dissenting, with whom ROSE, Justice, joins.
I must disagree with the result reached by the majority opinion and with the essential rationale for that decision. In light of our rule, recognized in the majority opinion, that the purpose and effect of the worker’s compensation laws is to remove the burden of industrial accidents from the worker, and therefore these statutes should be liberally construed to protect the injured employee (Bauer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Division, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1048 (1985); Matter of Johner, Wyo., 643 P.2d 932 (1982)), I cannot justify a construction of a statute specifically designed to protect an injured employee and his family based upon a long-term continued impairment of his earning power which affords him about half of the amount needed. It is clear from the table encompassed in the quotation from the district court’s decision that inflation had a substantial impact upon average monthly wages during the period between 1977 and 1983.
I cannot identify a retrospective application of a statute in this instance because the statutory language was identical at all relevant times. The only question to be decided is whether “two-thirds of the state’s average monthly wage,” used in § 27-12-405(d)(iv), W.S.1977, means two-thirds of the average weekly wage at the time of the injury or two-thirds of the *1083average weekly wage at the time of the additional award.
It seems .to me that there is as much logic and more policy justification for equating “two-thirds of the state’s average monthly wage” with the phrase “the state’s average weekly wage rate as determined quarterly” which appears in § 27-12-405(b), W.S.1977, as there is to equating it with “two-thirds (⅜) of the state’s average weekly wage at the time of the injury.” The entire statutory plan must be read in pari materia to determine what the legislature intended. Haddenham v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 648 P.2d 551, 553-554 (1982), and the authorities there cited. This ease demonstrates that the legislature knew how to use the qualifier “at the time of the injury” when it wished to so qualify the award, because it did so in § 27-12-405(b), W.S.1977. When language appears in one section, but is absent from the other, this court ought not to transfer the language, and should not add words to a statute under the guise of interpretation. Wetering v. Eisele, Wyo., 682 P.2d 1055, 1060 (1984); Matter of Voss’ Adoption, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481, 485 (1976). The omission of words from a statute is to be considered intentional.
While other justifications might abound, the foregoing simply demonstrates that the language governing the award of additional benefits need not be limited necessarily to two-thirds of the average salary at the time of the injury. This simply leaves the section without qualification, and in order to discover if there is any limitation on the additional award this court ought to look at the purpose of the statute in question. The court should identify the mischief the statute was intended to cure. State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holz, Wyo., 674 P.2d 732 (1983); Saffels v. Bennett, Wyo., 630 P.2d 505 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Wetering v. Eisele, Wyo., 682 P.2d 1055 (1984); Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State Board of Control, Wyo., 578 P.2d 557 (1978).
It is apparent to me that in adopting § 27-12-405(b), the mischief the legislature intended to deal with was the economic plight of an injured worker whose disability continued beyond the period for which his initial award would support him and his family. The legislature wanted to avoid leaving this admittedly permanently disabled employee without sufficient support. A liberal construction of the statute would lead to providing adequate additional support benefits to the injured employee who still experiences difficulties beyond the initial five-year period of benefits provided for in § 27-12-405(b). In an inflationary economy, tying the additional benefits to the earlier average salary has the effect of defeating the purpose of the statute, which essentially vests the trial court with discretion to award a suitable amount.
I recognize that the statute does not require the trial court to award the two-thirds of the average salary at the time of the hearing; although it does appear that in this instance the trial court intended to award what it perceived as the maximum benefits. The court still would have the discretion, however, to award some lesser amount because the statute simply provides that the district court may award additional compensation. I therefore would be disposed to reverse the district court and remand the case for a determination as to the amount of additional award which the district court deemed appropriate, bearing in mind that it could award as much as two-thirds of the average monthly wage at the time of the award. I do not conceive that this imposes a burden upon the system to recompute the award each month thereafter.