I have signed the majority opinion because I concur in the majority’s judgment that the disability insurance proceeds are the husband’s separate property. I also agree with the majority’s reasoning that the present case is distinguishable from In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848 [221 Cal.Rptr. 546, 710 P.2d 346] (Saslow) because the husband in the present case renewed the insurance policies after the parties’ marital separation, with premiums paid with his separate property, i.e., his postseparation income, and with no intent to provide retirement income to the marital community. I write separately, however, because I believe that instead of merely distinguishing Saslow we should overrule it. Saslow was poorly reasoned and incorrect in result and may continue to cause future problems that, unlike this case, cannot be distinguished.
As the majority correctly explains, Saslow held that disability insurance proceeds received after marital separation are community property if three conditions are met: (1) the insurance was purchased wholly with community funds; (2) payment of the benefits began before the separation; and (3) the benefits were intended to provide community retirement income. My principal objection to Saslow is the third element. In the private disability insurance context, I see no apparent logic in the notion that disability benefits can be a replacement for retirement income.
Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848, must first be put in context. It was preceded by a number of decisions dealing with government pensions and disability payments. For example, in the case on which Saslow relied most heavily, the husband was entitled to choose between military disability and retirement pay. (In re Marriage of Stenquist(1978) 21 Cal.3d 779 [148 Cal.Rptr. 9, 582 P.2d 96] (Stenquist).) He chose the disability alternative because its payments were higher—75 percent of his salary rather than 65 percent if he chose the retirement alternative. (Like his retirement, the disability payments were based on length of service and rank.) No one disputed that his retirement pension was a community asset. He contended, however, that the disability payments were his separate property. The court disagreed, finding that he should not be allowed to defeat the community interest in the retirement pension by electing the disability alternative. Specifically, the holding was that military retirement pay for disability contains two components, compensation for lost earnings (separate property) and retirement support (community property).
In Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848, as in the present case, the husband was not a government worker. The disability payments were purchased from a private insurer. Saslow acknowledged this difference and acknowledged the difficulty of applying the Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d 779, reasoning, but *1037nevertheless held that private disability benefits are separate property if they are intended by the parties to replace postdissolution earnings that would have been the spouse’s separate property, but are community property to the extent they are intended to replace retirement income. Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848, misinterpreted Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d 779. As a later Court of Appeal observed, “The case [Stenquist] holds only that the portion of a disability pension which is attributable to employment longevity rather than to the disability is akin to a retirement pension and thus is community property.” (In re Marriage of Fisk (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1705 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 95].) In Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848, as in the present case, no portion of the disability benefits were attributable to longevity of employment and thus bore no attribute of a retirement pension. Saslow extended Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d 779, beyond its logical limits.
Aside from a lack of precedent, the threshold problem with Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848, is that it does not comport with commercial insurance reality. A disability insurer does not pay its insured to retire; rather, the whole purpose of coverage is to replace lost earnings. Imagine the response if a person called his or her insurer and said, “I’m tired of working, sell me a lot of disability coverage, so I can claim a disability and retire early.” Preposterous as that is, it is the cornerstone of Saslow. One simply cannot, however, purchase disability insurance to retire.
The point in Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d 779, and the other government-worker cases was that the bureaucrat had a fund from which to draw based on his years of service, salary, and the like. He could take it either as a retirement pension or as disability. The courts believed the worker should not be allowed to defeat a spouse’s interest in this fund that had been acquired with community labor during the marriage merely by labeling the payments as being for disability rather than for retirement. In that limited context, the reasoning perhaps makes some sense. But, in the private disability insurance context, the principle is not only difficult to apply, as acknowledged in Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848, the principle also simply makes no sense. If the person is able to work, he will not be paid the benefits, i.e., as a practical matter insurance companies are not charitable institutions. They are not going to pay an insured to take an early retirement under the ruse of a disability.
