dissenting.
In my opinion the activities conducted by the appellee Ravenwood do not constitute “religious worship.” Such activities do not come within the intended ambit of the exemption which exempts all “places of religious worship” from ad valorem taxation.
In defining religion, the majority opinion adopts the basic guide stated by Justice Hughes: “The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.” In my opinion the Wiccan faith does not meet this test. Lady Sintana, the founder of Ravenwood, refers to herself as “a pagan and a witch.” Male followers are called “warlocks.” Each individual is connected to everything in the universe by what is known as the “karmic circle.” There is no belief in a deity in the sense of an anthropomorphic God, only a belief in some strange supernatural force which permeates the world.
Under that nebulous premise, there could be as many “places of religious worship” as there are homes or tents where humans meditate on the mysteries of life. It would certainly include places in which Satanic cults worship a supernatural evil force which dominates the world. I do not believe that such cults or beliefs qualify as a religion under the meaning of that term as understood by our *353founding fathers when they drafted the Constitution of the State of Georgia “relying upon the protection and guidance of Almighty God.” God has been defined as “the Being perfect in power, wisdom and goodness whom men worship as creator and ruler of the universe.” Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary.
While the majority opinion states that the Wiccan church does not believe in the devil, I do not believe it conforms to the traditional concept of a religion as embraced in the preamble of our State Constitution and as expressed in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag of the United States. This nation was founded “under God,” not the “karmic circle.”
I would reverse the judgment in Case No. 38413 and affirm the judgment in Case No. 38443.
I am authorized to state that Justice Clarke concurs in this dissent.