The accident which gave rise to this action occurred about seven o’clock at night on Christmas Eve, December 24, 1949, at the intersection of East Calhoun Street in the City of Sumter with a track of the defendant Railroad Company. The automobile in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger collided with a Diesel yard engine that was being backed across the street. The plaintiff suffered personal injuries, and instituted this action for damages in the sum of $3,000.00.
It is alleged in the complaint that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff were caused by the negligence, recklessness and wilfulness of the Railroad Company in failing to give *366the statutory signals as required by Section 8377 of the 1942 Code, in failing to keep a proper lookout, in not providing adequate mechanical signals at the crossing, in omitting to provide sufficient lights or other signals thereon to warn the traveling public of the approach of the engine and the danger of the crossing, in failing to provide a watchman at said crossing, and in failing to stop its engine in time to permit the automobile occupied by the plaintiff to proceed across the crossing in order to avoid the collision. These allegations were denied by the defendant, who interposed a defense of gross contributory negligence and wilfulness of the driver of the automobile, which should be imputed to the plaintiff, who was also guilty of gross contributory negligence upon the theory of joint enterprise.
Upon trial, the jury rendered a verdict for the full amount prayed for in the complaint. After the verdict was published, the defendant moved for a judgment non obstante veredicto, or, failing in that, for a new trial upon various grounds. This motion was refused, and the appeal followed.
We first consider whether the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict or to order judgment non obstante veredicto for the appellant on the ground that the plaintiff’s injury was caused not only by the contributory gross negligence of the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding, as a proximate cause, but that her injury was occasioned by her own contributory gross negligence as a proximate cause thereof.
The plaintiff, Carrie Rock, with her two sons, Harmon Rock and Abraham Rock, and her daughter-in-law, Ella Rock, left their home on the East side of the City of Sumter about 6:30 o’clock p. m. to go Christmas shopping, at which time it was dark. They were all riding in a Chevrolet automobile, the joint property of Harmon Rock and his father, Emanuel Rock, the husband of the plaintiff. Harmon Rock was driving the car; his wife, Ella Rock, was on the front seat to his right; the plaintiff, Carrie Rock, was riding on the back seat immediately behind the driver, with *367her son, Abraham Rock, sitting beside her. They proceeded west on Calhoun Street, where the railroad tracks in question are located, and it is admitted that they were all familiar with the railroad crossings in that vicinity.
There are three tracks of the defendant which cross East Calhoun Street on grade; these lay ahead of the Chevrolet car on the route they were following. The first track is the main line running from Sumter to Darlington; the second is a sidetrack adjoining the main line; and 40 or SO feet west there is a curving track which connects the tracks of the defendant with those of the Seaboard Air Line Railway. The defendant’s Diesel switch engine was slowly backing in a northerly direction on this connecting line when it was struck by the automobile. This connecting track crosses East Calhoun Street diagonally.
There are a number of permanent obstructions on both sides along the course followed by the plaintiff and her family as they proceeded west on East Calhoun Street. Calhoun Street is paved 40 feet in width between curb lines; it is a state highway and is heavily traveled. On the south side of the street driving from east to west, there is a large building (Early & Daniel Company), the average distance of which from the sidewalk is 32 feet, and about 30 feet from the main line track. Between the sidetrack and the curved connecting track toward the west, there are two other buildings on the south: one about 90 feet and the other about 98 feet from the sidewalk. On the north side of the street approaching the connecting track from east to west there is first a Negro church known as Bethel; then several dwellings at various distances from the main line; the one closest to the main line being about 11 feet from the street and about 100 feet from the main line track.
On the night in question, the defendant’s train crew was engaged in a shifting movement along its tracks. Just prior to the collision the engine, backing with two box cars attached to its front, first proceeded north along the main line emerging from behind the Early & Daniel Company build*368ing, and crossed East Calhoun Street. The movement proceeded a sufficient distance (about 150 or 200 feet) to clear the switch of the connecting track with the Seaboard north of the crossing. The engine, pushing the box cars ahead of it, then proceeded southward across Calhoun Street on the connecting track, and having cleared the street by about 5 or 6 feet, came to a stop. The two box cars were then uncoupled, and the engine, moving at a very slow rate of speed (estimated at about 2 miles per hour), reversed its direction and again backed north into and across East Calhoun Street, directly in front of the car in which the respondent was riding. The collision followed, with the automobile striking the engine at the rear trucks under the fireman’s seat. Following the collision, the engine was brought to a stop within 5 or 6 feet. The Diesel engine was equipped with a headlight on both front and rear, each of the same intensity; and there is no contradiction in the testimony that both were lighted.
