concurring.
I concur in the result. However, I am not satisfied that the facts stated in the affidavit are sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment mandate or the requirements of Code § 19.2-54. Notwithstanding my view on this point, it is clear that the officer who conducted the search believed, as does the majority, that the affidavit and the warrant which he was executing were legally sufficient. Hence, application of the exclusionary rule does not serve the purpose contemplated by the Supreme Court when the rule was announced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Under the circumstances of this case, I would apply what has come to be known as the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule. See Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947, 950, 275 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1981); Abell v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 607, 616-17, 272 S.E.2d 204, 210 (1980); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). See also Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The “Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 635 (1978).
STEPHENSON, J., joins in the concurring opinion.