The dispositive issue presented is whether Senate Bill 142 (S.B. 142) and Senate Bill 725 (S.B. 725) (Bills) contain multiple subjects in violation of the Okla. Const. art. 5, § 56.1 We find that because Senate Bill 142 and Senate Bill 725 contain multiple subjects, they are unconstitutional under art. 5, § 56 which requires special appropriation bills to contain a single subject.
FACTS
In appropriating state monies for fiscal year 1993, the Oklahoma Legislature passed fourteen appropriation bills covering various state functions.2 On December *25716, 1992, the petitioners, Representative Grover R. Campbell, Assistant Minority Leader, Representative Don Weese, Representative Carolyn Coleman, and Representative John Greenwood (collectively, Representatives), filed an original action challenging two of the bills. The Representatives assert that S.B. 142 and S.B. 725 contain multiple subjects in violation of the Okla. Const. art. 5, § 56. On February 1, 1993, the State Secretary of Energy, Charles Nesbitt (Nesbitt/intervenor) filed an application to intervene challenging the twelve other bills passed by the 2nd Session of the 43rd Legislature. The interve-nor agrees with the Representatives that S.B. 142 and S.B. 725 each contain a multiplicity of subjects. However, he alleges that the remaining bills also encompass multiple subjects and that they, too, are unconstitutional.3 The State Officials responded on February 9, 1993, in support of the constitutionality of the Bills. They argue that because S.B. 142 and S.B. 725 each encompass a single “function” of state government, the bills are in compliance with the single-subject mandate of art. 5, § 56. Final pleadings were received February 23, 1993.
Senate Bill No. 142 is styled “An Act Relating to State Cultural Entities.” The bill contains appropriations for the State Arts Council, the Oklahoma Department of Libraries, the Will Rogers Memorial Commission, the J.M. Davis Memorial Commission, the Oklahoma Historical Society, the Oklahoma Tourism and Recreation Department, and the Oklahoma Education Television Authority. Senate Bill No. 725 contains numerous provisions relating to “State Business Regulatory Agencies.” The bill appropriates monies to the follow-tag agencies: the Banking Department, the Department of Commerce, the Commission on Consumer Credit, the Department of Labor, the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Board and the Oklahoma Securities Commission.
SENATE BILL 142 AND SENATE BILL 725 CONTAIN MULTIPLE SUBJECTS. THEY ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ART. 5, § 56 WHICH REQUIRES SPECIAL APPROPRIATION BILLS TO CONTAIN A SINGLE SUBJECT.
The funding for numerous state agencies and the efficacy of the Legislature’s current model for appropriating state funds is challenged by the Representatives and by the intervenor. Their position is that the Bills are unconstitutional in toto. This argument is premised on the language of art. 5, § 56 of the Okla. Const. providing that all appropriations, except those found in a general appropriations bill, “ ... shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject.” (Emphasis provided.)
The State Officials contend that they have accomplished the mandate of art. 5, § 56, that special appropriation bills each contain only a single subject, by instituting a functional appropriation method. Under this method, each state “function” is funded through one special appropriations bill allowing the Legislature to consider the broad spectrum of a function rather than considering each agency individually. The State Officials argue the Bills each contain a single subject; that is, S.B. 142 covers the cultural functions of the State and S.B. 725 encompasses the business regulatory functions of Oklahoma.
*258The Representatives urge us to assume original jurisdiction and to issue a writ of prohibition freezing the .funds appropriated in S.B. 142 and S.B. 725. They insist that the constitutionality of these bills, both of which encompass special appropriations, is of great public concern.4 We find that the case before us presents one of those rare circumstances where this Court should grant a form of declaratory relief. Therefore, we assume original jurisdiction and grant the request in the form of declaratory relief.5
A.
THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE.