There is a sharp dispute in the evidence as to whether or not signals were given by bell and whistle or by either, and as to flagging at the crossing by members of the train crew. The driver of the automobile testified that he approached the railroad crossing at an estimated speed of from 20 to 30 miles per hour, but slackened his speed before reaching the crossing. He stated, as did the plaintiff, that they were looking, but did not see the engine until almost the instant of the collision, when Harmon Rock put on his brakes.
Jessie Nelson, a witness for the plaintiff, testified, as did other witnesses differently placed, that he was walking toward the crossing near Bethel Church, about 300 feet therefrom, and neither heard the engine bell nor the whistle blow, although he was near enough to the crossing to have heard them. Neither did he see a flagman. He also said that he .saw the engine and the box cars go south across Calhoun Street and disappear in the darkness (presumably behind the Early & Daniel Company building) ; and that the car *369occupied by the plaintiff passed him going toward the crossing while the train was hidden from his sight. That he saw the engine then back north across Calhoun Street just before the collision, when the automobile driver applied his brakes.
The witness Dosia Newberry, testified that at the time the engine crossed the street just prior to the collision, not only was the bell not rung or the whistle blown, but she saw no flagman there. That she started to walk across the crossing, and was almost upon the track when the engine came backing across the street, and that she neither heard nor saw it until it was almost upon her. She also stated, as did the switchman who testified for the defendant, that it was so dark at this crossing she could hardly see.
It is stressed by the defendant that there are two street lights on East Calhoun Street: one to the east 320 feet away from the crossing, near Bethel Church, and the other to the west 245 feet from the crossing. The inference may be drawn from the evidence, however, that these street lights afforded very little if any illumination at the crossing. It must also be borne in mind, as it relates to the alleged negligence or contributory gross negligence of the driver of the automobile and of the plaintiff, that the Diesel engine was only 5 or 6 feet to the south of East Calhoun Street when it slowly commenced its backward movement. Witnesses for the defendant said that it was so slow in its movement backward that it was merely creeping along. It may be inferred, therefore, that one approaching the tracks from the east had very little light, if any, at the crossing, except the headlight on the rear of the Diesel engine which was approaching this crossing diagonally on the curved connecting line.
Evidently this headlight must have thrown its rays far ahead and above the crossing. Then, too, the movement of the engine as it proceeded backward, was so slow that it could well have gone unnoticed by the driver of the Chevrolet automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger. This is particularly true when it is -remembered that this *370engine had headlights fore and aft. The driver of the car and the plaintiff both testified that they did not see this engine, and in our opinion under the circumstances here stated, the question as to their negligence or contributory willfullness, and that of the defendant, should have been passed upon by the jury.
This being a motion for a directed verdict, it will be assumed, although the testimony is in conflict, that the statutory crossing signals were not given, and that the railroad company was guilty of negligence per se by failing to blow the whistle or ring the bell. Also, in recognition of the familiar rule, in considering whether a motion for a directed verdict should have been granted against the plaintiff, the testimony and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, must be taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Under the specific terms of the signal statute, the common-law defense is eliminated from our consideration. The statute, Section 8377, 1942 Code, provides that if the failure to give the specified signals contributes to the injury, liability for all damages caused by the collision is imposed on the railroad company, unless, in addition to a mere want of ordinary care, the person injured, or the person having charge of his person or property, was at the time of the collision guilty of gross or willful negligence or unlawful act, and that such gross wilful negligence or unlawful act contributed to the injury. Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 196 S. C. 230, 13 S. E. (2d) 1, 133 A. L. R. 1144. And see the many cases cited in the opinion.
It appears to us that in approaching the railroad and entering upon its tracks, the evidence permits the reasonable inference that the driver of the automobile and his mother, the plaintiff, sitting on the back seat behind him, exercised as much diligence as an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the circumstances, having regard for their own safety and fairly endeavoring to perform their *371duty. The failure to give the statutory signals was not only negligence per se and a violation of a statutory duty on the part of the defendant, but this omission, and other negligence shown in the absence of a flagman at the crossing, also bears upon the conduct of the driver and the plaintiff, and must affect any estimate of the amount of care they should have observed. Ordinarily, such questions are for the jury.
It may be inferred from the evidence that the driver of ’the car slackened his speed as he approached the crossing; and in our opinion it was a question for the jury as to whether or not he exercised only slight care. We repeat, whether under the circumstances which confronted the driver of the Chevrolet and the plaintiff, they were guilty of gross or wilful negligence, was a question which the jury alone could determine. Upon the conclusion of all of the testimony, the jury visited the scene. We cannot say as a matter of law that the driver or the plaintiff was guilty of negligence or contributory negligence amounting to willfullness or wantonness.
