ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM:In our opinion on the merits we mentioned that Continental had urged on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to rule on its claim of nonliability based on certain exclusions contained in its policy. We held that no error was committed because the claimed issues were not properly processed as such by Continental at the trial. Our opinion stated that this court would not attempt to consider on appeal matters that had not been made issues in the trial court, by either the pleadings or the pretrial order or that were not tried before the court.
Continental has petitioned for rehearing on the ground that this court overlooked portions of the record which specifically raised the issues of the exclusions. It contends the trial court should have decided the issues and failed to do so; that they were properly presented to this court on appeal and should have been considered and decided and that failure to decide the issues in a written decision setting forth the court’s reasoning has resulted in a serious and substantial denial of justice to Continental.
We have re-examined the record with relation to Continental’s references and find no reason to alter our comments.
Continental’s answer consisted of admissions and general denials. In paragraph V of what was designated a “Counter Claim and Cross Claim” 1 it makes only one reference to exclusions in the following language :
“That the defendant Continental Casualty Company had on such date a policy in effect, insuring Federal Automotive Services, Inc., an Alaskan corporation, against certain risks and affording certain coverage in favor of drivers under contract with the said Federal Automotive Services, Inc., but exclud*110ing all others and excluding coverage concerning drivers under contract under circumstances such as exist under the controversy in question and surrounding and involving the accident of October 20, 1960.”
Paragraph VI of the “Counter Claim and Cross Claim” then alleged: “That the defendant’s policy of insurance provides no coverage for any and all claims arising out of such accidents by its. explicit terms and provisions of law.”
The most that can be said for the above paragraphs is that they constitute notice that Continental will, at pre-trial or at trial, come forward and identify the particular exclusions upon which it intends to rely and point out to the court why they have the legal effect claimed.
As to applicable exclusions, Continental’s pre-trial memorandum merely alleged:
The policy contained certain exclusions with regard to liability to passengers and to certain persons who were not covered as insured under the policy. These exclusionary provisions prevented coverage for Mr. Cummings and Juanita Jelich. And likewise the estate of Juanita Jelich.
The exclusionary provisions * were still unidentified, not quoted, nor their applicability discussed.
The court’s rather detailed pre-trial order, made .no mention of exclusionary clauses as a defense. The order did recite that Continental generally denied coverage and that it had made a counterclaim, and cross-claim against the other parties. The pre-trial memorandum was made a part of the pre-trial order by incorporation and a copy of Continental’s policy was accepted as an exhibit.
With the case at issue and the pleadings closed there was, as yet, nothing in the record to advise the trial judge which exclusion clauses Continental intended to rely on, where they might be found in the policy, and why they were considered applicable to the facts. It would have been impossible for the opposing parties or the trial judge to have prepared for trial on the issue of exclusions by studying the pleadings and memorandum and conducting legal research.
At trial, the opening statement of coup-,sel for Lumbermens shed slightly mote light on the matter of which exclusion clauses Continental intended to rely on when he said:
“With regard to Continental Casualty Company, Your Honor, Continental Casualty Company is relying on two exceptions or exclusions in their policy of insurance. One provides that there is no coverage for anyone who is not driving the vehicile (sic) with the permission of the owner, a standard clause found in all policies. The other exception they’re relying on Your Honor, is an exclusion for suits brought by any passenger in the vehicle against the driver.”
In his opening statement, counsel for Continental stated in part:
“Continental, Casualty would take * * and the evidence will, show that in its policy it described certain persons as insured; also, it has an exclusionary provision, as Mr. Delaney-points out, with regard to, among other things,. passenger claims against the operator, which Continental will rely upon.”
The trial judge then interrupted counsel 'and the following transpired:
“The Court: Let me ask, are you contending in this case that the coverage is not good as to Cummings or as to — -
“Mr. Thorsness: Yes, Yes, Your Hon- or, as to either one. As far as Continental Casualty is concerned, the policy does not cover either one.”
