concurring.
I concur in the lead opinion, but write separately to emphasize my view that this is an extremely close case. I believe that the totality of the circumstances would have provided Officer Williams with reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop if, for example, Officer Williams had been responding to a complaint, if he had acted on a tip, if he had seen the men doing anything potentially criminal, or if the men had tried to flee as Williams approached.
But because Officer Williams observed the men only for a moment before blocking their exit and had not seen them do anything other than sitting in See’s vehicle, I cannot say that there were “articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ ” See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)), or that the officer had anything more than an “ill-defined hunch[ ].” See United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir.2008). Officer Williams had every right to investigate further, but he should have simply parked his patrol car alongside See’s vehicle to carry out the investigation in a consensual manner. Instead, he parked his patrol car in such a way so as to block in See’s vehicle, thus transforming the encounter into a Terry stop. I therefore concur, although barely so, in the conclusion that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.