concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority concludes that “the AU calculated Vigil’s average weekly wage in a manner inconsistent with section 8-47-101(4), 3B C.R.S. (1986) (now codified at section 8-42-102(3), 3B C.R.S. (1992 Supp.)), the statutory provision that accords an AU broad discretion to avoid inequitable results.” Op. at 858. I agree. The majority further finds, however, “that the court of appeals erred when it substituted its judgment for that of the AU in specifically directing the AU to calculate Vigil’s compensation award based upon her average weekly wage earned during her earlier employment as a maid/housekeeper and at the time of her original industrial injury.” Id. at 858. I disagree. I find that section 8-53-124, 3B C.R.S. (1986), gives the court of appeals authority to order entry of judgment, and that the court of appeals appropriately ordered entry of judgment in the present case, premised on Vigil’s wages earned while a maid/housekeeper. I dissent as to part II.B. of the majority opinion.
We granted certiorari to consider
[wjhether the court of appeals erred in directing an administrative law judge to recompute the respondent’s permanent total disability benefits based on her average weekly wage at the time of her first injury when the respondent suffered loss of her wage-earning capacity as a result of two disabling injuries.
As the majority notes, sections 8-47-101 and 8-47-102 governed the calculation of compensation for workers sustaining work-related injuries. Op. at 854. Those sections have been revised and reenacted, and are currently found in sections 8-42-102 through 8-42-104, 3B C.R.S. (1992 Supp.), of the Colorado Workers’ Compensation Act.
Disputes arising under the Workers’ Compensation Act are governed by the hearing and review procedures set forth in Article 53 of Title 8. Section 8-53-119, 3B C.R.S. (1986) (now codified at 8-43-307, 3B C.R.S. (1992 Supp.)), provides that any person “dissatisfied with any final order of the panel, may commence an action in the court of appeals against the industrial claims office as defendant to modify or vacate any such order on the grounds set forth in section 8-53-120.” § 8-53-119, 3B C.R.S. (1986). Section 8-53-120 in turn provides, as the majority notes, op. at 856, several causes upon which the court of appeals may set aside the order, including the grounds that “the findings of fact do not support the order[,j or that the award or denial of benefits is not supported by applicable law.” § 8-53-120, 3B C.R.S. (1986).
As part of the hearing and review procedures, section 8-53-124 gives the court of appeals plenary authority to order entry of a proper judgment. Prior to the revision and reenactment of the Workers’ Compensation Act, it provided:
Upon setting aside of any order, the court may recommit the controversy and remand the record in the ease for further hearing or proceedings by the director, hearing officer, or panel, or it may order entry of a proper award upon the findings as the nature of the case shall demand. In no event shall such order for award be for a greater amount of compensation than allowed by articles 40 to 54 of this title, or in any manner conflict with the provisions thereof.
§ 8-53-124, 3B C.R.S. (1986) (now codified at section 8-43-312, 3B C.R.S. (1992 Supp.)) (emphasis added).1 The plain language of the statute dictates that the court of appeals has authority to order entry of a proper award if the nature of a particular ease so demands.
I find that, based on the “unique character” of this case and on the fact that the findings of the AU are not in dispute, it was appropriate for the court of appeals to order entry of judgment. Op. at 857; id. at 858 n. 9. As the majority notes, Vigil *860sustained a work-related injury in September 1987, at which time her weekly wages were approximately $418. In January 1988, Vigil returned to work for the same employer, but had a reduced earning capacity of approximately thirty-one percent; Vigil earned approximately $290 per week after her first injury. Three months later, Vigil sustained a second work-related injury, and was subsequently unable to work in any capacity.
The majority notes that:
the AU specifically found that the greater degree of injury was attributable to Vigil’s original injury; Vigil’s earnings were significantly higher at the time of the original injury; Vigil was employed for roughly seven years at her first position as a maid/housekeeper, yet only a few months at the second light-duty employ.
Op. at 857. The majority found that “the standard statutory methods of computing a claimant’s average weekly wage work a gross inequity to [Vigil].” Id. at 857. The majority thus correctly affirmed the court of appeals’ setting aside of the panel’s order. Under the plain language of section 8-53-124, however, the court of appeals appropriately ordered entry of judgment in favor of Vigil, based on the unique facts of her case — which, as the majority notes, are not in dispute — in order to comply with the requirement that an average weekly wage must be calculated fairly. § 8-47-101(4), 3B C.R.S. (1986); Op. at 858 n. 9. Because the Colorado Workers’ Compensation Act confers such authority on the court of appeals, I dissent to part II.B. of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to say that Justice MULLARKEY, joins in this concurrence and dissent.
. The language of section 8-43-312, 3B C.R.S. (1992 Supp.), is substantially similar to the language of section 8-53-124, 3B C.R.S. (1986).