dissenting.
In Division 1 of its opinion, the majority correctly cites the seminal case of Fullwood v. Sivley, 271 Ga. 248 (517 SE2d 511) (1999) for the proposition that the untimeliness of an application for certificate of probable cause or a notice of appeal from the denial of habeas relief ordinarily “subjects the appeal to dismissal. [Cit.]” (Maj. op. p. 327.) However, the majority then completely disregards the fact that Fullwood is wholly indistinguishable from this case.
As the majority correctly recognizes, this Court has held that, “before a habeas appeal will be treated as being subject to dismissal for procedural irregularities, it must be established that the [pro se] petitioner was informed of the proper appellate procedure.” Capote v. Ray, 276 Ga. 1, 2 (1) (577 SE2d 755) (2002). Applying this rule, Capote and Hicks v. Scott, 273 Ga. 358, 359 (541 SE2d 27) (2001) addressed the merits of a habeas appeal, but did so only after expressly distinguishing Fullwood. In this case, however, Thomas was informed of the proper appellate procedure in precisely the same *329manner as the habeas petitioner in Fullwood. In Fullwood, supra at 249, “the habeas court informed [the petitioner], within the text of the order, that his right to appeal was governed by OCGA § 9-14-52.” Likewise, in the final order here, the habeas court stated that Thomas “is hereby notified that his appellate rights concerning this decision are governed by OCGA § 9-14-52.” OCGA § 9-14-52 (b) provides that an unsuccessful habeas petitioner who desires to appeal must file both an application for certificate of probable cause with the clerk of this Court within 30 days from the entry of the order denying relief and a notice of appeal with the clerk of the habeas court within the same period. “Accordingly, the habeas court correctly informed [Thomas] of the proper procedure for obtaining appellate review of its order. [Cit.]” Fullwood v. Sivley, supra.
Decided September 22, 2008. Sarah L. Gerwig-Moore, for appellant.Contrary to the majority opinion, neither Capote nor Hicks rejected the method, utilized in Fullwood, of informing the petitioner of the proper procedure for obtaining appellate review by referring to the statute outlining that procedure. The single-Justice concurrence on which the majority also relies did not cite Fullwood, did not address the method used in that case and, obviously, could not constitute authority for rejecting the holding of that case. Harris v. State, 278 Ga. 280, 282 (600 SE2d 592) (2004) (Fletcher, C. J, concurring).
The majority acknowledges that neither the application for certificate of probable cause nor the notice of appeal was timely filed. Therefore, this appeal is not authorized and should be dismissed. Fullwood v. Sivley, supra at 255. “We do not ignore jurisdictional statutes in cases wherein the appellant has chosen, for whatever reason, to proceed pro se.” Fullwood v. Sivley, supra at 253. Because the majority has ignored OCGA § 9-14-52, even though Thomas was specifically informed pursuant to Fullwood that that particular statute governs his appellate rights, I must respectfully dissent to the judgment vacating the habeas court’s order and remanding the case with direction.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hines and Justice Melton join in this dissent.
*330Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, David K. Getachew-Smith, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.