(dissenting) — The traditional approach to the problem presented in this case is to classify the plaintiff according to his status, that is, based upon how he entered the premises. If the plaintiff entered without permission, he is a trespasser, and the landowner's duty is merely to refrain from wanton and willful injury to him. Mail v. M.R. Smith Lumber & Shingle Co., 47 Wn.2d 447, 287 P.2d 877 (1955). In order to circumvent this harsh rule where children are involved, the courts have developed the attractive nuisance doctrine. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of *530Torts 364 (4th ed. 1971); Barnhart v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 89 Wash. 304, 154 P. 441 (1916); Bjork v. Tacoma, 76 Wash. 225, 135 P. 1005 (1913). The application of the attractive nuisance doctrine is a question of law: the trial court determines whether the instrumentality or condition which caused the injury meets five specific tests. Shock v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wn.2d 599, 105 P.2d 838 (1940). If any one of the tests is not met, the attractive nuisance doctrine is not available to the plaintiff, and his case will not reach the jury unless there is some evidence of wanton and willful conduct by the defendant landowner. Mail v. M.R. Smith Lumber & Shingle Co., supra. In this case, the trial court found that the pond in which Joseph and Michael Ochampaugh drowned did not meet the attractive nuisance tests and granted summary judgment for the defendants.
A growing number of states have rejected this approach and have abolished the traditional common-law classifications, distinctions and exceptions for trespassers, licensees and invitees. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Pickard v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mariorenzi v. Joseph Diponte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976); Scurti v. New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 354 N.E.2d 794, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976); see Annot., Modern Status of Rules Conditioning Landowner's Liability Upon Status of Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser, 32 A.L.R.3d 508 (1970). These courts have simplified matters by abandoning classification of the plaintiff and adopting the foreseeability test used in all other tort actions to questions of premises liability. They have defined the duty owed by landowners as one of reasonable care under all the circumstances. These courts have held that the method by which the plaintiff entered the property and the extent to which the defendant had reason to know of his presence are *531merely two of the factors which the jury must consider in deciding whether the landowner violated the standard of conduct imposed upon him.
The notion of abandoning the common-law classifications is not new to this court. In Sherman v. Seattle, 57 Wn.2d 233, 356 P.2d 316 (1960), we affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, a child of three, despite our conclusion that the attractive nuisance doctrine was not applicable. We held that, regardless of the plaintiff's status, the defendant owed him the duty to use reasonable care and was negligent in failing to protect the child from the hazard where the child's presence was reasonably foreseeable.
[W]e think that regardless of [plaintiff's] status — be it that of an invitee, licensee, or trespasser — [defendant] owed him the duty to use reasonable care.
Sherman v. Seattle, supra at 239. See also Helland v. Arland, 14 Wn.2d 32, 126 P.2d 594 (1942); Potts v. Amis, 62 Wn.2d 777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963); Memel v. Reimer, 85 Wn.2d 685, 538 P.2d 517 (1975).
I agree with the courts of California, Hawaii, Colorado, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, New York and other jurisdictions which have allowed a plaintiff to state a cause of action under circumstances similar to those which exist here. The duty of the city should be one of reasonable care; the jury should be allowed to determine whether that duty was violated. I would reverse the summary judgment order and allow this case to proceed to trial.
Utter and Hicks, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.
Reconsideration denied February 14, 1979.