concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority opinion that under the common law as it exists in this state there is no liability in this case and that the trial court was correct in dismissing plaintiffs case for failure to state a cause of action. When the legislature, in 1949, repealed R.S. 1923, 21-2150, it would appear obvious that it intended the common law to prevail. As pointed out by the majority opinion, the legislature has, on numerous occasions, revised our liquor control laws but has failed to re-enact legislation creating the cause of action sought by plaintiff and it is not our position to do so. Hence, I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion.
I disagree with that portion of the opinion which would apply long-arm jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) to the facts of this case. The tortious act of the defendant in selling liquor to a minor in Missouri is too far removed from the auto accident occurring hours later, in Kansas, to be considered the “commission of a tortious act within this state” as required by the statute. While plaintiffs unfortunate injuries were suffered in Kansas, they were not, in my opinion, the result of any tortious act committed in Kansas by Jan’s Liquors. The tortious act of this defendant was complete upon the sale of the liquor in Missouri. There are not *642sufficient minimum contacts in this case to justify personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. See Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945); Schlatter v. Mo-Comm Futures, Ltd., 233 Kan. 324, 662 P.2d 553 (1983).
McFarland and Herd, JJ., join in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.