The trial judge had.a right to assume that at some point during the trial Continental would finally identify the exclusion provision, possibly quote it, and explain why “its explicit terms” applied “under circumstances such as exist under the controversy in question and surrounding and involving'the accident of October 20, 1960” as it inferred *111it would do in paragraphs V and VI of its “Counter Claim and Cross Claim”. This did not happen. The exclusion provisions were not once mentioned during the course of the trial.
After all parties had rested the court was advised that all counsel desired to submit briefs rather than present oral argument. The court agreed.
Trial briefs were not designated to be included in the record on appeal. As a result of this petition we have brought up the entire record from below. From this file we learn that Continental filed a trial brief on the same day that the trial was concluded. The brief deals extensively with the issue of permission to drive the rented automobile, and cites numerous authorities. As to exclusions, it does for the first time in the proceedings identify at least one of the exclusions and quotes it. No authorities are cited and no discussion of its applicability to the facts of the case is offered. Continental later filed an additional trial brief. Nowhere in this brief was any mention made of exclusions.
In due time a 13 page written memorandum opinion was published by the trial court. The opinion decided those issues which had been developed during trial and in the trial briefs. It did not attempt to decide the legal effect of the exclusion mentioned above. The court file reveals that a copy of a proposed declaratory judgment was served on Continental on August 3, 1962. This judgment adopted the court’s memorandum opinion as the findings of fact .and conclusions of law in the case. No objection to the proposed judgment was filed by Continental within the time provided by Civil Rule 78 (b) and the judgment was signed by the judge on August 9, 1962. On August 30, 1962 Continental moved to modify the judgment and submitted proposed findings of fact, one of which would have found that Continental’s policy “contained an exclusion as to passenger claims”. The exclusion was not quoted nor otherwise identified. The court denied Continental’s motion on the ground that it had not raised the issue as to the exclusion.
General pleading, such as that contained in the paragraphs just quoted, is permissible under our rules on the theory that an appropriate motion or use of the rules of discovery by the opposing parties will usually result in a full development of the issues before trial.2 If this should not happen, as in this case, pre-trial procedure is intended to clearly define the issues to be tried before and decided by the trial judge. Here, counsel for Continental participated in the pre-trial conference and signed the pre-trial order. The order does not mention exclusions as an issue. It does incorporate the pre-trial memorandum by reference. But this memorandum merely refers to them as “certain exclusions” as to “certain persons”, which prevented coverage for Cummings and Jelich.
The purpose of pre-trial is to clearly define all issues to be tried and decided. Counsel have a particular responsibility to assist the court in this respect so that the pre-trial order in final form accomplishes its purpose. Hidden issues or defenses are not to be tolerated.3
Continental has no basis for complaint. The issue of the applicability of certain exclusions could and should have been clearly covered by the pre-trial order. Instead it remained obscured in the pleadings. The fault lies with Continental and not with the trial court.
But even if it could be considered that the issue of exclusions survived the pre-trial order, it is obvious from the record that Continental failed to discharge its duty to the trial court. Exclusions were not mentioned during the trial. In a post trial brief, Continental for the first time quoted an exclusion and described where it might be found in the policy. No authorities were *112cited and no discussion of its applicability to the facts was offered.
Under such circumstances the trial court was fully warranted in holding that the issue had not been properly raised and in refusing to attempt to decide it.
This court will not consider on appeal matters that were not made issues in the trial court, by either the pleadings or the pre-trial order or that were not tried before the court.4
Rehearing is denied.
. We put to one side any discussion of whether Continental was actually pleading a defense instead of a counterclaim and crossclaim. See Civ.R. 8(c).
. See 2 Moore, Federal Practice § 8.13 (2d ed. 1962).
. Burton v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 1 F.R.D. 571, 573 (D.Ore.1941).
. Ark-Tenn Distributing Corp. v. Breidt, 209 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1954); Palmer v. Wolff, 8S Cal.App.2d 979, 200 P.2d 167, 169 (1948); Pippin v. United States, 109 F.2d 960 (6th Cir. 1935); McComb v. Goldblatt Bros. Inc., 166 F.2d 387, 389-390 (7th Cir. 1948).