(dissenting) — The majority holds that the procedures afforded the public in this case are adequate to protect their interests in electric rate setting. Although I agree with the constitutional and statutory analysis contained in parts I and II of its opinion, I cannot agree with the majority's conclusions concerning the application of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. § 2631 (Supp. 2, 1978) or the Seattle Administrative Code 3.02.1 therefore dissent.
As recognized by the majority, PURPA grants any electric consumer the right to intervene and participate in ratemaking proceedings. 16 U.S.C. § 2631(a). The majority asserts, however, that this right is limited to participation in the consideration of which standards utilities are required to consider in rate setting rather than participation in the actual ratemaking proceeding. I disagree. Such a result is consistent with neither the clear language of PURPA nor the legislative purpose behind its enactment. A close examination of the section relied upon by the majority demonstrates this fact. Section 2631(a) states:
In order to initiate and participate in the consideration of one or more of the standards established by subchap-ter II of this chapter or other concepts which contribute to the achievement of the purposes of this chapter, . . . any electric consumer of an affected electric utility may intervene and participate as a matter of right in any ratemaking proceeding or other appropriate regulatory proceeding relating to rates or rate design which is conducted by . . .a nonregulated electric utility.
(Italics mine.)
The majority's interpretation of this section focuses on the first part of clause 1, i.e., "in the consideration of one or more of the standards established by subchapter II of this *876chapter". But in doing so it ignores language in the second half of that clause. That language grants the right to participate in the consideration of "other concepts which contribute to the achievement of the purposes of this chapter". This language sweeps more broadly than suggested by the majority. When that phrase is recognized and read in light of the section's later reference to a right to "intervene and participate as a matter of right in any ratemaking proceeding", the opposite conclusion must be reached. (Italics mine.) The majority also relies upon Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 72 L. Ed. 2d 532, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982) as authority for the proposition that the phrase "any ratemaking proceeding" means selective ratemaking proceedings. The majority contends that the United States Supreme Court would have had to address the issue of usurpation of state law if the section were so read. The majority's reasoning assumes that the court would reach an issue that was not directly before the court. Such an assumption is unsound. In addition, the PURPA's grant of intervention would survive constitutional challenge because the extent of that intervention is defined by state law. Because the majority misinterprets this section, its reliance is misplaced. For instance, the majority quotes the House Conference Report's statement that "'[t]he procedures for the type of intervention are left to State law'". Majority opinion, at 872 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7797, 7816). The majority takes this deference to state law and equates it with deference to the City's procedures. Consequently, the majority declares "the plenary right of intervention [is] limited by the nature of participation afforded under the City's rate-making procedures", (majority opinion, at 872) and " [appellants' right of intervention and participation in all other proceedings of the Council were limited by the mode of participation provided by the City." Majority opinion, at 873. Such a result is an absurd leap in reasoning. Deference *877to state law means just that, state law. Nothing in PURPA justifies the majority's substitution of City of Seattle law for state law. To vest the right to determine the degree of intervention and participation with the utility or its municipal owner is to let the wolf guard the sheep. Neither section 2631(a) nor Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, supra, justifies the majority's analysis.
Lastly, the limited right of intervention and participation contemplated by the majority neglects legislative history that clearly establishes that this section should be interpreted broadly. The section quoted by the majority demonstrates this point. See majority opinion, at 871-72.
Having established that the right of intervention is to be determined by state law, the next question is what state law? I suggest the best resolution lies in this court requiring that the City of Seattle follow its administrative code in these proceedings. Such a result is consistent both with present state law and the goals of PURPA. The majority admits the Seattle Administrative Code could easily be interpreted to apply to the case at hand but implicitly asserts that such an interpretation exceeds the commonsense limits. I disagree.
Setting of electrical rates is the precise type of "regulation of future effect" which lends itself to the protections of the Seattle Administrative Code. If we as a court were to find ratemaking is a rule under the administrative code, ratepayers would be entitled to notice and a hearing on the adoption of the rates, instead of the limited notice and opportunity to comment allowed by the City in this case. This result would insure ratepayers notice and an opportunity to comment on the City's final rate design. This opportunity was denied by the City's last minute substitution of a new rate scheme, proposed hours before the public meeting.
Finally, by making the City's decision subject to hearing and comment under the administrative code, the court *878would have established a basis for participation which is more consistent with the procedural rights granted in PURPA. I would therefore reverse summary judgment and require the City of Seattle to conform to its own administrative code when engaging in the ratemaking process.
Williams, C.J., and Dore, J., concur with Rosellini, J.