It is the contention of the plaintiff that the settlement of the Aldridge lawsuit amounted only to a covenant not to sue and does not bar the prosecution of the present action. Where joint and several tortfeasors are involved it becomes a question of whether the settlement is a pro tanto payment for the purpose of allowing one of the defendants to "buy his peace” or whether it is intended as a settlement of the tort under the rule that there can be but one satisfaction of a right of action and that the release of one joint tortfeasor releases all. The case against Aldridge was terminated by a final judgment of the trial court which recited that it and the agreement on which it was based terminated all issues, which certainly means that, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, she received a substantial sum of money *123because of the negligence of Aldridge being the proximate cause of her injuries.
At what point has the plaintiff elected her remedy and obtained "a satisfaction”? Prior to 1967 (Ga. L. 1967, pp. 226, 247) it was well established that the plaintiff had to choose prior to judgment (except for a voluntary dismissal of the action without prejudice) which of two defendants he would hold accountable for the injury where the liability of one was repugnant to the liability of the other. Johnson v. Epting, 185 Ga. 667 (196 SE 413); Crane v. Atlanta &c. Nat. Bank, 40 Ga. App. 83 (149 SE 58); Winn v. National Bank of Athens, 110 Ga. App. 133 (138 SE2d 89). Thereafter Code § 3-114 was changed from the right to pursue "consistent concurrent remedies against different persons until he shall obtain a satisfaction from some of them” to "consistent or inconsistent remedies against . . . different persons until he shall obtain a satisfaction from some of them.”
The question is therefore not whether the remedies were consistent, and not whether the settlement was a covenant not to sue or a release, but whether the plaintiff has obtained "a satisfaction” against a person which precludes another satisfaction based on a repugnant theory of what happened. She cannot under any circumstances hold both Aldridge and Vickers. Her settlement of the suit against Aldridge which "settled all issues” according to the judgment rendered, which was for a substantial sum and which depended for its existence entirely on the fact that the defendant in the present appeal was not at fault, amounts to "a satisfaction” and bars a subsequent suit against another person on the same cause of action.
Further the plaintiff, having entered into an agreement settling the issue of whose negligence was the cause of her injuries, and having procured this agreement to be made the judgment of the court and having procured a substantial consideration, is now estopped to contend that the injuries were in fact caused by another, where there can be no issue of joint liability, and the liability of the one in and of itself establishes the innocence of the other.
The trial court did not err in granting Vickers’ *124motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Hall, P. J., Eberhardt, P. J., Pannell and Clark, JJ., concur. Bell, C. J., Quillian, Evans and Stolz, JJ, dissent.