The facts in this case are undisputed and can be simply stated as follows: On January 2, 1982, at approximately 4:30 p.m. appellant, Brian Corey, was injured while operating a snowmobile in Farragut State Park. The injury occurred when Corey struck a cable which was strung across a path in the park. The State of Idaho had installed the cable and was responsible for its maintenance. The area in which the accident occurred was open for snowmobiling and was not designated as a closed area. Appellant filed this action seeking compensation for his injuries from the *922State of Idaho. He alleged that the State was negligent in installing and maintaining the cable. The State moved for summary-judgment. The trial judge granted the motion, holding that the State was immune from liability under I.C. § 36-1604. This appeal followed.
Appellants present three issues on appeal. They argue first, that I.C. § 36-1604 is inapplicable under the particular facts of this case. Second, they contend that the State’s conduct in this case was “willful” and that the statute does not provide immunity for willful acts. Finally, they assert that if the statute is found applicable in this case, it must necessarily be struck down as an unconstitutional denial of appellants’ right to due process of law. We will address each issue in turn.
Appellants first argue that the statute does not apply in this case. I.C. § 36-1604, as amended in 1980, provides in pertinent part:
“36-1604. Limitation of liability of landowner. — (a) Statement of Purpose. The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public without charge for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes.
“(b) Definitions. As used in this section:
“1. ‘Land’ means private or public land, roads, trails, water, watercourses, private or public ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to or used on the realty.
“2. ‘Owner’ means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises. “3. ‘Recreational Purposes’ includes, but is not limited to, any of the following or any combination thereof: Hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, animal riding, motorcycling, snowmobiling, recreational vehicles, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites, when done without charge of the owner.
“(c) Owner Exempt from Warning. An owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes.
“(d) Owner Assumes No Liability. An owner of land or equipment who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use such property for recreational purposes does not thereby:
“1. Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose.
“2. Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed.
“3. Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons.”
The stated purpose of the statute is to encourage landowners to open their land to the public for recreational use. In the present case, appellants contend that the State — by erecting a steel cable across the trail, was attempting to exclude the public from its land. Thus, appellants assert that the statute does not apply.
Appellants’ argument is unpersuasive. I.C. § 36-1604 specifically provides that an owner of land who permits recreational use of that land without charge does not owe a duty of care to keep the premises safe for such use. The State of Idaho is an “owner” as defined by the statute. Farragut State Park is “public land” open for recreational use. It is uncontroverted that at the time of the accident appellant Corey was in an area of the park open for snowmobiling. Additionally, Corey was engaged in snowmobiling, a recreational activity specifically mentioned in the statute. Thus, there can be no question that , I.C. § 36-1604 is expressly applicable to the factual situation presented by this case.
*923Appellants next argue that I.C. § 36-1604 should be interpreted to exclude intentional or willful conduct on the part of the landowner. However, the issue of whether the statute would absolve a landowner from liability for such conduct is not before us. The only allegation of fault contained in appellants’ complaint is that, “The State of Idaho installed and maintained said cable negligently and failed to warn of its presence.” Appellants neither alleged nor does the record contain any evidence of intentional or willful conduct by the State. Thus, we take no position on the issue of whether I.C. § 36-1604 would absolve a landowner of liability for willful or intentional conduct. See Johnson v. Sunshine Min. Co., Inc., 106 Idaho 866, 871, 684 P.2d 268, 273 (1984).
Finally, appellants assert that I.C. § 36-1604 is unconstitutional as violative of due process because it purports to immunize a landowner from liability for intentional conduct. As we stated above, the question of whether the statute exempts intentional acts by a landowner is not properly before us. Accordingly, the question of whether the statute would be unconstitutional without such an exemption is not before us either.
In Johnson, appellants argued that I.C. § 36-1604 violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and analogous provisions in the Idaho Constitution because it created two classes of persons, non-paying recreational users of another’s land and all other persons using the land of another. This Court upheld the statute under the rational basis test noting that, “The encouragement of recreation enhances the physical well-being of Idaho’s people, has a positive effect on Idaho’s economy, and is a legitimate legislative goal.” Johnson, supra, at 870, 684 P.2d at 272. The applicable standard of analysis under a due process challenge is the same as under an equal protection challenge. See Heese v. A & T Trucking, 102 Idaho 598, 635 P.2d 962 (1981). Under the facts of this case, I.C. § 36-1604 advances legitimate legislative goals in a rational fashion and is therefore constitutional. As was noted above, we take no position on the issue of whether the statute exempts intentional acts of a landowner, and whether the lack of such an exemption would be constitutional.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
Costs to respondent.
No attorney fees on appeal.
SHEPARD, BAKES and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.