(concurring specially):
I concur, but with the following reservations. While the main opinion correctly states that in Alford plea cases, there must be a factual basis for the plea, see supra pp. 672-674,1 do not join the main opinion’s narrow reading of what constitutes a factual basis, wherein it states:
In Alford plea cases, however, when a defendant necessarily does not admit to all elements of the charged crimes, the record must be sufficient to satisfy the trial court and/or a reviewing court that the State’s case is strong enough to warrant acceptance of the plea when guilt is not admitted by the defendant.
Id. at 674 (footnote omitted).
As explained in Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992), a factual basis is found when the record of facts establishes either that the defendant committed the charged crime or that other facts exist that would substantiate prosecution of the charge at trial. Id. at 862. Thus, under Willett, it is essential, at the time of the plea, for facts establishing the strength of the prosecution’s case to be shown in order for the defendant to be able to evaluate the risks of conviction. Otherwise, the defendant could not truly make a knowing and voluntary plea. Accordingly, Willett ruled that a “court cannot be satisfied that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary unless the record establishes facts that would place the defendant at risk of conviction should the matter proceed to trial.” Id.
However, requiring evidence of actual guilt in Alford plea cases, as the main opinion does here, rather than requiring either evidence of actual guilt or facts that would otherwise substantiate prosecution of the charge at trial, is not compelled by Willett, nor by Alford, and is, as such, an unwarranted and ill-advised extension thereof.