(dissenting) — The majority opinion constitutes a significant departure from prior law, and calls into question the continuing viability of nearly all our cases relating to the extension of qualified immunity to the State. Because I do not believe the change in direction is advisable, I respectfully dissent.
The majority justifies its departure on several bases, none of which stand up under scrutiny. The majority relies upon (1) a general rule in the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958) which does not reflect the general rule in this state where governmental liability is at issue; (2) an unpersuasive attempt to distinguish a number of our cases; and (3) policy said to support liability of the State for the actions of parole officers even where the individual parole officers are immune, although policy considerations in fact weigh in favor of the extension of immunity.
In addition, the majority relies upon RCW 4.92.090, enacted in 1961 and waiving sovereign immunity. The majority’s view of the statute, however, is inconsistent with a line of cases extending from 1966 to 1992, cases which both precede and follow the decision in Babcock v. State, 116 Wn.2d 596, 809 P.2d 143 (1991), upon which the majority heavily relies. Babcock, which is distinguishable *450from this case, stands alone as a decision where the immunity of a state employee was not extended to the State.
A. RCW 4.92.090
The majority reasons that RCW 4.92.090, which abolishes sovereign immunity, operates to make the State presumptively liable in all instances in which the Legislature has not indicated otherwise.
RCW 4.92.090 was enacted in 1961. Laws of 1961, ch. 136, § 1. Contrary to the majority’s reasoning, the statute does not state a rule that if there is tortious conduct, the government is liable. Instead, the statute says that the government is liable to the same extent as a private person or corporation. In 1966, this court noted that prosecuting attorneys are individually immune, as a matter of public policy, from prosecution for acts done in their official capacity. Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wn.2d 882, 884, 410 P.2d 606 (1966). The court held that the public policy which requires quasi-judicial immunity for prosecutors also requires immunity for the state and county for the acts of the prosecutors in their official capacity. Creelman, 67 Wn.2d at 885.
The decision in Creelman followed by just a few years the enactment of RCW 4.92.090. Significantly, the decision was made in the face of the express argument made by the majority here — that the statutory abrogation of sovereign immunity forecloses the state and county from sharing the prosecutor’s immunity. Creelman, 67 Wn.2d at 885. Contrary to the majority opinion, Creelman demonstrates that RCW 4.92.090 does not constitute a bar to extension of individual employees’ immunities to the State (or other governmental employer). As is the case where private entities are involved, this court can and does continue to decide whether there is a sound legal basis for extending immunities. Sovereign immunity has been abolished. Development of the common law has not.
For over thirty years, the Legislature has known that *451under this court’s construction RCW 4.92.090 is not a bar to extension of an agent’s immunity to the employing State or other governmental entity. Cases decided since Creelman have similarly addressed individual immunity which is extended to the State. E.g., Guffey v. State, 103 Wn.2d 144 (qualified immunity of law enforcement officer extended to governmental employer); Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wn.2d at 125-26 (reaffirming that respondeat tort liability is retained as basis for local entity tort liability for acts of officers, which requires that immunity for judicial and quasi-judicial officers in performance of official duties be extended to local entity), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1044 (1993).
Given the long-standing legislative acquiescence in this court’s rejection of the argument that the waiver of sovereign immunity means that the immunity of the individual cannot be extended to the government, it is misleading for the majority to suggest, as it does, that RCW 4.92.090 would be treated as a nullity contrary to legislative intent if the qualified immunity of parole officers is extended to the State.
B. Agency Law
The majority also reasons that agency law dictates that the qualified immunity of the parole officers not be extended to the State. The general rule upon which the majority relies has not heretofore been the law in this state where governmental liability is at issue, and I believe its adoption in this case is unwise.
