(dissenting) — Petitioners in this case are all victims of alcoholism, a disease which exacts a tragic toll from among the citizens of our society. It is a disease which does not discriminate by age, race, wealth, or gender. Indeed, recent commentators have noted increased incidence of alcoholism even among our adolescents and children.
The petitioners themselves can attest to the grim consequences of the disease. Like many others afflicted with alcoholism, it has been a factor in their criminal behavior, with consequent entanglement in the criminal justice system. Petitioner Aripa's case is demonstrative. In his early 30's, he has been incarcerated for most of the last 20 years because of his alcoholism. Both he and the respondent Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) recognize his alcoholism.
Further, the circumstances of these petitioners are not unique. The evidence submitted in this case shows, and the trial court found, that of the approximately 1,500 inmates of the Washington State Penitentiary, approximately 60 percent, or 900, have a history of alcohol abuse.
In recognition of the problems associated with alcoholism, and particularly those problems of persons frequently incarcerated because of abuse of the drug, the legislature in 1972 adopted the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, RCW 70.96A.010 et seq. Through the many specific programs contemplated in the act, the legislature expressed its ambition to treat the disease wherever its victims sincerely request assistance. Given the legislature's appreciation of the relation between alcoholism and the criminal justice process, an appreciation justified in light of the statistical evidence of alcohol addiction among prisoners provided in the record of this case, it is inconceivable to me that the legislature intended to exclude inmates of the state's correctional institutions from among the persons to be served by the mandated treatment programs.
*143But even were a more explicit legislative expression of intent necessary, it can readily be found in RCW 70.96A-.050(3), which requires the department to:
Cooperate with public and private agencies in establishing and conducting programs to provide treatment for alcoholics, persons incapacitated by alcohol, and intoxicated persons who are clients of the correctional system.
The legislature was not satisfied merely to assign a passive, albeit cooperative, role to the state agency. Rather it imposed a duty on the department to establish
by all appropriate means, including contracting for services, a comprehensive and coordinated program for the treatment of alcoholics, persons incapacitated by alcohol, and intoxicated persons.
RCW 70.96A.080U).
It is evident the legislature intended that such a program include the gamut of services medical treatment of a disease would advise, as in the companion subdivision (2), the act provides:
(2) The program shall include, but not necessarily be limited to:
(a) Emergency treatment provided by a facility affiliated with or part of the medical service of a general hospital or licensed medical institution:
(b) Inpatient treatment;
(c) Intermediate treatment; and
(d) Outpatient and follow-up treatment.
Of special interest to us here in determining that the mandated treatment program should be provided to the petitioners, the legislature commanded further, in subdivision (3):
_ The department shall provide for adequate and appropriate treatment for alcoholics, persons incapacitated by alcohol, and intoxicated persons admitted under RCW 70.96A.110 through 70.96A.140. Treatment may not be provided at a jail or prison except for inmates.
In the face of this legislative order, the department has essentially claimed unlimited discretion to pick and choose *144among its clients who shall be provided treatment, and to determine what in the nature of treatment or education shall be provided to each. This is simply a case of a state agency which refuses to do its job. The arguments advanced by the department and accepted by the court do not, I believe, withstand close scrutiny.
First, the court would find the last sentence of RCW 70.96A.080(3), only to prohibit the use of penal facilities for the treatment of alcoholics, in keeping with the legislative intention to substitute treatment for punishment wherever possible. While the sentence no doubt reflects that intention, the final proviso, "except for inmates", can mean nothing unless it means that inmates will be afforded treatment where they are, in the interest of penal security.
Additionally, the court finds an absence of specificity in the use of the term "treatment" in the provisions cited. To find specificity one need look no further than the definitions provision of the act, RCW 70.96A.020, where the legislature carefully provides that:
"Treatment" means the broad range of emergency, outpatient, intermediate, and inpatient and emergency services and care, including diagnostic evaluation, medical, psychiatric, psychological, and social service care, vocational rehabilitation and career counseling, which may be extended to alcoholics, persons incapacitated by alcohol, and intoxicated persons.
RCW 70.96A.020(10).
The department cannot seriously contend it does not understand what treatment means. The precise language of the legislature defines it and it has itself further defined, in WAC 275-15, the comprehensive treatment program mandated by the legislature. The petitioners seek only treatment the legislature in its wisdom and compassion determined they shall be given. The department's interpretation and that of this court frustrates what I believe to be *145a clear statement of the will of the legislature.
Horowitz, J., concurs with Utter, J.