concurring:
I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals erred in vacating respondent’s guilty plea, but write separately because I adhere to my dissenting position expressed in State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005). In my opinion, the circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea unless the Grand Jury has returned a True Bill, or unless the defendant executes a written waiver of presentment prior to the trial court’s acceptance of the plea. S.C Const, art. I, § 11; S.C.Code Ann. §§ 17-23-130 and -140 (2003).
Here, the State relies upon respondent’s signature on a sentencing sheet that contains all the information necessary for a valid waiver of presentment to meet the statutory requirements3. While there is nothing in the record that indicates when the sentencing sheet was signed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proceedings in the court of general sessions are presumed to have been regular. E.g., *349Pringle v. State, 287 S.C. 409, 339 S.E.2d 127 (1986). Applying this presumption, I conclude respondent failed to meet his burden of showing there was no valid waiver of presentment. For this reason, I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the Court of Appeals.
. I disagree with the Court of Appeals that the Constitution and the statutes require the preparation of an indictment as a prerequisite to a waiver of presentment.