Implicit in Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848, was the view that the insurance company had been “scammed." Perhaps the facts in a given case may suggest a spouse has manipulated his or her circumstances so as to quit work early in life. But we should not be second-guessing the carrier’s determination that its insured is disabled. If it believed he or she was not disabled, it *1038surely would not have honored the claim for benefits. To suggest that disability insurance is a form of retirement planning will greatly surprise the insurance industry.
Moreover, the Sasbw holding, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848, seems to require a court to second-guess every insurer’s determination to pay benefits. If the insurer refuses to pay, the question of characterization of payments never arises. Thus, the question can arise only when the insurer concludes the insured is legitimately disabled. To characterize the payments as community property, however, the court will have to conclude that the carrier was duped and that the payments are really for retirement rather than for disability. This seems a curious result.
In light of all the flaws in Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848, and the problems it causes, I would overrule that decision. Otherwise, I concur in the present majority opinion.
Arabian, J., concurred.
GEORGE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.I concur in the majority’s conclusion that, under the circumstances of this case, the husband is entitled to retain as his separate property all of the disability benefits payable under the disability policies, because he chose to maintain the disability policies in force after separation—by paying the renewal premiums from his separate property—and thereafter became disabled. I agree with the majority that the decision in In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848 [221 Cal.Rptr. 546, 710 P.2d 346]—which held that, under some circumstances, disability insurance benefits, payable to a spouse after separation, may constitute community property—should not be extended to this factual setting.
Although I agree with the majority that the benefits payable under the disability insurance policies properly should be considered the husband’s separate property, I respectfully dissent from that opinion insofar as it fails to require the husband to reimburse the community for the value, at the time of separation, of the contractual right to renew the disability policies, a valuable asset that had been obtained and retained during the marriage through the expenditure of a significant amount of community funds. As I shall explain, in permitting the husband, upon separation, to appropriate for his own use and benefit this valuable community asset, without requiring him to reimburse the community for the value of that asset, the majority has departed from established community property principles and has provided an unwarranted windfall to the husband. In my view, regardless of the purpose or intent underlying the decision to obtain the disability policies, *1039there is no justification for refusing to provide a fair reimbursement to the community under these circumstances.
I
In analyzing the question whether the community is entitled to any reimbursement with regard to the disability policies at issue in this case, I begin with several familiar principles fundamental to the concept of community property. First, it is well established that property obtained during the marriage with community funds is itself community property. (Former Civ. Code, §5110, now Fam. Code, §760.) Second, it also is well established that this principle applies to insurance policies obtained during the marriage with community funds. (See, e.g., Tyre v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 399, 402 [6 Cal.Rptr. 13, 353 P.2d 725].) Third, it is equally well established that, upon separation of the parties or dissolution of a marriage, one spouse is not entitled to appropriate a community asset for his or her own use without reimbursing the community for the value of the appropriated asset. (Former Civ. Code, § 4800, subd. (a), now Fam. Code, § 2550; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366, 372-374 [217 Cal.Rptr. 301].)
As the majority acknowledges, each of the disability insurance policies here at issue was obtained initially during the marriage, and, prior to the parties’ separation, all of the premiums were paid with community funds. Accordingly, under the general community property principles set forth in the preceding paragraph, it is clear that, at the time of separation, each disability policy was itself a community asset.
After the parties separated, the husband appropriated and retained, for his own benefit and use, one significant element of these community assets—the contractual right of renewal contained in each of the then existing disability policies1—and thereafter continued to renew the policies until he became disabled and qualified for disability benefits under the policies. In my view, it clearly follows, under the general principles set forth above, that the *1040husband should be required to reimburse the community for the value possessed at the time of separation by the appropriated community asset— i.e., the value of the contractual right to renew the disability policies.
II
A question may be raised whether the contractual right of renewal contained within the disability policies here at issue is a sufficiently significant asset for which reimbursement should be required. In addressing that question, I believe it is useful to describe these disability policies in more detail than is set forth by the majority.
