dissenting.
Because Anthony G. Caroway knowingly violated Georgia law and Rule 8.4 (a) (2) by engaging in intentional criminal misconduct resulting in his conviction for felony possession of cocaine, felony possession of methamphetamine by ingestion, felony possession of marijuana and driving under the influence, and he sought treatment for his admitted abuse of illegal substances only after his second arrest, I agree with the State Bar that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case. See In the Matter of Horn, 269 Ga. 826 (505 SE2d 21) (1998); In the Matter of Stoner, 246 Ga. 581 (272 SE2d 313) (1980). While I commend Caroway for his efforts in combating his problems,
the appearance of a convicted attorney continuing to practice does more to disrupt public confidence in the legal *384profession than any other disciplinary problem. Members of the Bar must maintain a high standard of conduct. If the law is to be respected, the public must be able to respect the individuals who administer it.Decided May 23, 2005. William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, K. Gene Chapman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia. James E. Spence, Jr., for Caroway.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 582. See In the Matter of Calhoun, 268 Ga. 675 (492 SE2d 514) (1997) (maintaining public trust demands that lawyer who commits serious violation pay appropriate penalty, regardless of mitigating factors of addiction and subsequent treatment). The Court’s 24 month suspension of Caroway, a term far less than that imposed by the criminal court for his illegal conduct, fails to adequately protect the public and disrupts public confidence in the legal profession. Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson and Justice Hines join in this dissent.