concurring.
I concur with the foregoing opinion, but write separately to address further the fact that a right-to-sue letter had not yet been issued at the time plaintiff filed her ADA suit. Plaintiffs appeal places two policy considerations squarely in conflict.
On the one hand, dismissing this action based on res judicata would undermine the administrative scheme established by the General Assembly. By requiring the parties to proceed administratively before the Department of Labor prior to filing suit, the General Assembly — like Congress, before it, in enacting Title VII— recognized the value of having an administrative body investigate claims and, if appropriate, attempt to resolve them without the need for litigation.
On the other hand, the common law rule against claim-splitting is well-established in North Carolina and holds that “all damages incurred as the result of a single wrong must be recovered in one lawsuit.” Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 492, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1993) (emphasis omitted). To allow a person to seek damages for a termination of employment based on one theory and then, after an adverse decision on that theory, seek the same damages under another theory raises the specter of repetitive litigation, duplicative discovery, possibly inconsistent results, and -no assurance of finality.
I believe the two policies must be reconciled. The question is whether the policy underlying REDA’s administrative review process trumps traditional claim-splitting principles. In this case, as the majority opinion explains, plaintiff was permitted by state law to request a notice of right to sue in order to include the REDA claim in her federal lawsuit. If she preferred to continue the administrative process, she had the option, as defendant suggests, (a) to seek a stay of the pending action in order to allow completion of the administrative process or (b) to move to amend the complaint once the notice of right to sue was received.-Plaintiff, however, took no steps at all to *486try to include the REDA claim in the pending action. Significantly, the federal district court did not enter summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim until 19 March 2003, five months after plaintiff received her notice of right to sue with respect to the REDA claim.
I would also observe that while North Carolina courts have not previously addressed the issue before this Court, numerous other courts have considered closely analogous circumstances and overwhelmingly have reached the same conclusion as this Court. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wyo. Dep’t of Employment Div. of Labor Standards, 314 F.3d 501, 506 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that a Title VII lawsuit was barred by res judicata since plaintiff could have requested a right-to-sue letter or sought to stay a prior Equal Pay Act lawsuit pending completion of the EEOC administrative process), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 826, 157 L. Ed. 2d 48, 124 S. Ct. 181 (2003); Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 193-94 (3d Cir. 1999) (when a jury had rendered a verdict in a case alleging that plaintiffs termination violated the FMLA, plaintiffs second action challenging the discharge under the ADA was barred by res judicata; plaintiff should have requested a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC or sought a stay of the FMLA action pending receipt of the letter); Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 1997) (wrongful discharge ADA claim was barred by res judicata because of entry of summary judgment in a state court action alleging discharge in retaliation for workers’ compensation claim even though plaintiff did not have right-to-sue letter from the EEOC; holding that plaintiff should have sought to amend the state complaint upon obtaining the letter), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1046, 140 L. Ed. 2d 511, 118 S. Ct. 1361 (1998).
Because I find these cases persuasive in balancing the conflicting policies, I join the majority opinion. I would, however, urge trial courts to view favorably motions to stay proceedings and motions to amend complaints in these circumstances. See Churchill, 183 F.3d at 194 (“We believe that district courts are likely to look favorably on applications for stays of FMLA proceedings while plaintiffs promptly pursue administrative remedies under Title VII and similar state laws and we urge them to do so.”).