*224DISSENTING OPINION OF
CASSIDY, J.,WITH WHOM TSUKIYAMA, C. J„ JOINS.
I concur in Part I of Justice Lewis’ opinion but dissent from the holding of the majority of the court reversing the conviction on the grounds that the defendant’s confession was tainted and inadmissible by reason of the fact, or of the manner in which, the police officers imparted information to the defendant that they had obtained the parts he had received of the stolen automobile, which parts, upon defendant’s application, had been excluded from evidence by the trial court as illegally seized in contravention of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of the State Constitution.
I am unable to agree that there is a sufficient causal connection shown in this record between the automobile parts seized from the garage at the defendant’s home and the confession he gave to the police to warrant its exclusion on any theory that it was tainted. Further, this court should be bound by the trial court’s resolution of the issue.
As the majority points out, the rule of evidence upon which the appellant bases his case on the point under consideration was first enunciated in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385. That case laid down the rule that the Government may not use derivative evidence produced from following up information obtained by a search and seizure made in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. This rule was held also applicable to use of evidence derived from information illegally obtained by wiretapping in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, another bench mark in the field under consideration. In Liar done, the exclusion of evidence derived from an illegal act was analogized to the use of the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” The Silverthorne exclusionary rule has carried that label ever since.
*225There is no question but that the fruit of the poisonous tree rule applies to a confession which directly stems from and is tainted by an unlawful search and seizure. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85; State v. Evans, 45 Haw. 622, 372 P.2d 365. Part and parcel of the rule, however, is the cognate principle that notwithstanding there may have been an unlawful search and seizure, the Government is not precluded from using the facts thus obtained in building its case if it had acquired the same information from an independent source. The exposition of the two facets of the rule is given in the Silverthome case at p. 392, as follows:
“* * * The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. * * *”
The independent source doctrine permitting the purge of original taint from an illegal search or seizure has become as firmly established as the exclusionary portion of the rule established by the Silverthome case. And it is well settled that evidence comparable to that discovered or derived from information obtained by an illegal seizure is not per se inadmissible.
Close to home is Warren v. Territory, 9 Cir., 119 F.2d 936 (decided on appeal from this jurisdiction), in which it is stated at p. 938 on authority of the Silverthorne case that:
“[K] nowledge of facts gained from a proper independent source such as here obtained may be used, *226though it also may be obtained from an illegal act.” Recently, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
it was asserted in respect to the independent source doctrine (at pp.-487-488) :
“We need not bold that all' evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a ease is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant Objection is made has been come at by exploitation ■ of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959).”
It can be accepted, as argued, that when primary illegality has been shown, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the controverted evidence had an independent origin or was produced from leads provided by an'independent source. See United States v. Goldstein, 2 Cir., 120 F.2d 485, 488.
In our case, the prosecution definitely sustained the burden imposed on it in that respect/ There can be no other conclusion from the evidence but that the police officers had been informed by the defendanfs conf¿derates, before the officers went to the defendant’s home on their first visit on November 14, 1962, that the defendant had actively participated in stealing the complainant’s automobile ahd that he had received some of the parts subsequently stripped from it.
It is difficult for me to conceivé of a simpler situation in which ■ the independent' source doctrine could and should operate! Here, the- interrogation of defendant, including questioning him relative to the stripping of the automobile and the distribution of the parts, was not “come at by exploitation” of the illegal seizure. It fol*227lowed, rather, as a matter of course and ordinary duty from what the police investigation had revealed on defendant’s complicity in the crime prior to the seizure of the carburetor and manifold from the garage at his home. Harlow v. United States, 5 Cir., 301 F.2d. 361, 372-373; Wiggins v. United States, 9 Cir., 64 F.2d 950, 951. Further, I cannot agree that this court can properly hold that the confession given by defendant was infected by reason of what transpired between any of the police officers and the defendant between the time he was picked up at his home at 3 p.m. on the day in question and his confessing a few hours later.
Defendant’s claim that his confession was tainted rests on his testimony respecting conversations with a police officer on the way. to the police station and with Officer Kasparovitch prior to the iatter’s. questioning him at the police station.
In respect to the conversation on the. trip to the station, the gist of the defendant’s testimony, in which tailor-made leading questions of counsel played a prominent part,1 was that an officer told him that the police had the parts from the garage closet, and so he had to confess.
*228While Officer Ragsdale admitted he told the defendant on the way to the police station that the police had certain automobile parts taken from defendant’s home, his version of the remainder of the discussion between the two is not the same as that of the defendant. The officer testified:
“A * * * I told him I had the parts — ‘You may as well tell the truth as to what happened’ — because at that time he was very quiet. I asked him a question and he didn’t say anything; so I just said, ‘Let’s tell the truth. What happened?’ ”2
At the police station the defendant was held in an interrogation room for about three hours without anyone questioning him on the case, while Officer Kasparovitch, who was in charge of the investigation, questioned the other three participants in the theft of the automobile. Each of them implicated the defendant. When that phase of the investigation was completed, Officer Kasparovitch went into the interrogation room in which the defendant had been waiting to question him.
