I concur in the part of the opinion wherein it is held that the measurement should be to the south entrance, and that the order of the board should be annulled. I cannot agree, however, that there was a substantial conflict in the evidence as to whether the south entrance was less *851than iy2 miles from Lasher’s place of business. The matter was submitted to the trial court and to this court (at the first hearing) upon the basis that it was uncontroverted that the distance to the south entrance was less than 1 y2 miles and that the distance to the main entrance was more than 1% miles. The trial court found that there was uncontroverted evidence that Lasher’s place was within 1% miles of building 215. In my opinion the evidence supports that finding. The principal question for the trial court and this court (at the first hearing) was whether the measurement should be made to the south entrance or the main entrance. The trial court and this court held that the measurement should be to the south entrance. It was only after these rulings, unfavorable to the board, had been made that the board raised the question as to conflicting evidence—asserting in effect that when it decided the case, by relying upon the survey introduced in evidence by Lasher, there was conflicting evidence before the board, in that, the evidence as to measuring with automobiles was in conflict with evidence as to the survey made by a licensed surveyor. It seems to be the board’s position that, by reason of such alleged conflict, it should now be entitled to redecide the fact as to the distance by relying, presumably, upon, the purported measurement by automobiles which exceeded the survey measurement by 409 feet. It is to be remembered that Lasher, petitioner for a license, is the one who furnished the first survey map showing the distance to the main entrance to be 8,022.22 feet (being more than 1% miles). It is not to be assumed that he presented untrustworthy evidence. He does not claim that the survey was wrong. The objectors herein (the Western Los Angeles Citizens’ Committee) accepted Lasher’s survey as being correct. They introduced a survey map which was a copy of Lasher’s survey map, except that their map showed the distance from a certain point in the road (near building 215) to the south entrance. Their map showed that the whole distance from Lasher’s place to the south entrance was 7,835.36 feet (being less than 1 y2 miles). Both survey maps, which were made by the same surveyor, showed the same distance from Lasher’s place to a certain point in the road near building 215 (from which point measurements were made to the two entrances). From that common point to the main entrance, both maps showed the distance to be 384.62 feet. From that point to the south entrance, the objectors’ map showed the distance to be 197.76 feet. No one objected to the survey as to the distance *852from that common point to the south entrance. Under such circumstances, wherein the genuineness and accuracy of the survey were not questioned, it seems to me that in reality no point regarding authenticity of the survey maps is involved. The pathway or roadway from said common point on the road to either entrance was not an automobile road and those distances were not, and could not be, measured by automobile. Even if the automobile method of measuring were a proper method of measuring, it is clear that measuring by automobile was not in conflict with the survey from said common point on the road to the. entrances. In other words, if any measuring by automobile is to be regarded as being in conflict with the survey it would be the automobile measurement from Lasher’s place to the said common point on the road. Certainly there was no conflicting evidence as to the distances from the common point in the road to the entrances. In my opinion the automobile method of measuring is so unreliable that the evidence as to measurement by that method from Lasher’s place to the common point on the road should not be regarded as substantial evidence in conflict with the survey covering that distance. Measuring by automobile is unreliable for many reasons, one of which is that the odometer registers only in units of tenths of a mile (528 feet), and if the automobile does not start and stop when the odometer registers exactly the beginning of a tenth of a mile it would be a matter of guesswork as to how far the automobile had gone after the last tenth was registered. If the board should decide that measuring by the automobile method, which involves meandering and guessing, is controlling as against a survey, I think it would be acting arbitrarily and capriciously, and that its order should be annulled. In the present case it appears that the board did reject the automobile method of measuring, and based its finding upon the survey. Its order recites in part: “The nearest such barracks is Building 215 which is over one and one-half miles from the premises in question by the nearest road or roads, being, according to a survey submitted by applicant, 8,022.22 feet distant.” (Emphasis added.) In my opinion our first opinion was correct and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 8, 1952. Wood (Parker), J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 14, 1952.