We likewise think the inference may reasonably be drawn, in view of the circumstances, that if the driver of the Chevrolet saw the engine he could have reached the conclusion that the engine, with electric lights on both ends, was either standing still or moving forward, because its backward movement wa's almost too slow to be observable.
As was stated in Bishop v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 213 S. C. 125, 48 S. E. (2d) 620, 625:
“It is true that extra precautions are frequently required to protect the traveling public when a locomotive or train is being backed over a crossing. This would be particularly true at a crossing in a populous city or village, or where there are obstructions to the view or the train is backing at night, or where a train standing near a crossing is suddenly backed, or where the circumstances are such as to deceive or mislead á traveler and throw him off guard.”
*372The same principle is announced in Smith v. Southern Ry. Co., Carolina Div., 207 S. C. 179, 35 S. E. (2d) 225, 228, where it is said:
“Independently of any statutory requirement, ‘it is the common-law duty of the railroad company to give such signals as may be reasonably sufficient, in view of the situation and surroundings, “to put individuals using the highway on their guard” ’ ” Chisolm v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 121 S. C. 394, 114 S. E. 500, 35 A. L. R. 637.
The record shows that there were no automatic signal lights at this crossing. The only signal to an approaching traveler was the usual “Railroad Crossing” cross arm warning sign.
As bearing upon the alleged negligence of the driver of the Chevrolet and the plaintiff, we also call attention to Section 8355 of the 1942 Code, which provides that a bell of at least 30 pounds weight shall be placed on each locomotive, to be rung for at least 30 seconds before such engine, if it be standing still within less distance than 100 rods of the crossing, shall be moved.
In our opinion, the motion for a directed verdict was properly overruled.
The defendant advances as a defense, the doctrine of common enterprise. Error is assigned because the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict or order judgment non obstante veredicto for the defendant on the ground that on the occasion in question the plaintiff had the authority to direct and control the actions of the driver of the car in which she was a pasenger or guest. It is argued that this being true, the negligence of the driver can be imputed to the plaintiff. This assignment has to do with common-law negligence.
We have already adverted to the fact that the Chevrolet automobile was owned by Harmon Rock, the driver, and his father, Emanuel Rock, who was not in the automobile. The record shows that this shopping trip which the plaintif *373and her children were headed for was a family affair, and there is no evidence from which we may declare as a matter of law that the plaintiff either assumed to the driver the relation of master or superior, or had the control or direction of the automobile. The gross negligence, recklessness, etc., ii any, of the driver, should not be imputed to the plaintiff, who, the evidence shows, was a guest or passenger. The rule is clearly stated in Padgett v. Southern Ry. Co., 219 S. C. 353, 65 S. E. (2d) 297, 298, quoting from 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles, Sec. 501, page 786:
“The general principle applicable to a joint enterprise, which has the support of the greater weight of authority and the approval of this Court, is as follows: * *. In order to constitute a joint enterprise so that the negligence of the driver of an automobile may be imputed to an occupant of the car, it is generally held that there must be a common purpose and a community of interest in the object of the enterprise and an equal right to direct and control the conduct of each other with respect thereto. In other words, the passenger, as well as the driver, must be entitled to a voice in the control and direction of the vehicle. There must be a community in the object and purpose of the undertaking and an equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other in respect thereof. Each must have the control of the means or agencies employed to prosecute the common purpose. * * *’ ” See also Funderburk v. Powell, 181 S. C. 412, 187 S. E. 742, and Long v. Carolina Baking Co., 190 S. C. 367, 3 S. E. (2d) 46.
The testimony, which we need not state in detail, might support the inference that there was a community of object and purpose on the part of the plaintiff and her traveling companions, but it falls far short of establishing as a matter of law that she had an equal right with the driver to direct and govern the movements of the automobile, or any control over it. It was merely the ordinary social and domestic relationship, when a son, who owns an automobile or is part owner thereof, takes the mem*374bers of his family on a shopping tour. But ordinarily this carries no inference that his passengers have any right to direct and govern the movements of the automobile. The lower court committed no error in submitting this issue to lhe jury.
Error is assigned upon the ground that the trial judge charged, in accordance with respondent’s request, the doctrine of last clear chance, or as it is sometimes called, the humanitarian doctrine.
The cab of this Diesel engine was glass enclosed, and located on the rear of the engine. When the engineer started the last backward motion to the north, the rear of the engine — which was its front in this movement' — being 5 or 6 feet to the south of the street, he revolved around on his swivel stool so that he could face the direction in which he was going. He testified that as he approached the street, he looked to the east and saw two headlights quite a distance down the street. He looked again, and the headlights had approached nearer, and he realized that it was an automobile. He had then reached the center line of the street.