Defendant’s claim is that Kasparovitch immediately told him he might as well confess as the police had the parts. The defendant concluded by testifying that the only basis for his confession was that he felt the police had the parts and he might as well tell. Defendant’s full testimony in that respect is as follows :
“Q When Officer Kasparovitch came into the inter*229rogating room, what did he tell you as soon as he came in?
“A He told me, ‘Are you ready to confess?’ He told me, ‘You might as well. We have the parts.’
“Q Did he say, ‘You might as well. We have the parts’?
“A Yes.
“Q Now, what was your response?
“A I said I was ready.
“Q Why did you say you were ready to confess?
“A Because I felt that I wasn’t — there wasn’t anything I could do'.
“Q Did Officer Kasparovitch tell you that the others had confessed and implicated you?
“A Yes.
“Q When did he tell you this?
“A Within that same time.
*****
“MR. NAITO: When did he tell you that the others had confessed?
“WITNESS: It was after.
“THE COURT: After what?
“WITNESS: It was later on because the first thing he told me was, ‘Are you ready to confess?’
“MR. NAITO: Now, you stated that you confessed because you felt that they had the parts; so you felt you might as well tell?
“WITNESS: Yes.
“Q (By Mr. Naito) Now, was this the only basis for your confession?
“A Yes.”
Kasparovitch’s testimony is completely at odds with that of the defendant on this major point of the defendant’s case. The officer testified as follows:
*230“Q And at that time was his father mentioned in any way?
“A Yes. When I first went in there, I asked if he wanted to eat. He said no, he wanted to get it off his chest and continue. And I said, ‘Did your father talk to you about your attorney not wanting you to say anything to me?’ And he said, ‘Yes, but I want to get it off my chest and I want to talk about it.’ So I said, ‘Okay, let me have your story.’
“Q Then he gave you an oral statement?
“A Then he gave me an oral statement.
* * * * *
“Q; After you took this oral statement from Kitashiro, what, if anything, happened?
“A I asked him if he wanted to give me a stenographic statement and he agreed to do so.
“Q Did you take a stenographic statement?
“A Yes, I did.”
Kasparovitch denied he mentioned anything about automobile parts before questioning the defendant.
That the countervailing effect of Kasparovitch’s testimony on defendant’s claim was not missed at the trial level is reflected in the questioning of the witness by defendant’s counsel on cross-examination, as follows:
“Q According to your story, he told you he already talked to his father?
“A Yes,'sir.
“Q And his father warned him he should talk to a lawyer and not say anything?
“A He told me his father told him not to say anything.
“Q But in spite of that he wanted to make a clean breast of it?
“A Yes, sir.”
Further, the defendant admitted on cross-examination *231that he told Kasparovitch. he. wanted to talk, and :get it off his chest. - • ,
There are other features in evidence that hear on and should be considered in determining the issue.
Officer Kasparovitch testified that in a brief confrontation of defendant with Otake during the time the officer was questioning Otake, Otake implicated defendant. On objection of defendant, the court ruled that the evidence would be confined to Otake’s case. The ruling was undoubtedly correct insofar as the hearing on the merits was concerned. However, the court was then also entertaining the motion to suppress the confession. Otake’s testimony was clearly, pertinent to. the motion and it should have been admitted against Kitashiro for that limited purpose. While as stated by the majority, we cannot, in view of the, ruling, consider the evidence on this appeal, it nevertheless appears to me that other evidence in the record permits inferring the equivalent of what the rejected evidence tended to prove, namely, that before he was questioned by Kasparovitch, and, for that matter, before he left his home in custody of the police officers, defendant was. aware that his part in the theft had been revealed to the police by some of his accomplices.
It is in evidence that when the police officers went to the defendant’s home on the morning of November 14, 1962, they first met the defendant’s aunt, and told her of what they had learned prior to that time. The same story was related in turn to a younger woman in the household, and then to the defendant’s mother over the telephone. On the return of the police to the defendant’s home in the afternoon, the story was again told to defendant’s father,3 who then asked for and was given an *232opportunity to speak to Ms son in private. Judging this evidence in light of ordinary family relationships and according to common experience of mankind, a natural, rational and, I think, permitted inference is that the defendant knew before he got into the officers’ car to be taken to the police station that one or more of his companions had given the police the full story on the commission of the crime. For the same reason it can be inferred that Ragsdale was telling the defendant no more than he already knew when he informed him that the police had obtained the automobile parts from the garage.
