concurring in part; dissenting in part:
In order to isolate my disagreement with the majority, it is necessary to point out the areas where we do agree.
The pertinent portions of the two statutory sections under consideration are set forth for comparison:
A.R.S. § 32-2071 provides in part:
“The board shall issue a certificate as psychologist to any person who:
******
“(c) Has received the doctoral degree based on a program of studies the content of which was primarily psychological, or the substantial equivalent thereof in both subject matter and extent of training, obtained from an educational institution having a graduate program [accredited by certain specified organizations.]
******
“3. Passes a satisfactory credentials examination in psychological preparation as described in § 32-2072.” A.R.S. § 32-2072(D) provides m part:
“D. The board shall waive the examination requirement as prescribed by this article and shall grant a certificate . . provided the applicant . . . has a doctoral degree or equivalent thereof from an institution accredited, as provided in § 32-2071, paragraph 1, subdivision (c), at the time the degree was granted, based on a program of studies the content of which is primarily psychological, or the substantial equivalent thereof in both subject matter and extent of training, and in addition has had three years of professional experience satisfactory to the board.” (emphasis added)
Simply looking at the credentials examination and its waiver, it is apparent the statutory scheme provides a ludicrous and unworkable method of certification.
First, this “examination” only applies to applicants seeking certification under A.R.S. § 32-2071(l)(c) (academic qualifications only). The “credentials examination” does not require the applicant to take additional tests, for A.R.S. § 32-2072(A) simply provides that, “The examination shall consist of an evaluation of credentials submitted by the applicant to determine adequacy of training and experience.” Apparently, the board merely reviews the applicant’s educational history and internship to determine whether the PHD in psychology was obtained by taking the prerequisite psychological courses.1
This credentials examination shall be “waived” by the board under A.R.S. § 32-2072(D) if the applicant has three years of professional experience “satisfactory to the board” plus has taken courses in an accredited graduate program the content of which is “primarily psychological.” How the board is able to determine whether an applicant with three years professional experience has taken graduate courses which are “primarily psychological” without examining the applicant’s college credentials *30is simply beyond me. Obviously, the same type of board evaluation is contemplated for § 32-2072(D) applicants as is required for § 32-2071(l)(c) applicants and the statutory concept of “waiver” of that evaluation is ridiculous.
Aside from this glaring inadequacy, the § 32-2072(D) applicant must present three years professional experience “satisfactory to the board.” In my opinion, this is an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the board as not even general statutory guidelines are provided to determine what would be “satisfactory.” See, Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242, 204 P.2d 854 (1949); State Personnel Commission v. Webb, 18 Ariz.App. 69, 500 P.2d 329 (1972). While the issue of appellant’s professional experience was not an issue in this case, since the majority holds A.R.S. § 32-2072(D) unconstitutional which is going to require the legislature to rewrite that section if certification of psychologists based on work experience is to remain viable, it is important to point out additional constitutional infirmities.
I also agree with the majority that the use of the term “doctoral” in both § 32-2071(l)(c) and in § 32-2072(D) is confusing and ambiguous. In short, whatever hook you desire to hang your hat on, A.R.S. § 32-2072(D) is unconstitutional.
It is at this point that I have my first major disagreement with the majority. The majority opinion holds that § 32-2071(l)(c) is severable from the unconstitutional portions of the statute. (The sever-ability issue will be dealt with later.) The majority then interprets A.R.S. § 32-2071(l)(c) to mean that certification under that statute can be given to applicants who not only have PHD’s in psychology but also to applicants who have a “substantial equivalent” of the doctorate.
The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to determine legislative intent. Adams v. Bolin, 74 Ariz. 269, 247 P.2d 617 (1952); City of Phoenix v. Yates, 69 Ariz. 68, 208 P.2d 1147 (1949). While I readily admit that attempting to ascertain the legislative intent from this garbled piece of legislation is difficult, I am of the opinion that what the legislature intended to do, and with which the majority agrees, was to allow a two-step process for certification— one based on academic credentials and the other based on lesser academic achievements, but complemented by professional experience. That the legislature did not constitutionally accomplish the second step has already been spoken to. The first step, however, remains, and the academic qualifications required before an applicant may trod on that step is that “[the applicant] has received the doctoral degree based upon a program of studies the content of which is primarily psychological . . . .”
By interpreting A.R.S. § 32-2071(l)(c) to allow certification of applicants holding less than a doctoral degree, the majority is permitting under that section what the legislature obviously intended to be permitted under A.R.S. § 32-2072(D). In short, if the majority’s interpretation is correct, there would have been no necessity for the legislature to even attempt to enact A.R.S. § 32-2072(D). This appears to me to be contrary to any legislative intent that can be gleaned from this statute.
I am bolstered in this conclusion by a comparison of the language of these two sections. A.R.S. § 32-2071(l)(c) in pertinent part provides:
“Has received the doctoral degree based on a program of studies the content of which was primarily psychological, or the substantial equivalent thereof in both subject matter and extent of training . . .” (emphasis added)
A.R.S. § 32~2072(D) provides in pertinent part:
“. . has a doctoral degree or equivalent thereof . . based on a program of studies the content of which is primarily psychological, or the substantial equivalent thereof in both subject matter and extent of training . . . .” (emphasis added)
In my opinion, the phrase “or the substantial equivalent thereof” as used in A.R.S. § 32-2071(l)(c) has the same mean*31ing as it does in A.R.S. § 32-2072(D), that is, it modifies “program of studies” rather than “doctoral degree.”
I must therefore conclude that certification under A.R.S. § 32-2071(l)(c) is limited to those who hold a PHD in psychology, the equivalency being reserved to A.R.S. § 32-2072(D).