As the majority note each of the disability policies was written with a three-month renewal term and provided that in the event the renewal premium were not paid within the thirty-one-day grace period following expiration of any three-month term, the policy would lapse. At the same time, each policy contained a clause providing that the policy was “non-cancellable” and guaranteeing that the policyholder could continue the policy in force by timely payment of the renewal premiums. Finally—and this point may not be apparent from the majority opinion—each policy guaranteed that, from the time the policy was issued until the insured turned 65 years of age, the renewal premiums for the policy would remain unchanged, thus guaranteeing the policyholder that the full disability coverage provided under the policies could be retained until the insured reached age 65 at the same premium that was in effect when the policy was issued, regardless of the medical condition of the insured.2 (The policies also guaranteed the insured the right to renew the policies from age 65 to age 75 so long as the insured was “actively and gainfully employed full time,” but with respect to that time period the policies specifically provided that the premium rate was not guaranteed and that the insured would be required to pay premiums based upon “our premium rates in effect at time of renewals.”)
Under these circumstances, it appears clear that the contractual right of renewal contained in these policies constituted a significant asset that, in all likelihood, had a substantial value at the time the parties separated. It is evident, of course, that the right of renewal would have significant value if the husband’s medical condition at the time of separation was such that, in the open market, he either would have been unable to obtain comparable *1041disability insurance at any cost, or, more likely, would have been able to obtain comparable disability insurance only at a significantly increased premium. (Accord, Estate of Logan, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 319, 321, 326.) But even if the husband’s medical condition at the time of separation itself would not have affected the availability or cost of comparable disability insurance, the right of renewal contained in the policies in question nonetheless likely possessed a substantial value, because it appears improbable that, at the time of separation, the husband would have been able to obtain comparable disability insurance in the open market at the same premium that was in effect several years earlier when the disability policy initially was issued and when the husband was younger. Accordingly, in view of its “guaranteed premium” feature, the contractual right of renewal was likely to have significant value in most, if not all, circumstances. And precisely because the “guaranteed premium” aspect of the policies’ right of renewal was so valuable, it appears likely that a substantial portion of the very significant disability premium payments made by the community during the marriage was attributable to this feature of the disability policies.3
Under these circumstances, no justification exists for permitting the husband to appropriate, for his own benefit, this contractual right of renewal (which had been obtained during the marriage with community funds), without reimbursing the community for the value of this asset at the time of separation.
III
The general reimbursement principles set forth above are not inapplicable simply because, after separation, the asset in question—i.e., the right to renew the disability policies—may have been of value only to the husband and not to the wife. There are many items purchased with community funds during a marriage that may be of use or value to only one of the marital partners—for example, a spouse’s personal wardrobe, custom golf clubs, or other personalized property. When such items have been purchased during the marriage with community funds they are community property, and if one spouse retains such property upon dissolution, the other spouse is entitled to obtain community property of equal value (or the spouse who retains the property must otherwise reimburse the community for the value of the retained property).
In the case of an individual disability insurance policy, of course, the spouse who is covered by the policy is not compelled to renew the policy *1042after separation through the payment of premiums from his or her separate income, and thus, if the insured spouse chooses to let the policy lapse upon separation, the insured spouse, not having used a community asset, would not have any obligation to reimburse the community. But when, as here, the insured spouse, upon separation, chooses to exercise the right to renew the policy and maintain it in effect, the insured spouse has retained and utilized, for his or her own benefit, a community asset. Under such circumstances, there appears to be no reason why the spouse who retains such a community asset should not be obligated to reimburse the community for the value of the asset.
IV
Furthermore, the general community property principles requiring reimbursement under such circumstances are not inapplicable simply because the community asset in question—the contractual right to renew the disability policy—is less tangible than a suit of clothes, a dress, or a set of custom-made golf clubs. If, during the marriage, community funds or efforts are used, for example, to acquire an option to purchase a parcel of real property or shares of stock for an established price at some point in the future, there would be no question, of course, but that the option, though an intangible asset that might never be exercised, would be a community asset that could not be appropriated unilaterally by one of the spouses without reimbursement to the community. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Nelson (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 150, 154 [222 Cal.Rptr. 790] [stock options]; In re Marrige of Hug (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 782 [201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 46 A.L.R.4th 623] [same].) In like manner, the intangible nature of the contractual right to renew the disability policy, and the possibility that the insured might never become disabled and thus might never receive disability benefits under the policy, provide no justification for permitting the husband to appropriate the right of renewal as his own separate property without reimbursing the community for the value of that significant asset at the time of separation.