Another significant factor to be considered is that the defendant’s father talked to him again at the police station, and told him to follow counsel’s advice not to say anything about the case.
Considering all the circumstances in evidence, I can reach no other conclusion than that the illegality of the search and seizure in this case was too thinly connected to the taking by Kasparovitch and the giving by the defendant of the confession in evidence to permit or require a holding that it was tainted. I consequently cannot agree that it can be held as a matter of law that the confession should have been excluded as fruit of the illegally seized articles.
I do not find anything in the cases cited on behalf of appellant which warrants or justifies a reversal of the trial court’s ruling admitting the confession over the objection under consideration.
While the main authorities relied on by appellant *233may, by selected quotations from them, be made to appear to support his position, in my opinion, they do not, on scrutiny, bear it out.
People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353, 183 N.E.2d 651, from a factual standpoint, may be distinguished as, in that case, unlike this one, the defendant was directly confronted, when his confession was taken, with a gun and other articles which may have been illegally seized from his room. As is reflected in the quotation from the case set out in the majority opinion, the fact the defendant was confronted with the gun and articles was considered, and properly so, as an important factor in the court’s ruling. However a highly significant point to be noted is that the court did not hold, even with the confrontation, that the confession would be inadmissible as a matter of law if the seizure was found on remand to have been illegal. More will be said later in that connection.
In Commonwealth v. Spofford, 343 Mass. 703, 180 N.E.2d 673, the evidence declared inadmissible by the appellate court was obtained only by the lead produced by confronting the defendant with and questioning him on photographs that had been illegally seized from his abode. The evidence was held to be “branded with the original taint” because it was solely by direct use of the illegally seized photographs that the challenged evidence was obtained. The Spoford case, not ours, presents the type of situation where it is proper to declare the derivative evidence an “offshoot” of the illegal seizure.
In Hall v. Warden, 4 Cir., 313 F.2d 483, as the prevailing opinion here points out, the court treated the question of the admission of defendant’s confession which might have followed the defendant’s ascertaining that certain illegally seized articles were in the possession of the police, as one of voluntariness; While it seems to me *234that the majority is actually applying the ordinary voluntariness test when it speaks of the defendant being left to meditate for three hours, “while the corrosive properties of the poison so instilled [by Ragsdale] had their intended effect,” no contention has been made, nor could any be made, that Kitashiro’s confession was not, in fact, voluntary. On that score there can be no doubt on the record in this case that, to borrow apt language from People v. Freeland, 32 Cal. Rptr. 132, at pp. 136-137, “The circumstances smack of catharsis rather than the knout.”
I read Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, as negating rather than supporting appellant’s contentions. The import of the independent source doctrine and its applicability to this case readily appears from what the court states at pp. 278 and 280:
“The contention that illegal wiretapping precluded reliance upon the petitioner’s admissions rests primarily upon interrogations by New York County District Attorney Frank Hogan in 1943 when the petitioner appeared before the New York County grand jury and the Official Referee in the Appellate Division. State officers had a tap on the petitioner’s telephone during several, months of 1943. Mr. Hogan made frequent references to the tapped conversations when questioning the petitioner. The petitioner claims that his admissions of bootlegging activities during Prohibition were impelled by the belief that Mr. Hogan had learned from the tapped conversations the information sought by the questions. It is argued that the wiretaps were illegal under our decision in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, and that his admissions were therefore to be excluded from evidence as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ oh. the reasoning in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S, 385, and Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338.
*****
*235“It is true that the 1943 wiretaps prompted the calling of the petitioner^ before the county grand jury and the Official Referee. But the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts, not evidence obtained from an ‘independent source.’ Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra, at 392. * * * We are satisfied that any knowledge in Mr. Hogan’s possession which impelled the petitioner to answer truthfully came from such independent sources and that any connection between the wiretaps and the admissions was too attenuated to require the exclusion of the admissions from evidence.”
I think that an analysis of the pertinent evidence, in light of the authorities, permits only the conclusion that the defendant’s confession was not a product of nor was it tainted by the illegal seizure; However, even if a,different conclusion could be reasoned out from the . cold record, as the' majority does .in independently evaluating the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it, that would still not warrant a reversal.
The issue presented by appellant’s claim, asserted on the stand, that the reason he gave the confession was because he. “felt that they had the parts,” so he felt he “might as well tell,” was one of fact. As such, it was for the trial court fo resolve. This is recognized and accepted by all of the authorities in the field we are now dealing with. The point is clearly brought out in People v. Rodriguez, supra, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353, 183 N.E.2d 651, relied on heavily by appellant.. In. that case it is stated, at p. 654:
“Upon the new trial, therefore, it will be incumbent on the trial court, in connection with the defendant’s motion to suppress the challenged statements (see Code Crim. Proc., §§ 813-c, 813-d, 813-e, as added by *236L.1962, ch. 954, § 1), to hold a hearing in advance of the trial and decide the issues presented, namely, whether there was an illegal search and seizure and, if there was, whether Rodriguez’ confession was induced by confrontation with the illegally obtained articles.”
