Roberts v. Ravenwood Church

Addendum On Motion for Rehearing.

The taxing authorities have filed a motion for rehearing in this case.

1. In the motion for rehearing, they argue, among other things, that Ravenwood’s receipt of rental income on some of the rooms in the Moreland Avenue dwelling destroys its character as a place of religious worship.

As authority, they cite two decisions which have not been heretofore cited: Atlanta Masonic Temple Co. v. City of Atlanta, 162 Ga. 244 (7) (133 SE 864) (1926) and Trustees Academy of Richmond County v. Bohler, 80 Ga. 159 (7 SE 633) (1887). However, our reading of Masonic Temple and Bohler actually bolsters our conclusion that the tax exemption is not lost where, as here, the trial court has found that a building is used primarily as a place of religious worship with some rooms in the building being rented out to students of the religion and with the rent being used to defray such expenses as the mortgage on the property. Under these circumstances, there is no “element of profit” in the receipt of rent, and the element of income is “altogether secondary and incidental.” Trustees Academy of Richmond County v. Bohler, 80 Ga., supra, at p. 163. Nor are the rooms being rented out for a “business purpose.” Atlanta Masonic Temple Co. v. City of Atlanta, 162 Ga., supra, at p. 245. As held in Peachtree on Peachtree Inn v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403 (170 SE2d 709) (1969), see n. 1, supra, the fact that residents are charged a rental toward expenses of operating a charitable institution does not destroy the charitable nature of the institution. Nor should it destroy *354the religious nature of an otherwise religious institution.

In addition, both Peachtree on Peachtree Inn v. Camp, supra, and Massenburg v. Grand Lodge F. & A. M. of State of Ga., 81 Ga. 212 (7 SE 636) (1888), recognize that where only a portion of a building is used for a tax-exempt purpose, the comparative value of the portion used for the tax-exempt purpose should be distinguished from the remainder, with only that part used for the tax-exempt purpose being spared taxation.

2. The taxing authorities also argue that our decision exposes the subject tax exemption to the possibility of practically unlimited abuse.

In responding to this argument, it is first necessary to dispel the dissent’s suggestion that under the majority opinion, places of religious worship are practically unlimited and would include places in which Satanic cults worship a supernatural evil force.

Under the majority opinion, demonology and stereotypical witchcraft most emphatically do not constitute religion. As we stated in the majority opinion, the minimum requirements of religion are (1) a sincere and meaningful belief in God occupying in the life of its possessors a place parallel to that occupied by God in traditional religions, and (2) a dedication to the practice of that belief. Thus, in order to constitute a religion, there is the requirement that there be a belief in a deity occupying a place parallel to that occupied by God in traditional religions. However, this is not to say that under the legal definition of religion, only traditional religions qualify. In determining that the legal definition of religion should not be circumscribed in this manner, one need look no further than the guarantee of freedom of religion contained in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Motion for rehearing denied.

All the Justices concur, except Jordan, C. J., and Clarke, J., who dissent.