecessary to reach the issues addressed in this section.
. Judge Sloviter contends that "if a petitioner seeks and is denied a hearing in state court, there is nothing in § 2254(e)(2) that bars the district court from granting a hearing." See Sloviter Op. at 359. Such a holding would expand considerably this Court’s holding in Taylor, which allows for an evidentiary hearing only when the petitioner has been "diligent” in state court.
Furthermore, Judge Sloviter’s interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of § 2254(e)(2). Had Congress intended to make a habeas petitioner's entitlement to a federal hearing dependent upon whether the state court had held one, it could have done so by replacing the language "applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of” in § 2254(e)(2) with the phrase "state court has failed to hold a hearing on.” Section 2254(e)(2) does not state that the development of a factual claim requires an evidentiary hearing in state court and we should not assume that this is the only way a factual record can be developed. See United States ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 240 (7th Cir.2003) (observing that affidavits could develop the factual basis for a counsel ineffectiveness claim for purposes of § 2254(e)(2)); see also Taylor, 504 F.3d at 436 (rejecting a petitioner's claim that, because the PCRA court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing based on an inadequate state procedural default rule, he was entitled to a hearing in federal court). Under Judge Sloviter’s reading of § 2254(e)(2), a state prisoner could obtain an evidentiary hearing in federal court by filing an unsupported request for a hearing in state court, followed by a federal habeas petition which complains of the state court’s failure to hold a hearing. This reading of § 2254(e)(2) cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams, which required that the state request be made "in the manner prescribed by state law.” See 529 U.S. at 437, 120 S.Ct. 1479.
. To the extent Judge Sloviter believes that Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), “actually required” the District Court to grant Boyd a hearing notwithstanding the language of § 2254(e)(2), see Sloviter Op. at 361, she is incorrect. Townsend described the circumstances in which a federal court was required to grant an evidentiary hearing before AEDPA became law. See Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313, 83 S.Ct. 745. As the Supreme Court explained in Schriro, “[i]n cases where an applicant for federal habeas relief is not hatred from obtaining an evidentiary hearing by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the decision to grant such a hearing rests in the discretion of the district court,” as it did before AEDPA under Townsend. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 468, 127 S.Ct. 1933 (emphasis added). As the emphasized language reflects, this does not mean that Townsend requires hearings which are forbidden by § 2254(e). Rather, Townsend reflects the pre-AEDPA standard. As we explained in Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir.2000): “AEDPA amended the federal habeas statute in such a way as to limit the availability of new evidentiary hearings on habeas review.... Prior to AED-PA, new evidentiary hearings were required in several circumstances.... AEDPA, in contrast, permits evidentiary hearings on habeas review, but only in a limited number of circumstances.” Id. at 286 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
. Judge Sloviter criticizes my decision not to analyze the "cause” prong of Strickland. See Sloviter Op. at 357. I decline to do so, however, in light of precedents of the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit, and this decision should not be misconstrued as an approbation of Sciolla’s conduct.
. As explained above, the Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing while laboring under the erroneous conclusion that there
*378were no state court facts warranting AEDPA deference. This error required the District Court to disregard the fruits of that hearing, and examine the record to determine whether the state courts’ findings of fact were reasonable in light of the evidence Boyd chose to place before them. See Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 681 (3d Cir.2006); see also Lambert II, 387 F.3d at 234-35. Nevertheless, the District Court’s only citation to the record was to Boyd’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing that he would have accepted the initial plea. Consequently, the District Court failed to assess the reasonableness of the state courts' disbelief of Boyd's claim that he would have accepted the initial plea offer based on the evidence before them. This too was error. See Rolan, 445 F.3d at 680-81.
Furthermore, as Chief Judge Scirica’s opinion notes, once the Magistrate Judge conducted a hearing, the facts found by the Magistrate Judge were entitled to deference by the District Court, see Hill v. Beyer, 62 F.3d 474, 482 (3d Cir.1995), and could not be rejected without the benefit of a subsequent evidentiary hearing in the District Court.
In summary, to the extent the District Court relied on the evidentiary hearing transcript, it did so in violation of Rolan, and to the extent the District Court made different findings of fact based on that transcript, it did so in violation of Hill.
. Because Judge Sloviter believes that the Magistrate Judge was "required” to hold an evidentiary hearing, see Sloviter Op. at 359-60, she repeats the District Court’s error by making no effort to distinguish the evidence before the Superior Court from the evidence generated at the hearing before the Magistrate Judge. Instead, like the District Court, Judge Sloviter’s summary of the factual background relies on evidence which was not before the state courts, but which was presented for the first time to the Magistrate Judge. To remain faithful to § 2254(e)(2), I have attempted to separate the evidence that Boyd offered to the state courts from the much more voluminous (and sometimes inconsistent) evidence that he offered in federal court.
. On direct appeal in state court, Boyd’s counsel argued that Sciolla had communicated the initial plea offer “to [Boyd] and his parents,” and that Boyd "accepted the advice of counsel and rejected the plea.” App. 135. Likewise, Boyd averred that Sciolla "told me, through my mother” of the initial plea offer.
In her introduction, Judge Sloviter criticizes the state courts for their "assumption ... that Boyd ‘knew about the initial plea offer yet decided to "take his chances with the discretion of the court.” ’ ” Sloviter Op. at 374. The state courts made no such assumption. Rather, Boyd's counsel on direct appeal, Thomas Quinn, represented to the Superior Court that Boyd "decided to take his chances on the discretion of the court as to sentencing.” App. 85-86. Whether one calls this a concession, an admission, or a stipulation, it most assuredly was not an "assumption” by the state court. The state courts took Quinn at his word; far from being "disastrously wrong,” they had every right to do so.
. Boyd submitted affidavits from his parents to the effect that they would have advised him to accept the initial plea offer had they known of the guidelines range. Without passing judgment on whether those affidavits are credible, I note that even if believed, the affidavits shed no light on the question whether Boyd would have heeded his parents' advice. See Paters v. United States, 159 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir.1998).