Similarly in Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, 375 U.S. 85, the remand put the issue back to the trial court to decide, the Supreme Court stating, at pp. 90-91:
“* * * But the defendants were not allowed to pursue the illegal search and seizure inquiry at trial, because, at the time of trial, the exclusionary rule was not applied in Connecticut state courts.4 Thus petitioner was unable to claim at trial that the illegally seized evidence induced his admissions and confession. * * * Thus petitioner should have had a chance to show that his admissions were induced by being confronted with the illegally seized evidence.”
In Nardone v. United States, supra, 308 U.S. 338, it is said at p. 341:
* * Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government’s proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. A sensible way of dealing with such a situation — fair to the intendment of § 605, but fair also' to the purposes of the criminal law — ought to be within the reach of experienced trial judges. * * *” (Emphasis added.)
It was vital to the appellant’s case that his testimony be given credence, which the trial judge did not do. Instead, the judge expressly stated that he did not believe the defendant and that he did believe Kasparovitch. We are therefore confronted with a situation which calls for *237application of the fundamental principle of appellate review that there shall not be a reversal for any finding of fact depending on the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence. Territory v. Young, 32 Haw. 628, 634; Territory v. Rodrigues, 41 Haw. 50, 52; State v. Hassard, 45 Haw. 221, 231, 365 P.2d 202, 207. The rule is the same whether the determination of fact be by a jury or a judge. Territory v. Hart, 35 Haw. 582, 590-591. This rule has not been altered by the adoption of the Hawaii Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Tamanaha, 46 Haw. 245, 251-252, 377 P.2d 688, 692.
As a result of weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of the witnesses, with the benefit we do not have of observing them on the stand, the trial judge found that appellant’s claim was not substantiated. He expressly declared: “I don’t believe the defendant when he said that he confessed because they had the goods.” What was said in United States v. Goldstein, supra, 2 Cir., 120 F.2d 485, referred to in the prevailing opinion, is therefore particularly pertinent. The application of the fundamental principle governing the scope of appellate review of factual findings that should be adhered to in this case is there exemplified by the court’s statement, at p. 488: “However, if the judge had affirmatively found that the Taps’ contributed nothing to this result, we should not have disturbed the finding.” Cf., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593; Burke v. United States, 1 Cir., 328 F.2d 399, 402-403.
In my opinion the experienced trial judge’s ultimate finding of fact on the issue herein covered rests upon substantial evidence and warrants the recognition and acceptance which Goldstein indicates it should be given. With all deference, it appears to me that the majority’s failure to do so is a departure from the established standard governing appellate review of findings of fact.
I would affirm the conviction.
“MR. NAITO [defense counsel] : Now, at the time of your arrest at your residence, did the officer mention anything to you about any automobile parts?
“WITNESS: Well, I heard someone say that ‘we have .the parts already.’
“Q (By-Mr. Naito) Did they tell you where they got the parts?
“A Yes. From the garage closet.
“Q And this — was this told to you?
“A Yes,-1 think so.
“Q Did the officer say anything about making a confession because he had the parts ?
“A While we were riding down to the police station.
“Q While you were riding in the automobile going down to the police station?
“A Yes.
“Q Which officer said that to you?
“A I don’t reinember.
“Q Was there a general conversation going on’ in the automobile regarding this case?
“A Yes.
*228“Q Do you recall how many times he told you that they had the parts so you had to confess ?
“A Yes — no, I don’t remember exactly how much, but they told me quite a few times.
“Q They kept repeating it, is that correct?
“ (Witness nodding.) ”
As to the effect on a confession of an admonition to tell the truth, see Territory v. Sumngat, 38 Haw. 609, 613-614; Territory v. Young, 37 Haw. 189. In the latter case it is stated at p. 195: “Mere exhortation or adjuration to speak the truth does not render a confession incompetent.”
Officer Ragsdale’s testimony respecting his conversation with the father at the home on the afternoon of the arrest was as follows:
“A I told him who I was. X identified myself. And he more or less had an idea of the purpose of the police coming to the house.
*232“Q What did Mr. Kitashiro do ?
“A He just wanted to find out more about the circumstances. He was very cordial.
“Q Who did he talk to?
“A He spoke with me.
“Q You say he wanted to talk with someone?
“A No, he just wanted to find out how come the boys were involved ; so I gave him a brief summary of what had taken place prior to that time.”
The trial took place before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, was handed down.