V
Finally, in my view, the established community property principles mandating reimbursement cannot be held inapplicable on the theory that the asset here in question—the right to renew the disability policies at the guaranteed premium—is not reasonably susceptible of valuation. The record in this case contains no evidence whatsoever suggesting that this type of asset is not subject to reasonable valuation, and past cases that have discussed the valuation question with regard to the similar right to renew a term life insurance policy have observed that “expert testimony can undoubtedly establish its value.” (Estate of Logan, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 319, 326, fn. 8.)
*1043Indeed, in the course of dissolution proceedings, trial courts frequently are required to determine the value of numerous items, such as pension benefits, stock options, and business goodwill, that may not have a readily ascertainable market value and whose worth must be evaluated on the basis of expert testimony that takes into account a number of variables. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bergman (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 742, 752-754 [214 Cal.Rptr. 661] [pension benefits]; In re Marriage of Hug, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 794 [stock options]; In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 109-110 [113 Cal.Rptr. 58] [goodwill].) There is no reason to believe that experts in the field of insurance are incapable of providing a reasonable estimate of the value of the contractual renewal provisions at issue in this case, based, for example, upon a comparison of the premiums payable under the existing policies with the premiums that the husband would have been required to pay had he sought to obtain, in the open market, a new disability policy, with equivalent benefits, at the time of separation. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gonzalez (1988) 168 Cal.App.3d 1021, 1026 [214 Cal.Rptr. 634] [suggesting that the “replacement value” of an insurance policy may provide an appropriate method of valuation].) The value possessed by the right to renew the policies at the time of separation, of course, is not dependent upon the subsequent course of events that transpired after separation, and, in particular, would not be affected by whether, or when, the insured actually became disabled and began receiving benefits under the policy.
VI
Accordingly, although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in holding that some of the benefits payable under the disability policies should be treated as community property rather than the husband’s separate property (and I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the Court of Appeal judgment on this point), I conclude that, in addition, we should direct the Court of Appeal to order the trial court, on remand, to determine the value—as of the time of separation—of the community’s contractual right to renew the disability policies, and to order the husband to reimburse the community for that amount.
As prior decisions have explained, renewable term insurance policies contain two basic elements: (1) “dollar coverage,” payable if the insured-against event occurs within the policy period, and (2) the right to renew the policy for future terms, typically without proof of continued insurability at the time of renewal. (See, e.g., Estate of Logan (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 319, 324 [236 Cal.Rptr. 368].) In the present case, which involves “privately owned” individual insurance policies (rather than an employment-related group policy), the right of renewal contained in each of the insurance policies clearly constituted a legally enforceable contractual right, and not a “mere expectancy.” (See generally, Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 1994) ¶¶ 8:88 to 8:94, pp. 8-20 to 8-22; cf. In re Marriage of Spengler (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 288, 299 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 764] [“the renewal right aspect of an employment-related group term life insurance policy is not property subject to division in marital dissolution where the employee has no enforceable right to renewal' (italics added)].)
In this respect, the renewable disability policies here at issue differ significantly from the renewable term life insurance policies described in Estate of Logan, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 319. In Estate of Logan, the court quoted a treatise that stated that, in general, term life insurance policies “ ‘either have increasing premiums from year to year, or provide decreasing death benefits paid on the insured’s death. ’ ” (Id. at p. 324, citing 5A Markey, Cal. Family Law, Practice and Procedure (1979) § 122.03[2] [b].)
According to the testimony of an insurance agent called by the husband, at the time of separation the premiums on the disability policies here at issue exceeded $7,000 per year.