dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Because Granade, as attorney for the heirs at law, was hired to secure and protect their interest in the estate he later pilfered, he cannot now argue that he is entitled to attorney fees for acquiring that interest.
Ethical considerations, not technical distinctions, should prevail. The argument that Granade is insulated from his violation of at least six professional standards,1 because he changed hats from lawyer to administrator in concluding his involvement in this transaction, is one which only a lawyer would understand. He is the one who took the money. Whether he did it as lawyer or administrator is immaterial.2 In this case, the functions are indistinguishable, and his forfeiture in one should bar his profiting from the other. Granade’s claim to fees should have been summarily denied. In any event, a partial summary judgment in his favor was error.
*222Decided June 25, 1987 Reconsideration denied July 8, 1987. Smith, Gambrell & Russell, James H. Bratton, Jr., Frederick G. Boynton, Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr., for appellants. Glenville Haldi, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Weltner join in this dissent.
See Rules and Regulations of the State Bar, Standards 4, 23, 45, 63, 64, and 65, any one of which may subject a violator to disbarment.
Granade concedes, on the record, that he continued to represent the heirs until he was ousted as administrator and that the contingency upon which his fee was based (presumably as attorney in the will litigation) was the receipt by the heirs of their grandmother’s estate. Interestingly, he made no claim for fees at all until the heirs sought his removal as administrator. How then can this representation be said to be as a matter of law two separate and distinct matters?