Appeal from a judgment entered on a directed verdict of no cause of action in a suit by plaintiff claiming breach of an employment contract. Reversed and remanded for a new trial, with costs to plaintiff.
Plaintiff attacks the 1) granting of the motion for directed verdict, 2) the striking •of one Borsum’s testimony on the lower court’s ground that as a matter of law he was not an authorized representative of defendant company, and 3) the striking of certain evidence as violating the parol evidence rule.
We must view the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the victim of the directed verdict.1 Doing so, we -find that Scoville, a man now in his middle sixties, hás been a salesman for the defendant since 1944. In 1947 he sold defendant’s turkey feed in the West, where company sales had been few in the past. In January, 1948, by Bulletin, and for the first time, the company established a $2 per ton bonus, less salary and expenses, stating “we will look at the situation at the end of 1948, and see if this is the best possible bonus arrangement, both from the standpoint of the individual salesman and the Kellogg Company.”
Scoville, as was customary, began selling feed in the fall of 1948 for consumption in 1949. In November 1948, Scoville and Borsum had a conversation, Scoville estimating his 1949 business at 500 cars of feed, and Borsum expressing doubt as to such volume, but stating, when reminded that Scoville’s bonus would amount to $30,000, that he saw no reason why the bonus should be changed at that time and that nothing would be changed in the 1949 setup.
Thereafter Scoville worked harder than ever and sold considerable feed, such that in April, 1949, he asked Borsum and Williams (an admitted agent of the company) if they thought he had sold enough feed, whereupon Williams urged him to sell all he could. When Scoville suggested he would make considerable money under the bonus, Williams replied: “We have got money to pay the bonus, you sell the feed.” By July 1, 1949, Scoville had closed all his sales for the year. He claims and defendant denies that an agreement was consummated incorporating the bonus terms of 1948 in an agreement for 1949.
Shortly after he had made his last sales, and in mid-July, Scoville received a “Bonus Plan for 1949” which ivas signed by Borsum, scheduling a bonus far below that of 1948. Scoville acknowledged its receipt, expressed concern over the plan, but at that time specifically did not accept or reject its terms. Some slight evidence indicates that he complained orally several times. At any rate he protested to Borsum in January, 1950, being told he should make no trouble, else he, Borsum and Williams all would lose their jobs. In this same month, the company notified its salesmen there would be no *22bonus for' 1950, but Scoville’s salary would be raised. It may or may not be significant that in the 3 years when it was considered, the bonus -was fixed in January, 1948, in July, 1949, and abolished in January, 1950. The record is silent as to why a bonus was set so. early in 1948 and so late in 1949. Scoville denies that he assented to the terms of the “Bonus Plan for 1949.” Defendant says he did.
Scovillé had been ill prior to his conversation with Williams and Borsum in January, 1950, and-in February, on doctor’s order, he went to Arizona, returning in April, during which time his wife attended to his business. There is evidence that he was hospitalized later for a time.
On January 30, 1950, the company sent Scoville a check “to cover bonus for 1949.” The check was returned for deduction of withholding tax which the company had overlooked. A corrected check . was sent with a. letter stating that a complete adjustment would be made when Mrs. Scoville’s figures were received. On April 25, 1950, the company forwarded another check for $1,026.88, along with a letter signed by Borsum, stating that it represented “the balance due on your bonus for 1949.” The amounts of both checks were calculated on the schedule of the “Bonus Plan for 1949,” and both were cashed without protest. Scoville thereafter made no formal protest until the eve of his retirement at the end of 1950, when he wrote the assistant to the president of the company. Defendant claims there was an accord and satisfaction, an account stated, or an estoppel. Plaintiff claims the facts prove otherwise, and that there was a jury question;
It was error to strike Borsum’s testimony on the ground he did not represent the company. The only basis for such ruling was the fact that when asked at the trial who was his employer, he answered it was the Kellogg Company, an answer having no probative value as to his status many months before. The very contract which the company relies on was signed by Borsum, and the purported final bonus payment made to Scoville, and which the company claims was an account stated or an accord and satisfac-' tion, was forwarded by Borsum with a letter in which he asserted that the payment was the balance due. Under such circumstances, Borsum’s relationship to the company would appear to have been one of agency but at least it was a jury question.2
Defendant urges that the trial court did not err in striking as inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, all statements made prior to issuance of the “Bonus Plan for-1949,” whether they had resulted in agreement or not, since they were merged in the later agreement. Such contention assumes the most important fact in this case,— whether Scoville accepted the terms of the “Bonus Plan for 1949.” The facts most fa*23vorable to plaintiff are not such as would require all reasonable minds to conclude that there was such an acceptance, hence whether Scoville’s actions were such as to constitute an acceptance also was a jury question.
The same conclusion holds as to whether his actions constituted an accord and satisfaction, and agreement to settle disputed claims, based on a consideration,3 or as to whether his actions bound him to an account stated,4 balancing accounts, and failing to overcome the rebuttable presumption that he would be bound for lack of protest within a reasonable time.5
We believe and hold that the facts of this particular case entitled plaintiff to go to the jury on his theory of the case,6— that he had a contract to get a $2 per ton bonus as he did in 1948, and that defendant was entitled to go to the jury on its theory of a different agreement, and on its defenses of accord and satisfaction and account stated. As to the estoppel claimed by defendant, it is difficult to find in the record any representation knowingly ■ made by plaintiff, upon which he intended defendant to rely and which the defendant, having done so, acted to its legal detriment.7
CROCKETT and WADE, JJ., concur.. Finlayson v. Brady, Utah, 240 P.2d 491; Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., Utah, 249 P.2d 213.
. 2 Am.Jur. 359, § 454.
. Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan Ass’n, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669; 1 Am.Jur. 215, § 1.
. 1 Am.Jur. 272, § 16.
. Benites v. Hampton, 3 Utah 369, 3 P. 206; 1 C.J.S. Account Stated, § 37, page 715.
. A. W. Sewell Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 80 Utah 378, 15 P.2d 327.
. Black’s Law Dictionary, Third Edition.