If my interpretation is correct, that is, only applicants holding a doctoral degree in psychology are entitled to certification under A.R.S. § 32-2071(lXc) and the appellant not having such a degree, the judgment of the trial court denying certification must be affirmed.
However, I have a more basic disagreement with the majority and that is the severability of A.R.S. § 32-2071(l)(c) from the unconstitutional A.R.S. § 32-2072(D). The majority holds that A.R.S. § 32-2071(lXc) survives the severance of A.R.S. § 32-2072(D). In my opinion, this amputation results in the death of the entire statute.
The general rule adopted in Arizona is expressed in Selective Life Ins. Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 101 Ariz. 594, 422 P.2d 710 (1967):
“. . . [WJhere the valid parts of a statute are effective and enforceable standing alone and independent of those portions declared unconstitutional, the court will not disturb the valid law if the valid and invalid portions are not so intimately connected as to raise the presumption the legislature would not have enacted one without the other, and the invalid portion was not the inducement of the act.” Id., at 599, 422 P.2d at 715.
Stated conversely, where one part of a statute is held to be of no effect because of unconstitutionality, the whole statute will be ineffectual if the remaining sections would make little sense in expressing the intent of the legislature. Barrows v. Garvey, 67 Ariz. 202, 193 P.2d 913 (1948).
As previously stated, the legislature intended article 2, ch. 19.1, title 32, entitled “Certification” to provide two avenues for certification as a psychologist in Arizona— one based upon academic achievement of a PHD in Psychology under A.R.S. § 32-2071(l)(c) and the other based upon an “equivalency” plus practical experience, under A.R.S. § 32-2072(D). There is nothing in the legislative history of this act which would indicate that the legislature would have enacted one without the other and therefore, I would find under the Arizona test that the entire certification scheme must fail.
Moreover, there are serious constitutional questions raised as to whether a statute which bases certification of psychologists upon academic qualifications alone, at least as to psychologists engaged in the practice of psychology at the time of the enactment of the certification requirements, is valid. As was stated in Taylor v. Hayes, 131 Ill. App.2d 305, 264 N.E.2d 814 (1970):
“In the instant case the right of the plaintiff to pursue his profession was fixed during the preregulatory period and any subsequent legislation affecting his profession must be reasonable as it affects his special situation. We find that the requirement that plaintiff, as a practicing psychologist at the time of the enactment of the Act, possess a master’s or doctoral degree to qualify for registration is unreasonable and arbitrary and denies him due process of law since it effectively excludes him from continuing to practice without providing an alternative method for evaluating his ability.” Id. 264 N.E.2d at 818.
See also, Berger v. Board of Psychologist Examiners, 172 U.S.App.D.C. 396, 521 F.2d 1056 (1975) and Whittle v. State Board of Examiners of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328 (Okl.1971).
I therefore must conclude that the legislature would not have enacted this legislation without A.R.S. § 32-2072(D) for to do so might result in unconstitutionally depriving practicing psychologists of due process. Having reached this conclusion, the entire act must be declared invalid.
I would therefore reverse the decision of the trial court insofar as it implicitly upholds the constitutionality of art. 2, ch. 19.1, *32title 32 Arizona Revised Statutes. However, since the only relief requested by appellant in the superior court was that he receive certification as a psychologist, which certification I would hold cannot be constitutionally granted under the present statute, I would affirm the dismissal of appellant’s special action proceedings.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
PROEB, Chief Judge, Division 1.The appellee State of Arizona Board of Psychologist Examiners filed a motion for rehearing directed to our opinion dated December 6,1977, to which appellant Leonard M. Cohen has filed objections.
Appellee does not raise any issue regarding our analysis of the constitutional or legal questions which would warrant granting a rehearing.
Appellee does, however, present to the court a serious issue relating to the authenticity of course credits which the Board of Psychologist Examiners found had been earned by appellant at the University of Pittsburgh. The matter comes to light in view of our order directing the superior court to enter a new judgment that appellant has complied with A.R.S. § 32-2071(l)(c).
Appellee now contends for the first time in this case that 33 course credits in psychology from the University of Pittsburgh which were found by the Board to belong to appellant were in reality credits earned by another person having the name of Leonard M. Cohen. Appellee points out that the Board received and considered the transcript of these credits without realizing the mistake. Appellant responds by conceding the error, but argues that it does not make any difference because appellant still has enough credits to qualify for certification under the formula we announced in our opinion.
In reviewing the present record once again, we find that the issue of the wrong transcript has been present in the case although never adjudicated by either the Board or the superior court. It also appears that appellant raised the question in his opening brief on this appeal, but in a context which made our consideration of the issue unnecessary in view of the finding of the Board that appellant was entitled to the credits referred to. Now it is the appellee which directs our attention to the wrong transcript and asks us to modify our opinion so that a de novo hearing may be held on the question.
If the 33 credits referred to are not properly attributable to appellant, his right to certification is clearly in question.
For that reason, we modify our previous opinion by vacating that portion which directs the trial court to enter judgment that appellant has complied with A.R.S. § 32-2071(l)(c). Instead, we reverse the judgment of the superior court and direct that the case be remanded to the Board of Psychologist Examiners for a new hearing on the question of whether appellant qualifies for certification as a psychologist under A.R.S. § 32-2071(l)(c). The findings of the Board previously made are vacated and it is directed to enter new findings consistent with our earlier opinion.
IT IS ORDERED denying the motion for rehearing.
OGG, J., concurs.. The board by rule has determined that “primarily psychological” as used in A.R.S. § 32-2071 means “a program 65% or more of which is in a department of psychology or in other departments if the content of the course as determined by the Board is essentially psychological.” Whether this rule means anything is doubtful, for in the final analysis, it appears the board, apparently subjectively, must determine whether the course is “essentially psychological.” The validity of this rule is not directly before us.