Most state constitutions contain some form of the single-subject rule.6 Its purpose is to prevent the practice of logrolling — the enactment of legislation through the combination of unpopular causes with popular legislation on an entirely different subject.7 Not only does the single subject rule prohibit log-rolling, it also enables the public and the Legislature to understand the scope and effect of pending legislation. Generally, the only notice of pending legislation is a publication of its title.8
The Courts which have considered what the State Officials refer to as a functional approach to addressing the requirement that special appropriation legislation contain a single subject, are divided on the efficacy of the method.9 However, even if we were to adopt a more expansive approach to the application of the single-subject rule of art. 5, § 56, it is unclear that the result hoped for by the State Officials would be accomplished. Apparently, the State Officials’ contention is that a functional approach to consideration of the single-subject mandate of art. 5, § 56 would lead to the upholding of more legislation than what they characterize as the “strict approach” applied in Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694, 698 (Okla.1991).10
A review of the relevant case law does not support this proposition. Our recent *259decision in Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694, 698 (Okla. 1991) is dispositive of most of the arguments presented. In Johnson, we held that under art. 5, § 57 of the Okla. Const., general legislation bills and special appropriation bills are limited to one subject. Section 56 requires that general appropriation bills embrace nothing but appropriations. Here, special appropriation bills are presented — both Bills contain appropriations and general legislative provisions. Significantly, the Bills do not contain severability provisions; and the Oklahoma Constitution does not have a provision which allows the Governor to treat each subject of a multi-subject bill as a separate enactment. Nor does it have any provision authorizing this Court to excise offending provisions and to leave the balance standing.11 Just as art. 5, § 56 requires that special appropriation bills contain a single subject, art. 5, § 57 mandates “(e)very act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject ... except general appropriation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision of statutes .. .”.12 Except for limited exceptions — none of which apply here— § 57 requires that every act of the Legislature be limited to a solitary subject. The Bills cannot withstand a single-subject challenge under art. 5, § 56 or under art. 5, § 57.
The Representatives and the State Officials all rely upon Opinion of the Justices, 512 So.2d 72, 77 (Ala.1987) in support of their respective positions. In Justices, the Alabama court found that provisions providing appropriations for elementary and secondary schools, junior and technical colleges, and for colleges and universities all came within the single rubric of “appropriations for public education.” However, the court held that appropriations within the same bill for non-state agencies violated Alabama’s constitutional restrictions on general appropriation bills. The Alabama court allowed appropriations all relating to a single subject — public education — to stand. It struck the non-related provisions for non-state agencies. The holding in Justices is premised on a history of the funding practices of the Alabama Legislature rather than on any detailed one-subject analysis. It is not particularly instructive for our purposes. We must determine, under Oklahoma law, whether S.B. 142 and S.B. 725 violate the Oklahoma constitutional provisions prohibiting multi-subject legislation.
Nor can the State Officials find a great deal of support for their adoption of the functional approach from other jurisdictions. The California Supreme Court appears to consider the functional approach more restrictive than an approach requiring that provisions be reasonably germane to each other.13 In Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 294, 816 P.2d 1309, 1320 (1991), the California Supreme Court compared a functional approach to a requirement that all provisions of legislation be germane to each other. In doing so, the California Court wrote:
*260“... Petitioners appear to be confusing germaneness with functional relationship. As we have previously held, the single-subject provision does not require that each of the provisions of a measure effectively interlock in a functional rela-tionship_ It is enough that the various provisions are reasonably related to a common theme or purpose_” (Citations omitted.)
We also recognized in Black v. Oklahoma Funding Bd., 193 Okla. 1, 140 P.2d 740, 743 (1943) that when considering the single subject mandate of art. 5, § 57, that legislation containing provisions which are germane, relative, and cognate to one another do not violate the unity-of-subject requirement.14
The State Officials appear to share the confusion between functional relationship and germaneness alluded to by the California Court. As oúr prior cases applying art. 5, § 57 indicate, the most appropriate standard for applying the single-subject rule is germaneness: are the various provisions related to a common theme or purpose? We expressly affirm the viability of this germaneness test for challenges brought under art. 5, § 56. To the degree that “functional relationships” between different provisions may be shown to illustrate a common purpose thus establishing the ger-maneness of the provisions, it may have some usefulness. Nonetheless, germaneness is the standard.
