dissenting.
This is a very close case but one key piece of evidence, taken in context, demon*861strates that a retaliatory motive may have played a part in Amrhein’s termination. That evidence is Marquedant’s statement to Amrhein that “if [she] wanted to choose all of [her] days [off], then [she] should not have complained in the first place,” and that Amrhein had “open[ed] up a can of worms.” The timing of those statements, uttered by a decision-maker in the termination, a few weeks after an internal investigation into Amrhein’s charges of discrimination and her threats to go to the EEOC, a few weeks after another decision-maker complained that Amrhein was a “huge challenge” and costing the company time and resources, and a scant twelve days before the termination, imply a retaliatory intent. Because of that evidence, I believe we should treat this as a mixed motive case, shifting the burden to the employer to demonstrate that it still would have terminated Amrhein for reasons other than retaliation. Because there is a genuine factual dispute regarding whether HCSC would have terminated Amrhein absent any unlawful motive, summary judgment should be vacated and the ease should be remanded for trial.
Although timing helps Amrhein make her case, I agree with the majority that timing alone might not be enough to take the case to trial. It may be helpful to briefly recap events at the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004, as Amrhein’s troubles at work were escalating. In early December 2003, Benner issued Amrhein a warning about her personal telephone use. Amrhein complained that Redpath’s personal telephone usage exceeded her own but he had not been similarly warned. Amrhein indicated she was considering filing a complaint with the EEOC. On December 12, 2003, Amrhein sent an e-mail to Marquedant complaining that Redpath was receiving preferential treatment even though he was far less productive than she, a difference she attributed to sex discrimination. Marquedant forwarded the e-mail to Cosey, a human resources representative, and Cosey conducted an internal investigation. On January 14, 2004, Cosey and Marquedant met with Amrhein to inform her that Cosey found no evidence of gender discrimination. They also presented her with a revised warning about her phone usage. Amrhein reiterated her intent to file a complaint with the EEOC. Marquedant conveyed this threat to Ben-ner and Woods the next day. In late January, when Amrhein learned she was not getting a pay raise, she reminded Mar-quedant of her intent to pursue a sex discrimination claim with the EEOC.
On February 4, 2004, Woods asked her supervisor for help in addressing their “options” with Amrhein because she was a “huge challenge” and was “costing [the company] a huge amount of time and resources.” Only two weeks later, on February 18, 2004, Marquedant met with Amrhein and other group specialists to discuss the new policy for scheduling paid time off. When Amrhein questioned the policy because it did not allow her to take off all of the days she had accumulated, Marquedant, one of the decision-makers in the termination, told Amrhein that “if I wanted to choose all of my days, then I should not have complained in the first placet.]” Amrhein Dep. at 256. Marque-dant, in the same meeting, “then went on to make reference to [Amrhein] ‘opening up a can of worms.’ ” Amrhein Affidavit at ¶ 18. The record contains conflicting accounts of the tenor of this discussion, and on summary judgment, we must construe those accounts in Amrhein’s favor. Amrhein (and others) denied that Am-rhein raised her voice or was argumentative or engaged in insubordination.
Nonetheless, Amrhein was terminated approximately twelve days later for insubordination and for other infractions that *862the majority details. Two of the three decision-makers in the termination had recently made comments that could be construed as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent. See Tubergen v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 517 F.3d 470, 473-74 (7th Cir.2008) (under the direct proof method, direct or circumstantial evidence that the employer’s decision to take the adverse employment action was motivated by an impermissible purpose may suffice). Circumstantial evidence includes suspicious timing or behavior. Tubergen, 517 F.3d at 473-74. In my view, Marquedant’s statements at the February 18 meeting indicated that she was not happy about Amrhein’s complaints about discrimination. Woods’ February 4th request for “options” to deal with Amrhein and a charge that she was costing time and resources came very soon after the company had expended time and resources conducting an internal investigation into Am-rhein’s charge of sex discrimination. Construing these circumstantial statements and events in Amrhein’s favor, her employer appears to have been motivated at least in part by retaliation for complaining about gender discrimination. Moreover, the conflicting accounts of Amrhein’s behavior at the February 18th meeting suggest that Amrhein was not insubordinate and that the charge of insubordination was a pre-textual reason for the termination. Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir.1999) (a plaintiff may demonstrate pretext with evidence tending to prove that the employer’s proffered reasons are factually baseless, were not the actual motivation for the discharge in question, or were insufficient to motivate the discharge). True, Amrhein had also violated certain company policies, but it is unclear whether HCSC would have terminated Amrhein for those violations alone. An employer may well have a mixed motive, that is, more than one reason for firing an employee, but if the termination would not have occurred but for the retaliatory intent of the employer, then the termination is unlawful. Speedy v. Rexnord Corp., 243 F.3d 397, 401-02 (7th Cir.2001); McNutt v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 707-09 (7th Cir.1998).
In a mixed motive case, an employer accused of retaliating against an employee for exercising her rights under Title VII may avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same employment decision even if it had not taken the plaintiffs protected activity into account. Speedy, 243 F.3d at 401-02; Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 893-94 (7th Cir.1996) (in the face of direct evidence of retaliation, the employer must ultimately establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have taken same action even if a desire to retaliate in no way tainted its decision making). Summary judgment will rarely be granted in a mixed motive case once the plaintiff has presented direct (including circumstantial) evidence that a forbidden factor contributed to the employer’s decision to take an adverse action against the employee. Frobose v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Danville, 152 F.3d 602, 615 n. 12 (7th Cir.1998). See also Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir.1997) (employee can prevail under Title VII so long as an illicit criterion played a motivating role in her discharge, even if another, legitimate criterion also played a role; once employee has presented direct evidence that a forbidden factor contributed to the termination, generally a trial will be required to determine whether the employer would have taken the same action in the absence of that factor).1 Unless the employer has pre*863sented undisputed evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence of any retaliatory intent, summary judgment is inappropriate. Because HCSC has not produced that evidence here, because the claim of insubordination may be pretextual, and because the true motive for the discharge is in dispute, summary judgment should not have been granted here. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. Moreover, Amrhein's inability to point out a comparable employee, one who had a similar *863disciplinary record and who was managed by the same supervisor, is not determinative in a direct evidence/mixed motive case. Although evidence of a comparable employee is considered helpful, it is not required. Speedy, 243 F.3d at 402-03.