Initially, this court has extended individual immunity to the governmental employer in a number of cases. Creelman, 67 Wn.2d 882; Guffey, 103 Wn.2d 144; Frost v. City of Walla Walla, 106 Wn.2d 669. The agency principle upon which the majority relies did not require a different result in those cases. Indeed, the decision in Creelman to extend the indi*452vidual immunity to the governmental employer was made in the face of argument that "the immunity of one of two or more persons, who would otherwise be liable for a harm, does not bar recovery against the others.” Creelman, 67 Wn.2d at 885 (the argument was based upon 4 Restatement of Torts § 880 (1939)). The court rejected the notion that immunity of one person may not be extended to another where the policy reasons for the immunity apply as well to the second person or entity. This conclusion was reached in precisely the kind of case now before the court — where a party is asserting that a general rule be applied to hold that immunity of a state agent does not extend to the State where the State is sued on the basis of respondeat superior.
Moreover, in Frost, this court overruled Spencer v. King County, 39 Wn. App. 201, 692 P.2d 874 (1984), where the Court of Appeals had refused to extend individual police officer immunity to the county under the involuntary commitment law. Frost, at 673-74. In Spencer, the court, like the majority in this case, relied in part upon Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217 (1958) for its holding. In overruling Spencer, the court said that the decision there contradicted Creelman.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217 (1958) was cited in Babcock. First, the court noted the general rule that an agent’s immunity generally does not extend to the principal. Babcock, 116 Wn.2d at 620. The court then recognized, however, that "personal immunities” of some government officials had nevertheless been extended to the government in this state. Babcock, 116 Wn.2d at 621 (citing Creelman and Guffey). The court distinguished those cases by saying that in each of them the State had "committed no acts of its own; the plaintiffs could only sue on the basis of respondeat superior.” Babcock, 116 Wn.2d at 621. The court then said that the plaintiffs in Babcock alleged that DSHS’s negligent supervision caused injury.
To the extent this analysis means that the government may not shield itself from negligent acts which are distinct *453from those of the immune individuals, this analysis is sound. As the court said in Babcock, 116 Wn.2d at 622, existence of some tort liability would encourage DSHS, the agency there involved, to avoid negligent conduct and enable persons injured by DSHS to recover.
More important to this case, where the basis of the suit is respondeat superior, Babcock recognized that our cases have extended individual immunity to the government employer, and have done so despite the general rule of agency law relied on in this case by the majority. Contrary to the majority’s implication in this case, Babcock does not stand for the proposition that Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217 precludes extension of immunity in this case.
In short, as acknowledged in Babcock, and as reflected in our cases, § 217 does not represent the general rule in this State where the governmental employer is sued on the basis of respondeat superior.
C. Prior Case Law
The majority attempts to distinguish cases extending individual immunity to the State.
The majority says that prior cases extending immunity to the State involve judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. It then summarily dismisses cases where the court has extended the individual’s immunity to the government employer which does not involve judicial or quasi-judicial immunity, saying they are "not sound authority.” Majority at 442.
Specifically, the majority says that judicial and quasi-judicial immunity are designed to protect the government, not the individual employee, from suit. Majority at 441. Protection of the public, and, in the case of judicial immunity, the independence of the judiciary, are purposes met by such immunities, and justify extending the individual’s immunity to the governmental employer. Ma*454jority at 441. In contrast, the majority says, qualified immunity such as is granted to parole officers and caseworkers is intended to protect the individual from the unduly inhibiting effect the fear of personal liability would have on their performance of their jobs. Majority at 441.
Neither our cases nor common sense support the distinction drawn by the majority. In Creelman, where prosecutors’ quasi-judicial immunity was addressed, the public policy identified was that
[i]f the prosecutor must weigh the possibilities of precipitating tort litigation involving the county and the state against his action in any criminal case, his freedom and independence in proceeding with criminal prosecutions will be at an end.
Creelman, 67 Wn.2d at 885.
In Frost, the court held that statutory immunity granted to a police officer engaged in seizure and impoundment of a vehicle under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act must be extended to the employer city. The court relied upon the Creelman rationale, reasoning that the public policy underlying the immunity was
to promote efficient and unhampered police action, free from the hindrance created if liability could be imposed on police for their good faith, objectively reasonable actions. To give the officers protection against liability, while allowing suits against the jurisdiction employing them, would defeat this purpose.
Frost, 106 Wn.2d at 673.
Creelman is founded on the policy that a prosecutor cannot effectively prosecute under the threat of individual liability. Without question the public’s interest in prosecution of criminals is at issue, and accordingly the government’s interest is at issue. Prosecutors must have the freedom and independence to do their jobs in the public interest.