In State v. First Nat’l Bank, 660 P.2d 406, 414-15 (Alaska 1982), the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged that it has so broadly construed subjects in order to bring them within the single-subject rule of the Alaska Constitution that its actions might be construed as a sanction for legislation embracing “the whole body of the law.” At the same time, the Alaska court readily recognized that its continued application of a broad-brush approach to the consideration of the subject of legislation rested solely upon the doctrine of stare decisis. The court observed that were it considering the issue of a single subject for legislation for the first time, it would apply a more narrow test.15
B.
APPLICATION OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE.
Just as the Alaska judiciary feels bound by its prior rulings, so do we. Although the argument was not identified by the Legislature as a functional approach to consideration of the one-subject rule encompassed in art. 5, § 56, we were urged in Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694, 698 (Okla.1991) to accept, as a single-subject, diverse legislation under a heading of “state government.” We rejected this proposition because the adoption of an approach which would allow unrelated legislation to be included in a single enactment simply by the skillful drafting of a broad topic would defeat the purpose of the single-subject mandate of art. 5, § 56 — to prevent the execution of piggyback legislation by including it within popular bills.16 Our consideration of the challenged Bills must be measured against the standard of art. 5, § 56 which requires special appropriation bills to contain a single subject. That means if the bill contains multiple provisions, the provisions must reflect a common, closely akin theme or purpose. Although it is not possible to refine this formulation more precisely, it should by now be apparent from a review of our prior cases that neither § 56 nor § 57 supports an expansive reading. The common themes or purposes embodied in legislation must be readily manifest.
Neither enactment withstands scrutiny under this standard. Senate Bill 142 is identified as an act relating to state cultural entities. Although a number of its provisions are directed to state agencies whose *261primary objective might be considered cultural development, it contains provisions which cannot be characterized as “cultural.” Section 16 of the act reappropriates monies originally designated for the Oklahoma Department of Tourism and Recreation to provide the state match to federal Bureau of Reclamation Fund Program Funds.17 The bill also provides for reap-propriation of funds relating to the development of an industrial airpark economic study.18 It restricts the closing of state parks,19 and it provides for the establishment of an intern program for the State Regents for Higher Education.20 These provisions have no relationship to the subject of cultural entities identified by the State Officials as the single subject of S.B. 142.
The heading of S.B. 725 providing that it is “an act relating to state business regulatory agencies” presents a topic almost as broad as the one identified, and disapproved, in Johnson — “state government.” Included within the regulatory scheme are headstart programs and a detailed list of money received for asbestos abatement. A program providing for early education of children and one requiring an accounting of funds received to abate a health hazard, although regulatory in nature, do not fit within the rubric of “state business regulatory agencies.” They cannot be considered to come under the topic of business as do provisions for the Banking Department and the Commission on Consumer Credit.
Article 5, § 56 requires that special appropriation bills similar to Senate Bills 142 and 725 embrace a single subject. Each of the Bills contain provisions which are unrelated to each other and to their expressed subjects. Because Senate Bill 142 and Senate Bill 725 contain multiple subjects, they are unconstitutional under art. 5, § 56 requiring special appropriation bills to contain a single subject.21
*262CONCLUSION
The Bills appropriate monies to varied State agencies. The funds were available to the agencies as of July 1, 1992. Undoubtedly, the majority of the monies appropriated have been expended; and monies which have been appropriated and disbursed are not recoverable.22 Although the usual operative date of opinions issued in original actions is the date the opinion is promulgated,23 we recognize that a midyear adjustment to agency funds in the face of the current fiscal climate would cause severe disruption to the State agencies involved. Although the Court has attempted to handle the instant cause expeditiously,24 the Legislature has completed another budget process. We have no desire, in a year in which the State is faced with significant budget constraints, to issue an opinion which would necessitate the calling of a special session. Such a session would be costly and might result in precious resources appropriated to government operations being expended to support the session itself. We may give prospective operation to our announcements when necessary to avoid disruption and to allow a period of adjustment.25 Logic and the late hour of the challenge require26 that we give a prospective operation to this opinion. Because we have no desire to disrupt the funding of state agencies, the effective date of the instant pronouncement shall be June 30, 1994.27
Much of the Representatives’ argument concerning the validity of Senate Bill 142 and Senate Bill 725 involves the lengthy process of enacting legislation, and the time constraints imposed by art. 5, § 26.28 We are not free to so expand the meaning of constitutional provisions through the post-hoc application of an inconsistent functionality test.29 To do so would allow the Constitution to be read as permitting that which it was clearly meant to prohibit. The clear language of art. 5, § 5630 requires that all special appropriations bills embrace a single subject. Because Senate Bill 142 and Senate Bill 725 contain a multiplicity of provisions unrelated to a common *263theme or purpose, they are unconstitutional.
