(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe the Court of Appeals properly reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of two suits brought by respondent (Sloan). I would affirm as modified the Court of Appeals’ opinion and find that Sloan’s suits are not moot and that Sloan has standing to bring the suits in circuit court.
Mootness
An appellate court will not pass on moot and academic questions or make an adjudication where there remains no actual controversy. Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 549 S.E.2d 591 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 926, 122 S.Ct. 1295, 152 L.Ed.2d 208 (2002). Moot appeals differ from unripe appeals in that moot appeals result when intervening events render a case nonjusticiable. Id. A case becomes moot when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon the existing controversy. Id. This is true when some event occurs making it impossible for the reviewing Court to grant effectual relief. Id.
*573An exception to the mootness doctrine is that questions of public interest originally encompassed in an action should be decided for future guidance, however abstract or moot they may have become in the immediate contest. Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist., 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d 88 (1947). The Court of Appeals found, pursuant to Ashmore, that this case falls into the public importance exception to the mootness doctrine and that a ruling on the merits of Sloan’s suits would provide future guidance to petitioner.
The majority, relying on Curtis v. State, supra, finds the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect standard for determining'whether a case falls into the public importance exception to the mootness doctrine. The majority states “the Court of Appeals focused not on the standard for invoking this exception (“questions of imperative and manifest urgency”), but instead on the label applied to it (“matter of important public interest”).”
This Court, in Curtis, stated that one exception to the mootness doctrine is that: “an appellate court may decide questions of imperative and manifest urgency to establish a rule for future conduct in matters of important public interest.” Curtis, 345 S.C. at 568, 549 S.E.2d at 596 (emphasis added). However, I do not believe Curtis, via the language italicized above, imposed an additional requirement to the public importance exception to the mootness doctrine. To read Curtis to impose a requirement that a question must be of “imperative and manifest urgency” to meet the public importance exception is against the jurisprudence of this state. See Berry v. Zahler, 220 S.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 459 (1951) (questions of public interest should be decided for future guidance, however abstract or moot they may have become in the immediate contest); Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Dist., supra (same). I would hold that questions of public interest should be decided for future guidance without a requirement that there be some urgency to the matter.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly held that this case falls squarely within the public interest exception. As the. Court of Appeals has noted in a similar case, an important public interest exists in the stewardship of public funds and a strong need exists to provide guidance for future procurement *574decisions. Sloan v. Greenville County, 356 S.C. 531, 590 S.E.2d 338 (Ct.App.2003) (Sloan 2003). The inability to provide any effective relief in a case should not be a barrier to the court’s consideration of a question of exceptional public interest. Id.
Because a question of important public interest is involved, I would hold the Court of Appeals properly reversed the circuit court’s decision to dismiss the suits as moot.
Standing
Although the Court of Appeals did not address the issue whether Sloan had standing to bring the suits against petitioners, I would now address this issue.
To have standing to institute an action, one must have a personal stake in the subject matter of the lawsuit. Evins v. Richland County Historic Pres. Comm’n, 341 S.C. 15, 532 S.E.2d 876 (2000). This Court has consistently held that a private individual may not invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative act unless the private individual can show that, as a result of that action, a direct injury has been sustained, or that there is immediate danger a direct injury will be sustained. Joytime Distribs. & Amusement Co., Inc. v. State, 338 S.C. 634, 528 S.E.2d 647 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1087, 120 S.Ct. 1719, 146 L.Ed.2d 641 (2000). Moreover, the injury must be of a personal nature to the party bringing the action, not merely of a general nature that is common to all members of the public. Id.
The general rule is that a taxpayer may not maintain a suit to enjoin the action of State officers when he has no special interest and his only standing is the exceedingly small interest of a general taxpayer. Crews v. Beattie, 197 S.C. 32, 14 S.E.2d 351 (1941). The mere fact that the issue is one of public importance does not confer upon any citizen or taxpayer the right to invoke a judicial determination of the issue. Id. For a plaintiff to have taxpayer standing, the party must demonstrate some overriding public purpose or concern to confer standing to sue on behalf of his fellow taxpayers. Sloan v. Greenville County, 356 S.C. 531, 590 S.E.2d 338 (Ct.App.2003). See also Baird v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 511 S.E.2d 69 (1999) (standing may be conferred upon a *575party when an issue is of such public importance as to require its resolution for future guidance).
Sloan has standing because the question presented is of such substantial public importance as to warrant a resolution for future guidance. See, e.g. Sloan v. School Dist. Of Greenville County, 342 S.C. 515, 537 S.E.2d 299 (Ct.App.2000). The public interest involved is the prevention of the unlawful expenditure of money raised by taxation.
With specific regard to procurement of services for public works projects, the Court of Appeals has found:
The expenditure of public funds pursuant to a competitive bidding statute is of immense public importance. Requiring that contracts only be awarded through the process of competitive sealed bidding demonstrates the lengths to which our government believes it should go to maintain the public’s trust and confidence in governmental management of public funds. The integrity of the competitive sealed bidding process is so important that in some states “once a contract is proved to have been awarded without the required competitive bidding, a waste of public funds [is] presumed ... without showing that the municipality suffered any alleged injury.”
Sloan 2003, 356 S.C. at 550-551, 590 S.E.2d at 348-349 (citation and quotation omitted).
The Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Sloan 2000 and Sloan 2003 compels the same result in the instant case. Here, Sloan has an interest as a taxpayer in how public funds were spent. The projects required the expenditure of millions of taxpayer dollars and this burden was borne exclusively by the taxpaying citizens of Greenville County. Sloan, therefore, has a material interest in whether the County followed the procurement procedures set out in the county code.
As stated in Sloan 2003, the issue in the present case is of sufficient public importance to confer standing. Resolution of the issues in this case wall likely have an impact on government practices beyond the confines of the case itself. Green-ville County and other public entities must be accountable under the laws that govern how they spend public money.
*576For these reasons, Sloan has standing to pursue these suits in the circuit court. Therefore, I would affirm as modified the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
TOAL, C.J., concurs.