Richard J. Norton and Mary S. Norton were married August 16, 1941. Two children were born of the marriage: Michael, now about 9 years old, and Genevieve, now about 4 years.
Mr. and Mrs. Norton were divorced, by an interlocutory decree August 9, 1949, and by a final decree August 18, 1950.
By the interlocutory decree the mother was awarded custody of both children. But, in September, 1949, one month after the entry of the interlocutory decree, by agreement of the parties Michael was turned over to the father.
The mother remarried in December, 1950. The father also remarried; to a lady with two children by a former marriage.
The father sent the boy to the mother, to he present at her second marriage. After her marriage the mother sent word to the father that she was going to keep the boy in her home.
So the father presented his motion to the superior court for modification of the original order of custody. After a somewhat protracted trial the trial judge ordered that the *359father be given custody of the boy. From this order the mother appeals.
Reference is made to a further and more detailed statement of the facts in a dissenting opinion in this case by Mr. Justice pro tern. Hanson.
When one gets through with this case, it boils down to this: The mother was awarded custody of the boy, but was unable for financial reasons to take care of him. So the father took him and placed him in the boy’s grandmother’s (the father’s mother’s) home. Then the father moved into his mother’s home and paid a lot of attention to the boy, taldng him on trips, on outings, and elsewhere. Then the father, married a woman with two children. And the boy’s mother remarried. Each parent now has a home of his own where the boy may live.
Assuming, as this court thinks the trial court properly did, that both homes were with proper persons; taking into consideration, as we think the trial court did, the principle that other things being equal the mother should be given first consideration; nonetheless this court is of the opinion that there is substantial evidence supporting the findings of the trial court that the best interests and welfare of the boy require that he stay with his father.
The order so made was within the discretion of the trial court, and we are unable to say that there was any abuse of discretion. The tragedy in this—as in so many divorce cases— is to be found in the hurt done to a child. When parents will not go along together, or by the conduct of either or both of them make it impossible to go along together; when they cannot or will not maintain a home in which their child may grow to manhood and have the benefit of the love and protection of both father and mother, such parents will never know what they have done. The hurt to them in after years of being deprived of custody will never equal the hurt inflicted by them themselves upon a helpless child.
So this court agrees with the trial judge that this boy should not be moved around any more. He has been domiciled with the father for some time. It may be assumed that he told the trial judge that he did not object to being with his father, and that the trial court believed that it would be a mistake to change the boy’s residence and manner of living, at least for the present. Some doubt may be expressed as to whether the "boy will be as welcome in his father’s new home, along with two children of a former marriage of the step*360mother, as he was with his grandmother. But in the circumstances of this case at this time this court is bound by a fair exercise of the discretion of the trial court.
The order is affirmed.
Doran, Acting P. J., concurred.