This is the second time in less than two years that this Court has been called upon to determine whether legislatively enacted laws are unconstitutional for violation of the single-subject mandate. In Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694, 669 (Okla.1991), we gave prospective operation to our pronouncement largely because our ruling had not been foreshadowed. Today, we give a prospective effect to our holding to avoid needless disruption to the operation of state agencies. We trust that a third opinion will not be necessary. Our consideration for the practical operations of government should not be understood to be a shield for the continued enactment of unconstitutional laws. Although we are sympathetic with the time constraints the Legislature faces in session, this Court is bound to uphold the Constitution — we are prepared to do so.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED; DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED; PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION TO JUNE 30, 1994.
HODGES, C.J., and HARGRAVE and WATT, JJ., concur. ALMA WILSON, J., concurs specially. SUMMERS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. LAVENDER, V.C.J., and SIMMS and OPALA, JJ., dissent.. The Okla. Const. art. 5, § 56 provides:
"The general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the expenses of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the State, and for interest on the public debt. The salary of no officer or employee of the State, or any subdivision thereof, shall be increased in such bill, nor shall any appropriation be made therein for any such officer or employee, unless his employment and the amount of his salary, shall have been already provided for by law. All other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject."
. At the Court’s request, the State Officials filed a list of the general subjects of the challenged bills. The bills and the general subjects identified are as follows:
S.B. No. 725 — Business Regulatory Functions
S.B. No. 142 — Cultural Functions
H.B. No. 2425 — Law Enforcement Functions
S.B. No. 723 — Judicial Functions
H.B. No. 2421 — Educational Functions
S.B. No. 726 — Public Safety Functions
*257H.B. No. 2427 — Government Service Functions
H.B. No. 2423 — Social Service Functions
H.B. No. 2424 — Natural Resource Regulatory Functions
H.B. No. 2422 — Finance Functions
S.B. No. 724 — Health Services Functions
H.B. No. 2420 — General Appropriation Bill
H.B. No. 2426 — General Supplement Appropriation Bill
H.B. No. 1977 — Prescribing Duties, and Budgetary and Spending Limitations and Caps
. The right of the Secretary of Energy to intervene has not been challenged. He appeared in the cause at oral argument presented to a Referee of this Court. As a statutory cabinet officer, the intervenor has an interest in the constitutionality of the challenged legislation because the agencies which he supervises are affected by at least one of the bills. The intervention is allowed. However, because of the prospective operation of the instant opinion, we need not address the constitutionality of the additional twelve bills he challenges. See, discussion and accompanying footnotes, pp. 261-262, infra.
. Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694, 696 (Okla.1991); Phillips v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 577 P.2d 1278, 1281 (Okla.1978).
. The application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for writ of prohibition are transformed into a request for declaratory relief. Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison, 850 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Okla.1993).
. Johnson v. Walters, see note 4 at 697, supra; Knowles, "Enforcing the One-Subject Rule: The Case for a Subject Veto,” 38 Hastings L.Rev. 563, 565 (1987).