The sum and substance of the engineer’s testimony is to the effect, in our opinion, that he had no reason to believe that the automobile would fail to stop until almost the instant of collision, when he blew the cattle alarm and applied the brakes. When the brakes were applied, the engine stopped within 5 or 6 feet. The testimony of the flagman is practically to the same effect, and they both testified, — engineer and flagman — that the bell never ceased ringing during the entire movement of the engine. The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the engineer’s testimony, when taken as a whole, and not isolated portions thereof, is that he had the crossing blocked before he had any reason to believe that the automobile was not going to stop.
We do not think that the testimony is susceptible of the inference that the engineer, the fireman, or any members of the crew could by the- exercise of reasonable care, have rea*375lized the perilous situation of plaintiff at a time when a collision' could have been avoided. Under the evidence, all had the right to assume that the automobile would be brought to a stop at a place of safety.
As was stated in Melton v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 206 S. C. 251, 27 S. E. (2d) 490, 492:
“The employees of a railroad company have the right to assume, unless the contrary appears, that a person approaching the track is in possession of his faculties, and will use his senses of sight and hearing; and that he will stop in a place of safety. A railroad company is not required to slacken the speed of its train upon seeing a person approaching the track, unless the circumstances indicate that he does not or cannot see the train. However, if it appears to the engineer that such a person is in a position of danger and does not see the train it may become the duty of the company in certain circumstances and in the exercise of due care to make all reasonable efforts to slacken speed or stop the train. Mack v. South Bound Railroad Company, 52 S. C. 323, 29 S. E. 905, 40 L. R. A. 679, 68 Am. St. Rep. 913; Fletcher v. South Carolina, etc. Railroad Company, 57 S. C. 205, 35 S. E. 513; Gosa v. Southern Railway Company, 67 S. C. 347, 45 S. E. 810; Lee v. Northwestern Railroad Company, 89 S. C. 274, 71 S. E. 840; 52 C. J. 253.”
The same rule is announced in Seay v. Southern Railway Carolina Division, 205 S. C. 162, 31 S. E. (2d) 133.
This is not a case of one on a track in an easily observable helpless condition or one, who approaching a railroad crossing was making frantic efforts to stop, and those in charge of a train, by exercising ordinary care, could have discovered the driver’s perilous position in time to have avoided the accident. The principles laid down in Bishop v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 213 S. C. 125, 48 S. E. (2d) 620, have a strong application here..
There is no evidence that the plaintiff or the driver of the automobile were not 'in full possession of their senses of *376sight and hearing; no evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the plaintiff and the driver were in an evidently perilous position, and therefore the appellant, its agents and servants, had the right to assume that the plaintiff and the driver would use their senses of sight and hearing and stop in a place of safety. When it was apparent that the automobile was not going to stop, the engine had then practically blocked the street, at which time the emergency brakes were applied, and it was promptly stopped.
As was stated in Bishop v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 213 S. C. 125, 48 S. E. (2d) 620, 627:
“We have assumed in this discussion that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to permit a recovery on the theory just discussed. The correctness of this assumption is open to serious question. It is alleged in the complaint that the respondents failed to keep a reasonable and careful lookout. It is not alleged that the decedent was in a position of peril which should have been discovered by respondents in time to have avoided injuring him. The allegation that respondents neglected to keep a proper lookout tends to negative the thought that they discovered the decedent in a perilous position. See Hemmer v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 24 Tenn. App. 42, 139 S. W. (2d) 698; Cleveland Railway Co. v. Masterson, 126 Ohio St. 42, 183 N. E. 873, 92 A. L. R. 15; 38 Am. Jur., page 960.”
The foregoing observation is likewise applicable here. It is charged in the complaint in the current case that the defendant failed to keep a reasonable lookout, and was negligent in failing to stop its engine in time to permit the automobile operated by Harmon Rock, the driver, to proceed over the crossing ■ without colliding with the engine. It is not alleged that the plaintiff was in a position of peril which should have been discovered by defendant in time to avoid injuring plaintiff. But irrespective of this, certainly the allegation that the defendant neglected to keep a proper lookout tends to negative the thought that the train crew discovered plaintiff in a perilous position.
*377In our opinion, the court committed error in charging the humanitarian doctrine. For this reason, the judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted.
The foregoing opinion, on petition for rehearing, is substituted for the former opinion, which is withdrawn.
Judgment reversed.
Stukes and Oxner, JJ., concur. Baker, C. J., concurs in part and dissents in part. Taylor, J., dissents in part.