Similarly, a police officer’s ability to function as a police officer is also affected if the fear of personal liability *455inhibits decision making and police action. That does not mean the purpose of the immunity is the protection of the individual. As in the case of quasi-judicial prosecutorial immunity, the purpose, as explained in Frost, is to assure unhampered and efficient police action. Again, it is the ability to do the job in the public interest that underscores the immunity.
In this case, as in Frost, avoidance of personal liability for the employee is not the purpose of the qualified immunity recognized in Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195. The purpose of the qualified immunity granted to parole officers is to enable them to perform a difficult job under exacting conditions where decisions must be made which affect both the parolee’s liberty and the safety of the public, free of fear of lawsuits. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 215. The fundamental purpose is to provide the individual "parole officers the immunity they need to perform their jobs effectively . . . .” (Italics mine.) Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 216.
Effective supervision of parolees is clearly in the public interest. Moreover, it is simply naive to think that the possibility of government liability would have no effect on the way the government’s employees perform their jobs. The majority’s implication that any immunity which is not judicial or quasi-judicial immunity is not designed to protect the public, and accordingly the government, violates common sense.
In addition, this notion that the function of qualified immunity of parole officers is to alleviate personal liability is questionable in the face of RCW 4.92.075. Under that provision, the State will satisfy a judgment entered against a state employee for acts or omissions while performing, or in good faith purporting to perform, official duties. Thus, for the most part, an employee performing his or her job should have little fear of personal liability in any case. The remaining, and perhaps greater concern, is the impact on job performance and ultimately public safety which *456will result from refusing to extend qualified immunity to the State.
D. Public Policy
The majority states that public policy supports a refusal to extend the qualified immunity of parole officers to the State, observing that the potential of state liability "can be expected to have the salutary effect of providing the State an incentive to ensure that reasonable care is used in fashioning guidelines and procedures for the supervision of parolees.” Majority at 446.
This makes no sense. Without an extension of immunity the State will be liable on a respondeat superior theory for a parole officer’s negligence regardless of whether he or she substantially complied with directives and regulations. What difference would it make whether the State drafted the guidelines with reasonable care, if liability for the employee’s negligence exists in any event?
More importantly, the State may be sued for its own independent acts of negligence. See Babcock, 116 Wn.2d at 621. Although I will not attempt to list all the actions which might give rise to liability for the State’s own negligence, there could, for example, be negligence in training and supervising parole officers or in establishing guidelines and procedures, depending upon the circumstances.
Where parole supervision is involved, additional policy considerations are implicated. In Taggart, the court held that the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board enjoys quasi-judicial immunity and is absolutely immune for its release decisions. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 207. Despite this immunity, however, release decisions, as well as supervisory decisions, will be inhibited if the parole officers’ qualified immunity does not extend to the State. The reason is that, like the parole officers, the Board cannot help but be affected by the potential for State liability resulting from its release decisions. If the State may be subsequently liable for a parole officer’s negligent supervision of an inmate *457with dangerous propensities, the Board is apt to think twice about paroling inmates who otherwise would be paroled. One might initially think this is in fact a side benefit to no extension of immunity (no release of potentially dangerous inmates), but further reflection reveals the flaw in that thinking. Parole provides a means of supervising the parolee as he or she rejoins society. Through that supervision there is the opportunity for the parolee’s integration to occur while some control of the parolee’s life and conduct is maintained. The benefits of monitored release are lost where parole is not granted. Those benefits for inmates eligible for parole should not be lost based upon the possibility that the State might be liable for some parolee’s violent conduct.
The policy considerations are not confined, of course, to performance of the job, here parole supervision. The importance of an available remedy for the injured party weighs heavily in the balance. In general, leaving a wronged claimant without a remedy "runs contrary to the most fundamental precepts of our legal system.” Lutheran Day Care, 119 Wn.2d at 105. The public policy of providing a remedy for wronged claimants does not always tip the scales, though, as is evident from our cases where the policy in favor of the immunity outweighs this policy. E.g., Creelman, Frost. Moreover, in Taggart the court did not adopt an absolute immunity for parole officers. Instead, the parole officer is immune only for actions in furtherance of a statutory duty and in substantial compliance with the directives of superiors and relevant regulatory guidelines. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 216. Victims of violent felons are not deprived of a remedy where the parole officer did not substantially follow directives and guidelines; neither the individual parole officer nor the State would have immunity in that case.