. Johnson v. Walters, see note 4, supra; Bond v. Phelps, 200 Okla. 70, 191 P.2d 938, 950 (1948).
. Stewart v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 196 Okla. 675, 168 P.2d 125, 128 (1946); John Deere Plow Co. v. Owens, 194 Okla. 96, 147 P.2d 149, 152 (1943). The subject expressed in the title of an act limits its scope. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 803 P.2d 688, 692 (Okla.1990); Oklahoma City v. Brient, 189 Okla. 163, 114 P.2d 459-60 (1941).
. Not all the cases identify the approach as "functional.” However, the following cases consider approaches similar to the one suggested by the State Officials. They all refer to the inclusion of broad topics under a single legislative enactment. Jurisdictions rejecting a functional approach: State v. Leavins, 599 So.2d 1326, 1334 (Fla.App.1992) (Statute addressing varied subjects relating to environmental resources violated single-subject provision of Florida Constitution.); Clinton v. Taylor, 284 Ark. 238, 681 S.W.2d 338-39 (Ark.1984) (Appropriations for a judicial retirement system and changing a county from one judicial district to another did not constitute bill with unity of subject.).
Jurisdictions appearing to allow a functional approach: Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal.3d 336, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 332, 801 P.2d 1077, 1083 (1990) (Act with subject of criminal justice reform containing provisions relating to crime victims and abrogating judicial decisions concerning criminal rights upheld.); Miller v. Bair, 444 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Iowa 1989) (Legislation did not violate single-subject requirement when common purpose was multifaceted effort to promote economic development. The Iowa court would also allow the Governor to sever a bill into two subjects in order to avoid the single-subject requirement — an approach we rejected in Johnson v. Walters, see note 4 at 698, supra.); Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173, 1180 (1985) (Although the Alaska court expressed concern over the practice of upholding legislation under broad topics, legislation intended to deregulate intrastate air and motor carriers was upheld.); Miller v. PPG Indus., 48 Ohio App.3d 20, 547 N.E.2d 1216-17 (1988) (Statute having common purpose of regulating hazardous waste facilities upheld.).
.In Johnson v. Walters, see note 4, supra, we struck down a budget reconciliation bill in which the provisions were unrelated.
. The prospective application of the instant cause, see discussion pp. 261-262, infra, moots any argument concerning the practical effect of our ruling. In Rogers v. Excise Bd. of Greer County, 701 P.2d 754, 761 (Okla.1984), we recognized that although the decision in a cause was necessary because of the possibility of repetition, the granting of relief was denied. In Rogers, funding for the sheriffs department had been reduced without authority by the Greer County Excise Board. Although we found that the reduction was unauthorized, we denied relief because of the confusion that would have resulted in trying to adjust a prior fiscal year’s budget and because no practical relief could be granted — the sheriff could not hire staff for pri- or fiscal years. Here, monies appropriated and expended may not be recovered. City of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 789 P.2d 1287, 1294 (Okla.1990). See also, Westinghouse Elec. v. Grand River Dam Auth., 720 P.2d 713, 720 (Okla.1986).
. The Okla. Const. art. 5, § 57 provides in pertinent part:
“Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except general appropriation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision of statutes ... Provided, That if any subject be embraced in any act contrary to the provisions of this section, such act shall be void only as to so much of the laws as may not be expressed in the title thereof."
. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 294, 816 P.2d 1309, 1320 (1991).
. The Okla. Const. art. 5, § 57, see note 12, supra.
. The Alaska court expressed the same concerns in Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine, see note 9, supra.
.Johnson v. Walters, see note 4, supra; Bond v. Phelps, see note 7, supra.
. Section 16 of S.B. 142 provides in pertinent part:
"The sum of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (1500,000.00) originally appropriated to the Oklahoma Department of Tourism and Recreation ... is hereby reappropriated and redes-ignated for providing the state match to federal Bureau of Reclamation Matching Fund Program funds_”
. Section 17 of S.B. 142 provides in pertinent part:
"The sum of Thirty Thousand Dollars ... made to the Oklahoma Department of Commerce ... for the purpose of an industrial airpark economic development study is hereby reappropriated to the Oklahoma Department of Tourism and Recreation and redesig-nated for the purpose of matching funds for any grant awarded to South Western Oklahoma Development Authority for the purposes of an industrial airpark economic development study ...”
