Georgia Military Academy filed its petition for declaratory judgment praying that the court hold that if it (a) should abolish military training for its students, (b) should admit girls and young women as students, and (c) should change its corporate name to Woodward Academy, Inc., all as provided in a resolution of its governing board, the doing of these things would not violate a condition subsequent in the deed under which it holds the major portion of its property. The condition subsequent provided for the reversion of the property to the heirs of Colonel J. C. Woodward “if ever the aforementioned properties herein conveyed cease to be used for the purposes set forth in the charter of the grantee corporation.” The appellants, who would, in the event of reverter, have a one-sixth undivided interest in the property, filed an answer in which they contend that the property would revert to them and the other *722heirs of Colonel J. C. Woodward should the proposed action of the governing board be carried out.
A motion for summary judgment filed by Georgia Military Academy was granted, from which judgment appeal was filed. The sole error enumerated is that the court erred in granting a summary judgment in favor of the appellees. The appeal is based on two grounds — first, that there was a “genuine issue as to a material fact” (Code Ann. § 110-1203; Ga. L. 1959, p. 234) and hence a summary judgment should not have been granted, and second, the proposed changes in the nature of Georgia Military Academy would constitute a breach of the condition subsequent.
There was no genuine issue as to a material fact which should have been submitted to a jury. To the motion for summary judgment was attached an affidavit of the President of Georgia Military Academy setting out various facts entering into the decision by the governing board to dispense with military training and to admit girl students at Georgia Military Academy. Appellants filed no- counter affidavit. The sole question for determination was whether, under the terms of the condition subsequent contained in the deed conveying the property to Georgia Military Academy, there would be a forfeiture of the property to the heirs of the grantor in case the proposals of the governing board were carried out. This was purely a question of law to be determined by the court. Thus, the court properly entered judgment on the motion for summary judgment without submitting the case to a jury.
(a) Certainly changing the name of the corporation from “Georgia Military Academy” to “Woodward Academy, Inc.” would not breach the covenant, for the name is not the purpose or a purpose for which the corporation was created.
(b) On determining whether the admission of girls and/or dispensing with military training would work a forfeiture of the estate under terms of the condition subsequent, certain principles of law are applicable. First, courts look with favor on charitable and educational gifts and trusts.” “Gifts or trusts for charitable purposes are favorites of the law and the courts . . . [they] will not be declared void if they can, by any possibility consistent with law, be upheld; courts of equity, it is *723said, will go to the length of their judicial power to sustain such gifts.” 15 Am. Jur. 2d 111, Charities, § 105. Conditions subsequent in deeds are not favored in this State. Taylor v. Sutton, 15 Ga. 103 (4). “No act will be construed to work the destruction of an estate, unless the language of the grant to that effect be clear.” Lawson v. Georgia So. &c. R. Co., 142 Ga. 14, 19 (82 SE 233). The general principle is well stated in 19 Am. Jur. 527, Estates, § 65: “It is a well-settled rule that conditions tending to destroy estates, such as conditions subsequent, are not favored in law. They are strictly construed. Accordingly, no provision will be interpreted to create such a condition if the language will bear any other reasonable interpretation, or unless the language, used unequivocally, indicates an intention upon the part of the grantor or devisor to that effect and plainly admits of such construction. . . Generally, all doubts are resolved against restrictions on the use of the property by the grantee.” “The general abhorrence to the condition subsequent with its threat of forfeiture extends to forfeiture itself. Thus the courts are inclined not to construe a state of facts as constituting a breach of a condition subsequent unless such a situation clearly exists.” Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 4, § 1886, p. 648. See also cases cited.
The breach must be clearly and unequivocally manifest to work a forfeiture of this property under the condition subsequent. We do not think such is true here. In the first place the condition subsequent provides that the property shall revert if it ceased to be used for the purposes set forth in the charter of the school, and that was “for the purpose of a charitable and educational institution.”
It is significant in determining whether the condition subsequent would be breached by admitting girls or abolishing military training, that after stating in the petition for charter that the “purpose” is to conduct a charitable and educational institution as thereafter set out, the petition immediately follows with requests for certain “rights and powers.” It did not set out requirements, but it stated that petitioners desire the right and power to conduct a preparatory school for the education of boys and young men, the right to prescribe courses of study *724and to maintain and preserve order, to confer degrees, etc., to do all acts necessary to the operation of a military academy and preparatory school. Nowhere is it said that grantee must conduct a military academy or must not admit girls and young women. If it had, clearly there would be a forfeiture of the estate.
The charter conferred power upon the governing board to apply for and obtain charter amendments “either in form or substance.” This language indicates that Colonel Woodward, after conveying his property for “a charitable and educational institution,” conferred upon the governing board broad powers as to how that institution should be operated, permitting the board to change the charter “in form and substance,” which permitted the board to adjust the school to changing conditions of the future. He clearly did not expect the school always to be operated just as it was then being operated, and foreseeing such, gave the governing board power to change the charter in substance, as it now wishes to do.
We construe the charter as requiring that the property be used for a “charitable and educational institution,” and giving the board broad powers as to the manner and method of operation, and that the reverter clause in the deed would not become effective if the governing board should admit girls and young women or should not furnish military training to its students but only if the school should cease to function as a charitable and educational institution.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Duck-worth, C. J., Candler, P. J., and. Grice, J., who dissent.