Moreover, if there is negligence on the part of the State aside from the individual parole officer’s supervision of the parolee, the State may be sued on its own account.
*458On balance, sound policy considerations favor extension of the parole officers’ qualified immunity to the State.
E. Babcock v. State
Finally, the majority’s assessment of our cases, and in particular its heavy reliance upon Babcock, is unwarranted. Our cases do not support the majority opinion, which is why the majority finds it necessary to distinguish or disapprove every one of them except Babcock. Despite the majority’s heavy reliance, even Babcock is poor support for the majority’s position.
In Babcock, the court based its refusal to extend the qualified immunity of caseworkers to DSHS on three grounds. First, the court noted that while caseworkers had statutory immunity for taking children into seventy-two-hour protective custody, the Legislature made it clear in RCW 26.44.060(3) that it did not intend to supersede or abridge remedies in RCW 4.92 (actions against the State). The court applied the statute by analogy to the common-law immunity it adopted, and concluded the individual’s immunity should not be extended to the State. There is no similar statutory provision at issue in this case, i.e., no indication that the Legislature intended that the Creel-man rationale not be applied to support extension of individual employee immunity to the governmental employer.
Second, Babcock cited the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217, but expressly distinguished cases where the basis of asserted state liability was respondeat superior. As explained, § 217 does not compel the majority’s result in this case.
Third, Babcock also emphasized public policy considerations. As explained above, public policy considerations weigh in favor of extending the qualified immunity of the parole officer to the State in this case. Moreover, this court has recently recognized that the public policy considerations concerning caseworkers involved in placing children are different from those involved in parole supervi*459sion. In Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 216, the court declined to require that the parole officer’s actions be reasonable as a prerequisite for the qualified immunity. In contrast, a showing of reasonableness was required for the DSHS caseworkers to invoke the qualified immunity. See Babcock, 116 Wn.2d at 618. The court in Taggart explained: "The standard we announced in Babcock was appropriate because of the unique circumstances inherent in the foster care placement of children”. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 216.
In Lutheran Day Care, we noted that the Babcock decision "somewhat” limited Creelman, because the State did not get the benefit of the qualified or absolute immunity of the caseworkers (as had been true in every other case where the question of extending individual immunity to the State had been addressed). Lutheran Day Care, 119 Wn.2d at 102. Lutheran Day Care thus frankly recognized what the majority fails to: Babcock is the only case where such immunity was not extended. As the court expressly recognized in Taggart, the policy concerns at issue in Babcock are not the same in the case of parole supervision.
Lastly, the majority says that Babcock impliedly overruled Guffey. Majority at 439 n.3. Having expressly distinguished Guffey, Babcock cannot be said to have overruled that case. However, unlike the result in Babcock, the majority opinion in this case does impliedly overrule Guffey, and Frost as well. See Majority at 443-44. Thus, there will be a notable consequence of the majority opinion — it is likely that state and local governmental employers no longer possess the qualified immunity recognized in those opinions.8
I would hold that the qualified immunity of a parole officer does extend to the State. Accordingly, I would affirm *460the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial court erred by refusing to give the State’s proffered instruction on availability of that immunity if the requirements set forth in Taggart are satisfied.
Durham, C.J., and Guy, J., concur with Madsen, J.
Reconsideration denied January 3, 1996.
In Guffey, the court said that under the theory of respondeat superior, the State and the Washington State Patrol could not be held liable for a trooper’s acts where the officer had a qualified immunity for those acts. The majority criticizes the authority cited in Guffey for this proposition. Majority at 442-43. However, the qualified immunity of a police officer was extended to the State in Frost v. City of Walla Walla, 106 Wn.2d 669, 724 P.2d 1017 (1986), and the analysis in that case, as is Guffey’s result, is consistent with Creelman.