. Section 20 of S.B. 142 provides in pertinent part:
“Effective July 1, 1992, no additional state parks shall be closed for part of the year without the specific authorization of the Legislature ...”
. Section 23 of S.B. 142 provides:
“The State Regents for Higher Education are authorized to establish an internship program in conjunction with the Department of Tourism and Recreation for students enrolled in an institution of The Oklahoma State System of Higher Education who are pursuing an Associate or Business Administration degree in the area of tourism management.”
.We are not prepared to hold, as the Representatives urge us to do, that the single subject requirement of art. 5, § 56 may.only be met by either the enactment of a general appropriations bill containing multiple subjects or by the passage of individual agency special appropriation bills. See, State Bd. of Ins. v. National Employee Benefit Admin'rs, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex. Ct.App.1990) (Although recognizing the premise that two bills might be so related as to constitute a single subject, the Texas Court found that a bill relating to the administration of an insurance plan and to third-party subscription plans contained multiple subjects.). However, we note the implementation of these methods might be the most efficient avenue for avoiding an art. 5, § 56 attack. Both art. 5, § 56, see note 1, supra, and art. 5, § 57, see note 12, supra, provide that general appropriations bills may contain multiple subjects. These constitutional provisions allow for a single bill to fund state government. The Legislature has used general appropriations bills in the past to accomplish this goal. See, general appropriations bills enacted between 1908 and 1953. The title to Senate Bill 277, enacted by the Second Legislature in 1909, demonstrates the function of the general appropriations bill. It provides:
"An Act to provide the necessary expense of state government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1910 and 1911, and making appropriations therefor from the state treasury of the State of Oklahoma.”
*262We note that in Draper v. State, 621 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Okla.1980), this Court held that the Legislature need not enact a general appropriations bill to accomplish annual funding of state agencies. In Draper, we found H.B. 1140 — a bill containing special appropriations to the State Board of Education for the funding of common schools — to be constitutional. The bill in Draper contained appropriations to a single state agency, concerning a single subject — the common schools.
. City of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, see note 11, supra.
. Movant to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas v. Powers, 839 P.2d 655-56 (Okla.1992).
. Final pleadings were received February 23, 1993.
. Johnson v. Walters, see note 4 at 699, supra; General Motors v. Oklahoma County Bd., 678 P.2d 233, 238-41 (Okla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 909, 104 S.Ct. 1689, 80 L.Ed.2d 163 (1984).
. Although the Representatives expressed some concerns about the constitutionality of the process used by the 43rd Legislature during the legislative process, the formal challenge was not filed until December 16, 1992. At that time, the Bills had been law for approximately five months. The Representatives admit that the challenge was delayed in order to avoid making the challenge a political football during the November elections.
. The State Officials argued that the real parties in interest — heads of State agencies — had not been included in the challenge process, and that the failure to do so was fatal to the Representatives' cause. Because our decision is not effective until the end of the fiscal year, operation of State agencies will not be affected by funding constraints resulting from an adverse ruling. Therefore, we need not address the necessity of naming the heads of the various agencies as parties.
. The Okla. Const. art. 5, § 26 provides in pertinent part;
"The Legislature shall meet in regular session at the seat of government at twelve o’clock noon on the first Monday in February of each year and the regular session shall be finally adjourned sine die not later than five o’clock p.m. on the last Friday in May of each year...."
. McCurtain County Excise Bd. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 340 P.2d 213, 216 (1959); Hines v. Winters, 320 P.2d 1114, 1119 (1957); State ex rel. Ogden v. Hunt, 286 P.2d 1088, 1090-91 (1955).
. The Okla. Const. art. 5, § 56, see note 1, supra.