dissenting.
I accept the standard approved by the majority that the penalty imposed by the Board in a disciplinary proceeding is prima facia correct. I further agree that the penalty imposed should not be disturbed unless, upon our independent reading of the record, “it appears unjustified by a reasonable view of the evidence or contrary to law.” I disagree, however, with the conclusion of the majority that there is no valid basis for disturbing the penalty.
Acknowledging that many members of this Court might have been unwilling to impose the ultimate sanction in the present case, the majority is unwilling to reverse the ruling of the Board. I share the majority’s reluctance to disturb a result that has been reached after careful consideration by a group of high-minded lawyers who seek only to perform the difficult and unpopular task of policing their profession. Nevertheless, the revocation of Tucker’s license to practice law, under the facts of this case, shocks my conscience and, in my view, is unjustified.
The record shows that Tucker was dilatory, disorganized, and inefficient. His failure to communicate with his clients was inexcusable. But his conduct, while subject to valid criticism, was not dishonest. In the Carrington matter, Tucker filed the petition for child support within two months after his fee had been paid and two months before the client filed a complaint with the Virginia State Bar. Tucker failed, however, to keep his client informed or to make himself available for information.
In the Braxton matter, Tucker was dilatory and uncommunicative. Nevertheless, after considerable delay and lack of communication between lawyer and client, Tucker had a final divorce decree entered in accordance with his employment agreement. The Board reported that the client “suffered no loss, but the matter was delayed beyond the normal time expected for this type of uncontested divorce.”
The Board acknowledged in its final order that the two cases “if taken by themselves, might warrant something less than the sanction” imposed. But the Board took into consideration three earlier instances where Tucker had been disciplined. In 1982, his license had been suspended for 45 days for unauthorized alteration of a document. In 1984, his license had been suspended for 90 days for charging an excessive fee and failing to “pick up a deed of trust.” *536In 1984, he received a private reprimand for failure to return overpaid real estate taxes to a client.
The Board concluded that Tucker had developed a pattern of misconduct over a considerable period of time which indicated that he was unable to practice law competently “without causing injury to his clients.” In the two cases under direct review, however, Tucker’s misconduct, which undoubtedly was aggravating and frustrating to the clients, consisted of no more than delay and failure to communicate. There was no suggestion that his conduct was similar to that for which he had previously been disciplined. It might be a permissible inference that he had learned from the earlier disciplinary proceedings to avoid those kinds of misconduct. If procrastination and failure to communicate with clients are sufficient to justify permanent denial of the privilege of earning a living as a lawyer, the ranks of the practicing bar may soon be seriously depleted.
I do not object to a lesser penalty for Tucker’s sins of omission, but I cannot agree that the ultimate sanction is justified. I would reverse the order insofar as it revoked Tucker’s license and remand the case for determination of a more appropriate sanction.
STEPHENSON and THOMAS, JJ., joint in dissent.